Lodge v. Bern

Citation328 Mass. 42,101 N.E.2d 748
PartiesLODGE v. BERN et al.
Decision Date05 November 1951
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

M. Michelson, Boston, for plaintiff.

S. P. Sears, Boston, J. L. Lyman, Boston, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILKINS, WILLIAMS and COUNIHAN, JJ.

QUA, Chief Justice.

This bill is brought against Irene Bern and the Great American Indemnity Company, hereinafter called the insurer, to reach and apply the obligation of the insurer on a liability policy covering an automobile owned by Bern to the payment of a judgment for $20,000 and costs recovered in the United States District Court by the plaintiff against Bern as compensation for bodily injury suffered by the plaintiff on February 1, 1947, in an accident in which Bern's automobile was involved on a public way of this Commonwealth. G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 113; c. 214, § 3(10).

The limit of liability in the policy for injury to each person was $25,000. One of the 'Exclusions' of the policy provided in substance that so much of the coverage as exceeded the $5,000 for the compulsory portion of the policy required by G. L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 1A, as amended, and defined in section 34A, as appearing in part in St.1935, c. 459, § 2, should not apply 'while the motor vehicle is used as a public or livery conveyance * * *,' and it was stated in the 'Declarations' that the purposes for which the vehicle was to be used were 'Pleasure Use.' General Laws (Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 113A, contains a provision forbidding exceptions or exclusions from the compulsory coverage as to specified accidents, but this provision had no application to the coverage in excess of the required $5,000. In the Superior Court the trial judge entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of the compulsory coverage and costs. The plaintiff appeals, contending that the decree should have been for the entire amount of the judgment.

The hearing took the form of statements by counsel to which opposing counsel assented. In substance the following facts were thus developed or could have been inferred: The injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of one Lipinski in driving the automobile owned by Bern and registered in her name. Lipinski, who was present at the hearing, would testify, as he had testified in the United States District Court, that he had obtained the automobile 'as a rental vehicle for a money consideration from the Bern's Driverself System, a concern that operated a rental auto service.' He had signed a printed form of 'rental agreement' requiring him to return by a certain hour. It was agreed that at the trial of the original cause in the United States District Court the only evidence 'of agency or legal responsibility on the part of the defendant Irene Bern in connection with the operation of the vehicle by Lipinski at the time of the accident was through Chapter 231, Section 85A of the General Laws * * *.' That section provides in part that registration of a motor vehicle in the name of a defendant as owner shall be prima facie evidence that it was being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the defendant was legally responsible. Nothing further than as hereinbefore stated appeared as to the course of the trial in the United States District Court.

The insurer contends that these facts show that as to all coverage above the compulsory amount the case falls within the exclusion relative to the use of the vehicle as a livery conveyance, and also that such use was in violation of the provision in the 'Declarations' that the use of the vehicle would be pleasure use. The plaintiff insists that the insurer cannot be permitted to put forward either of these propositions in the present suit because it must have been decided in the United States District Court as one of the bases of the judgment against Bern that Lipinski was operating as the...

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7 cases
  • Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • March 26, 1991
    ...v. Frew, 318 Mass. 595, 597, 63 N.E.2d 350 (1945); Saragan v. Bousquet, 322 Mass. 14, 20, 75 N.E.2d 649 (1947); Lodge v. Bern, 328 Mass. 42, 45, 101 N.E.2d 748 (1951). It argues, therefore, that to require indemnification of the settlement amount without a specific judicial finding placing ......
  • Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gamache
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • April 3, 1997
    ...to that judgment. See Miller v. United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 448-449, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); Lodge v. Bern, 328 Mass. 42, 44-45, 101 N.E.2d 748 (1951). ...
  • Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
    • December 14, 2012
    ...insured in an action on the policy.” Miller v. U.S. Fid. & Cas. Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75, 77 (1935); accord Lodge v. Bern, 328 Mass. 42, 101 N.E.2d 748, 749 (1951); see Gamache, 675 N.E.2d at 444 n. 10. 6. The relevant evidence in Blanchard suggested that Paul had a motive to dissemb......
  • CSX Transp. Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
    • July 27, 2011
    ...facts established, it is not barred from subsequently challenging issues not determined in the original action. See Lodge v. Bern, 328 Mass. 42, 45 (1951); Sweeney v. Frew, 318 Mass. 595, 597 (1945). 2. Application The parties do not dispute that CSX notified MBTA of the estate's claims and......
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