Lockwood v. Bassett

• Decision Date: 05 January 1883
• Citation: 49 Mich. 546,14 N.W. 492
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: LOCKWOOD v. BASSETT and another.

14 N.W. 492

49 Mich. 546

LOCKWOOD v. BASSETT and another.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 5, 1883

B. and his wife, the defendant, executed a deed of certain land owned by B., leaving the name of the grantee blank, and defendant, with whom the deed was left to use for her personal benefit, filled in the name of her brother as grantee and delivered the deed to him to hold the property for her, and he paid her upon delivery $8,000, which was used in paying off incumbrances on the land. B. conveyed his interest in the land to defendant, and upon the death of her brother his administrator filed a bill to subject the land to a lien in the nature of a mortgage for the money paid to defendant. Held, that the lien was valid and should be enforced.

Appeal from Wayne.

Aikman & Walker and C.J. Walker, for defendants.

COOLEY, J.

The complainant, as administrator of Chauncy M. Lockwood, claims a lien in the nature of a mortgage under a deed given by the defendant Sarah M. Bassett and Henry Bassett, her husband, to the intestate of certain lands the title to which at the date of the deed was in the husband. The lien which is claimed is for the sum of $8,000 which it is conceded by the defense was had by Mrs. Bassett from the intestate, who was her brother. But Mrs. Bassett insists that the money was a gift to her from the intestate; and the case, so far as it rests upon the facts, turns mainly upon this claim of gift. But she also claims that the deed, when executed and acknowledged by the husband, contained no name of a grantee, and that the name of the intestate was afterwards inserted and the deed delivered without the husband's consent. This being so it is argued that the deed is inoperative for any purpose. This statement sufficiently indicates the issues. Henry Bassett has since conveyed to his wife any interest he may have had in the lands, so that his rights are no longer in question.

We have carefully searched the record of the case for evidence of the gift Mrs. Bassett relies upon, and are forced to the conclusion that it is not proved. Discarding such of her own evidence as is incompetent, because relating to facts which if they existed, must have been equally within the knowledge of the intestate, we find nothing of a satisfactory character to support the defense. We think it fails entirely.

It remains to be seen whether the lien which is relied upon by the complainant can be supported, in view of the undoubted fact that the deed, when executed by Henry Bassett, contained no name of grantee. The facts as we think are that Bassett executed the deed in that form and delivered it to his wife in order that she might thereby be enabled to dispose of the land in her own interest, and that she subsequently had the name of Chauncy M. Lockwood inserted as grantee and delivered it to him. Whether the delivery was expressly made by way of pledge, for the money obtained, is not so certain, but it is shown without dispute that Chauncy was to hold the land for his sister, and the payment of the money by him was the occasion and the inducement for the delivery of the deed.

Many cases hold that a deed executed and delivered with a necessary part left in blank is ineffectual as a conveyance though afterwards the blank is filled. Hibblewhite v McMorine, 6 Mees. & W. 200; U.S. v. Nelson, 2 Brock. 64; Chase v. Palmer, 29 Ill. 206; Whitlake v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381; Williams v Crutcher, 6 Miss. 71; Davenport v. Sleight, 5 Dev. &amp B. 381; Cross v. State Bank, 5 Ark. 525; Viser v. Rice, 33 Tex. 139; Heath v. Nash, 50 Me. 378; Wunderlin v. Cadazan, 50 Cal. 613; Burnes v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305; Ingram v. Little, 14 Ga. 73; Lindsley v. Lamb, 34 Mich. 509. But other cases hold that if the filling of the blank is by express authorization of the grantor, this is sufficient, even though the authority is by parol. Ex parte Kirwan, 8 Cow. 118; Vleet v. Camp, 13 Wis. 198; Van Etter v. Evensom, 28 Wis. 33; Schurtz v. McManamy, 33 Wis. 299; Ragsdale v. Robinson, 48 Tex. 379; Pence v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn. 417; Field v. Stagg, 52 Mo. 534.

In Iowa where there are like decisions importance is attached to the fact that the statute does not make a seal essential to a deed. Swartz v. Ballou, 49 Iowa, 188; McClain v McClain, 52 Iowa, 274; [S.C. 3 N.W. 60.] In this state the statute...