Lockwood v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 02 October 1984
• Citation: 206 Cal.Rptr. 785,160 Cal.App.3d 667
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Sandra Sue LOCKWOOD et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, County of Santa Clara, Respondent, PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. A026767.

Page 785

206 Cal.Rptr. 785

160 Cal.App.3d 667

Sandra Sue LOCKWOOD et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT, County of Santa Clara, Respondent PEOPLE of the State of California, Real Party in Interest.

A026767.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

Oct. 2, 1984.

Hearing Denied Dec. 13, 1984.

John M. Wadsworth, Gregory H. Saldivar, Baker, Brauer, Saldivar & Postelle, San Jose, for petitioners.

Leo Himmelsbach, Dist. Atty., Lane J. Liroff, Deputy Dist. Atty., San Jose, for real party in interest.

HANING, Associate Judge.

Sandra Sue Lockwood and Timothy Raymond Lockwood were accused by information of felony child abuse (Pen.Code, § 273a, subd. (1)) allegedly inflicted upon their young son. A juvenile court dismissed a dependency petition (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 300 et seq.) based on the same facts, and the Lockwoods moved to dismiss the criminal proceedings on the ground of collateral estoppel. Their motion was denied; this petition for an extraordinary writ followed. We issued an alternative writ of prohibition. We conclude that the Lockwoods' position has merit and that a peremptory writ of prohibition should issue.

The Lockwoods' son, then 11 months old, was brought to a hospital with a spiral fracture of his thigh bone. X-rays disclosed what could have been older, healing fractures of bones in both arms, and there signs of burns on the child's arm and ankle. The Lockwoods initially stated that they had found the child injured in his crib, but later acknowledged that they had "grabbed the child by the limbs and jerked him in order to correct him from doing a behavior that they didn't go along with," and Mr. Lockwood stated that "he may have been too rough" but "that he's never tried or purposefully tried to hurt the child."

The juvenile probation department promptly filed a dependency petition, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d), which alleged the described injuries "for which the parents have no reasonable explanation; therefore, said minor ... resides within a home which is an unfit place for him by reason of cruelty."

Police then filed a felony complaint which alleged a violation by both parents of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (1), in that "[t]he said defendant(s) under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, did wilfully cause and permit [the child] to suffer and did inflict on said child unjustifiable physical and mental pain, and while having the care and custody of said child, did wilfully cause and permit the person and health of said child to be injured, and did wilfully cause and permit said child to be placed in such situation that its person and health was endangered."

The dependency petition came to hearing first. There was a conflict of expert testimony as to the probable cause of the child's injuries: The doctors who initially saw him suspected child abuse; a doctor called on behalf of the Lockwoods testified that the empirical evidence was consistent with accident and disease.

The juvenile court ordered the dependency petition dismissed, expressly finding "that the major injury to the leg is not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence to have been an abuse" and that it could not conclude that "whatever is going on" in the child's arms "is ... the result of an abuse by these parents." In essence the court resolved the evidentiary conflict against the allegations of the petition.

At preliminary examination the Lockwoods asserted but the magistrate rejected a collateral estoppel defense; the Lockwoods were held to answer and an information was filed. In respondent court the Lockwoods made a nonstatutory motion to dismiss the information on the collateral estoppel ground. A hearing was conducted at which the head of the district attorney's juvenile bureau gave narrative testimony as to the nature of dependency proceedings and the district attorney's role in them. The Lockwoods' motion was denied; this writ petition followed.

Preliminarily the People argue that because the Lockwoods' collateral estoppel motion was not made until more than 60 days after they were arraigned, the Lockwoods are precluded by Penal Code section 1510 from obtaining pretrial review in this court. On its face section 1510 applies only to "[t]he denial of a motion made pursuant to [Penal Code] Section 995 or 1538.5 ...." The People concede that the Lockwoods' motion was nonstatutory (cf. Murgia v Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286, 293-294 fn. 4, 124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44; People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 474 fn. 3, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321; People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 968 fn. 9, 140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382), but argue that section 1510 should be construed to apply to all pretrial defense motions. We find the People's argument unpersuasive. Even were we inclined to do so we would not be empowered to rewrite the plain language of section 1510.

On the merits, the rulings below appear to have misconstrued the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is an aspect of but by no means coextensive with the broader concept of res judicata. (Cf. Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 874, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098; 4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, §§ 197, 222, pp. 3335, 3357.) Where res judicata operates to prevent relitigation of a cause of action once adjudicated, collateral estoppel operates (in the second of two actions which do not involve identical causes of action) to obviate the need to relitigate issues already adjudicated in the first action. (Cf. generally 4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure, supra, Judgment, §§ 147, 148, 197, pp. 3292-3294, 3335-3336.) The purposes of the doctrine are said to be "to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation, to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system, [and] to protect against vexatious litigation." (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co., supra, at p. 875, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098; cf. People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 488-489, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) Obviously, for the collateral estoppel doctrine to apply the issue must have been adjudicated in the first action; the cases and texts agree that there are three additional prerequisites: (1) The issue in the second action must be identical to the issue adjudicated in the first action; (2) the first action must have proceeded to a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the collateral estoppel is to be asserted must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the first action. (People v. Sims, supra, at p. 484, 186...