Pence v. Arbuckle

• Decision Date: 18 March 1876
• Citation: 22 Minn. 417
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: SYLVESTER PENCE <I>vs.</I> SAMUEL C. ARBUCKLE.

22 Minn. 417

SYLVESTER PENCE vs. SAMUEL C. ARBUCKLE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 18, 1876.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the court of common pleas of Ramsey county, refusing a new trial, after a trial before Brill, J., and a jury.

John B. & W. H. Sanborn, for appellant.

Henry J. Horn, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

Ejectment to recover a lot in the city of St. Paul. The complaint is in the usual form. The answer puts in issue the allegations of the complaint, and alleges new matter. On the trial the following facts were admitted, to wit:

In the month of August, 1857, the plaintiff, being the owner of the lot in question, delivered to Oscar Stephenson, in St. Paul, a blank form of warranty deed, containing all the usual printed matter contained in printed warranty deeds, signed by plaintiff and wife, and acknowledged by them in due form of law as their act and deed, before a proper officer, who certified to the same under his official signature and seal, the certificate being dated August 24, 1857. The names and residences of the parties, the description of the property to be conveyed, the consideration to be paid, and the date of the deed, were at that time left blank. The instrument was delivered by plaintiff to Stephenson to enable the latter to sell the lot as agent for plaintiff, and, by filling up the blanks and delivering the instrument, to convey to the purchaser.

In the latter part of 1861 Stephenson filled up the blanks, inserting his own name as grantee, and the sum of $500.00 as the consideration, and the date as August 24, 1857 — the same as the certificate. In 1862 Stephenson sold the lot to John Kenkle for $275.00, and executed to him a deed of the same. Kenkle was ignorant of the facts in reference to the instrument delivered by plaintiff to Stephenson, and relied upon that instrument as a valid deed of the plaintiff. That instrument and the deed from Stephenson to Kenkle were thereupon properly recorded. In 1865 Kenkle conveyed to defendant, who purchased for a valuable consideration and in good faith, and without any knowledge or notice of the manner of the execution of the deed from plaintiff to Stephenson, or that the same had not been fully filled up and completed in all parts before execution by plaintiff; and, in making his purchase and accepting the conveyance to him, the defendant relied upon the deed from plaintiff to Stephenson and the record thereof. Upon executing his deed to Kenkle, Stephenson delivered possession of the lot to him, and he delivered such possession to defendant upon making the conveyance to him.

From 1857 till after the delivery of the deed to Kenkle the plaintiff was a citizen of Virginia, and Stephenson and Kenkle citizens of Minnesota.

These facts being admitted, each party introduced some evidence which, in the view we take of the rights of the parties on the admitted facts, was of no importance, and, the parties having rested, the court instructed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, which they did, and a motion for a new trial having been refused, the plaintiff appeals to this court.

In the transaction in 1857 — the execution and acknowledgment of the blank deed — both plaintiff and Stephenson seem to have understood that the latter could, under plaintiff's parol authority, fill up the blanks, and, by delivering it, make it the valid deed of the plaintiff. The blank deed was delivered to Stephenson for that purpose.

There is no little conflict in the decisions on the question whether an agent may be authorized by parol to fill up a deed which is ineffectual by reason of blanks left in it when it passes out of the hands of the maker; but this plaintiff is not in a position to raise that question, for, on the admitted facts, he is estopped, as to this defendant, to deny that the deed to Stephenson is his lawful deed.

An estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts or representations, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally, or through...