Loescher v. Cnty. of Plumas
| Decision Date | 18 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-cv-1984-KJM-KJN,2:19-cv-1984-KJM-KJN |
| Parties | LYNNE LOESCHER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF PLUMAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Defendants County of Plumas ("County") and Plumas County Sheriff Greg Hagwood ("Sheriff Hagwood") move to dismiss plaintiff Lynne Loescher's claims. Mot. to Dismiss ("MTD"), ECF No. 16, at 1. Plaintiff filed an opposition. Opp'n, ECF No. 24. Defendants replied. Reply, ECF No. 26. The court heard oral argument, held by videoconference, on June 26, 2020, with Larry Baumbach appearing for plaintiff, Shanan Hewitt appearing for the County and Sheriff Hagwood, and James Walter appearing for defendant California Highway Patrol Officer Macloud Lutney ("Officer Luntey"). Hr'g Min., ECF No. 27. For the reasons below, the court GRANTS defendants' motion to dismiss.
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On or about August 30, 2018, plaintiff operated a vehicle on California State Route 70 near the Greenville exit. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 7, ECF No. 13. On that night, plaintiff stopped "in response to the evident authority" of defendant Officer Luntey. Id. After she stopped, plaintiff alleges Officer Luntey drove alongside her vehicle and asked whether she was following anyone; plaintiff allegedly responded she was following her husband. Id. ¶ 8. Officer Luntey stated he stopped plaintiff's husband's vehicle because he had been driving "erratically" and also claimed he stopped plaintiff's vehicle "because she was driving 'iffy.'" Id.
In response to Officer Luntey's order to submit to a search "without probable cause," plaintiff provided him with her license and vehicle registration. Id. Plaintiff alleges Officer Luntey then conducted the search "in an abusive manner" and "caused" plaintiff to take a breathalyzer test to measure the presence of alcohol in her system. Id. Plaintiff claims she "registered below the lawful limit" and yet Officer Luntey decided to transport her in his vehicle to the Sherriff's station in Quincy, California, where she would take another breathalyzer test. Id.
At the station, plaintiff performed another breathalyzer test, which also indicated she was not under the influence of alcohol. Id. (). As a result of this test, plaintiff avers the officers did not have probable cause to detain her any longer, but Officer Luntey directed other officers to book her on "'open' charges," submit her to fingerprinting, and photograph her. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff then allegedly demanded "to be brought before a committing magistrate and notified of the criminal charges for which she was being held and allowed to post bail"; she claims defendants ignored her demands. Id. ¶ 10. For eight hours overnight, she remained in a holding cell with "unusable facilities," without toilet paper, and with a floor covered "with urine and feces," which caused her "severe emotional pain and suffering." Id.
Following her release, plaintiff was ordered to appear in court, so she hired counsel, but never faced any charges from this arrest and incarceration. Id. ¶ 12. She also sought and obtained medical treatment and hospital care, for which she incurred reasonable expenses;she expects to require further medical expenses for the injuries sustained as a result of unlawful arrest and imprisonment. Id.
On September 30, 2019, plaintiff filed suit against defendants. Compl., ECF No. 1. On December 31, 2019, the parties stipulated to granting plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint. Min. Order, ECF No. 11. On January 3, 2020, plaintiff filed the amended complaint. See generally FAC. She names as defendants the County, Sheriff Hagwood, Officer Luntey and Does 1 through 50, who were allegedly involved in her booking and incarceration.1 FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges the County is a municipal corporation and governmental subdivision of the State of California responsible for the described conduct, Sheriff Hagwood is responsible for administering the jail and for participating and associating with Officer Luntey, and Officer Luntey is an employee of the State of California. Id.
Plaintiff brings three claims in the operative complaint: (1) municipal and individual liability for violation of Fourth, Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, id. ¶¶ 7-13; (2) battery, id. ¶¶ 14-15; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 16-17. Plaintiff demands declaratory judgment, as well as general and punitive damages. Id. at 6. Defendants challenge all claims against the County and Sheriff Hagwood in the pending motion. MTD at 1.
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A court may dismiss "based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
Although a complaint need contain only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to survive a motion to dismiss this short and plain statement "must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must include something more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" or "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Determining whether a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679. Ultimately, the inquiry focuses on the interplay between the factual allegations of the complaint and the dispositive issues of law in the action. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
In making this context-specific evaluation, this court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). This rule does not apply to "'a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,'" Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) quoted in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to "allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice" or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2001). A court's consideration of documents attached to a complaint or incorporated by reference or matter of judicial notice will not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003); Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); compare Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) ().
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Defendants argue the Fourth, Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment claims brought under Section 1983 against the County fail because plaintiff's complaint lacks the necessary "factual allegations" to demonstrate an "unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice" from the County. MTD at 3-8.
Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of [law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under this section, municipalities and other local governments, including counties are considered "persons." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
Under Monell, counties "are responsible only for their own illegal acts," Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (emphasis in original) (citations, internal quotation marks omitted). "They are not vicariously liable . . . for their employees' actions." Id. (citations omitted). To successfully establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must show "'(1) that [he or she] possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.'" Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)). "Official . . . policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). "[A] custom or practice can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded." Hunter v. Cty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). "[E]vidence of inaction—specifically failure to investigate and discipline employees in the face of widespread constitutional violations—can support an inference that an unconstitutional custom or practice has been unofficially adopted by a municipality." Id. at 1234 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
Prior to the Supreme Court decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, sup...
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