Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1983
• Citation: 195 Cal.Rptr. 576,147 Cal.App.3d 1071
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 13 Ed. Law Rep. 1021 Ray E. LOEHR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VENTURA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST., et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 67996.

Page 576

195 Cal.Rptr. 576

147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 13 Ed. Law Rep. 1021

Ray E. LOEHR, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. VENTURA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DIST., et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 67996.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Oct. 13, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1983.

Hearing Denied Jan. 18, 1984.

Parker and Covert by Spencer E. Covert, Jr., and Margaret A. Chidester, Santa Ana, for plaintiff and appellant.

Musick, Peeler & Garrett by Stuart W. Rudnick, P.C., Thomas E. Hill, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents Ventura County Community College District.

Liebert, Cassidy & Frierson by Larry J. Frierson, Melanie M. Poturica, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent Ely.

Drescher, McConica & Young by Philip C. Drescher, P.C., John R. McConica, II, Ventura, for defendant and respondent Stone.

COMPTON, Acting Presiding Justice.

Some two years after being discharged by the Board of Trustees of the Ventura Community College District from his position as Superintendent and Chief Executive Officer of the District, plaintiff Ray E. Loehr instituted this action seeking both damages for his alleged wrongful termination and reinstatement. Defendants ¹ demurred generally to the complaint alleging that it was barred by various statutes of limitation and, more particularly, by plaintiff's failure to comply with the filing provisions of the California Tort Claims Act (Gov.Code, § 900 et seq.). The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. (Code Civ.Proc., § 581(3).) This appeal follows.

The applicable rules of appellate review need little discussion.

We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. The allegations of the complaint and attached exhibits therefor must be accepted as true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241; Collier v. City of Pasadena (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 917, 920, fn. 1, 191 Cal.Rptr. 681; Baldwin v. Zoradi (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 275, 279, 176 Cal.Rptr. 809.) Unless clear error or abuse of discretion is demonstrated, however, the trial court's judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of a demurrer will be affirmed on appeal. (Owens v. Foundation for Ocean Research (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 179, 182, 165 Cal.Rptr. 571; see generally Longshore v. County of Ventura (1979) 25 Cal.3d 14, 21, 157 Cal.Rptr. 706, 598 P.2d 866.)

Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the pertinent law, we are convinced that the trial court correctly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action. The judgment must therefore be affirmed.

The complaint, filed in April 1982, asserts six causes of action, each arising out of the Board of Trustee's alleged wrongful termination of plaintiff's employment contract almost three years before its expiration. The pleading thus included claims for breach of contract, tortious breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conspiracy and failure to prevent conspiracy to wrongfully interfere with a business relationship and to induce breach of contract, writ of mandate and injunctive relief regarding common law principles of fair procedure and substantive due process, writ of mandate and injunctive relief regarding violation of Education Code section 87031, and defamation.

In substance the complaint alleged that on May 5, 1980, the Board, by vote of three to two, discharged plaintiff for purported malfeasance and misfeasance in office. One week later, May 12, 1980, plaintiff requested in writing that the Board reconsider its action and reinstate him to his former position.

The request was subsequently rejected and, on June 3, 1980, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court against the District, the Board, and three individual trustees for damages and injunctive relief under the federal Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C., § 1983). A preliminary injunction reinstating plaintiff as superintendent was granted the following month. In November 1980, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the operation of the injunction pending resolution of defendants' appeal of the order. Approximately one year later, in October 1981, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the District Court, vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the matter for further proceedings on the merits.

On November 19, 1981, while his federal action was still pending, plaintiff, in an attempt to comply with the requirements of the Tort Claims Act, filed a claim with the District for $1 million in compensatory damages, $1.2 million in special damages, and a total of over $2.5 million in exemplary damages from the individual trustees.

Following the Board's timely rejection of his demand, plaintiff sought to amend his action in federal court to add, inter alia, pendent state claims for writ of mandate, breach of contract, wrongful inducement of breach of contract, and defamation. Less than one week after denial of his motion to amend, plaintiff filed his combined complaint for damages and petition for extraordinary relief in state court. ²

The trial court's ruling sustaining defendants' demurrer was based in substantial part upon the notice of claim requirements of Government Code sections 905 and 945.4. These provisions of the Tort Claims Act require, as a condition precedent to bringing suit for "money or damages" against a local public entity, the timely presentation to the defendant of a written claim and the rejection of that claim in whole or in part.

If the claim is for injury "to person or to personal property or growing crops," the claim must be presented within 100 days after the accrual of the cause of action; if the claim is for injury of any other sort it must be presented within one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov.Code, § 911.2.) For purposes of calculating these time limits, the date on which an action accrues is the date upon which it would be deemed to have accrued under the applicable statute of limitations. (Gov.Code, § 901.) As a general rule, the date of accrual is the date the plaintiff incurred injury as a result of the defendant's alleged wrongful act or omission. (See Los Angeles City Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 459, 467, 88 Cal.Rptr. 286; Mosesian v. County of Fresno (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 493, 500, 104 Cal.Rptr. 655; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Actions, § 263, p. 1116.)

On appeal from the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff first contends that most, if not all, of the causes of action alleged in the complaint were not subject to the requirements of the Tort Claims Act. Arguing in the alternative, he next asserts that even if the Act did apply, the time limitations in which a claim against a governmental entity must be filed were tolled by virtue of his federal court litigation. In any event, plaintiff lastly maintains that his written request for reinstatement lodged with the District in May 1980, and his formal demand for damages in November 1981, satisfied any duty he may have had to submit a timely claim before initiating his state court action. Each of these arguments were, of course, made and expressly rejected at the trial court level.

Turning first to plaintiff's initial contention, we think it clear that each cause of action asserted in the complaint, regardless of how entitled or denominated, falls within the purview of the Tort Claims Act and thus required the filing of a timely claim as a prerequisite to the bringing of the instant action.

By its own terms, the filing requirements of the statute extend only to actions for "money or damages." (Gov.Code, §§ 905, 905.2.) Although this term is not defined in the Act, it is comprehensive in scope and includes tort claims arising out of negligence, nuisance, breach of statutory duties, and intentional wrongs. (See Van Alystyne, California Government Tort Liability Practice, §§ 5.7, 5.13 (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980), and cases cited therein.) Actions for breach of contract also fall within the scope of claims for "money or damages." (See Baillargeon v. Department of Water & Power (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 670, 138 Cal.Rptr. 338; Voth v. Wasco Public Util. Dist. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 353, 128 Cal.Rptr. 608; Myers v. County of Orange (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 626, 86 Cal.Rptr. 198.)

Plaintiff's reliance on E.H. Morrill Company v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787, 793, 56 Cal.Rptr. 479, 423 P.2d 551, and Longshore v. County of Ventura, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 22, 157 Cal.Rptr. 706, 598 P.2d 866, for the proposition that actions arising out of contract are immune from the claims-presentation statutes is sorely misplaced. Although Government Code section 814 provides an exemption from the immunity provisions of the Act (See Gov.Code, §§ 815-895.6) for actions predicated on breach of contract, this exemption is totally unrelated to the filing requirements set forth in sections 900 et seq. Even a cursory review of the Legislative Committee's Comment to Government Code section 814 ³ makes it obvious that the Legislature never intended this statute to exempt contract actions from the claims provisions of the Act. Such requirements allow the governmental entity an opportunity to settle claims before suit is brought, permit an early investigation of the facts, facilitate fiscal planning for potential liabilities, and help avoid similar liabilities in the future. (Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 575, 581, 121 Cal.Rptr. 842.) The purposes served by the Act clearly apply whether an underlying action sounds in tort or contract.

In their briefs both parties argue at considerable length whether the various causes of actions asserted in plaintiff's complaint sound in tort or contract. In light of our...