Loewer Realty Co. v. Anderson
Decision Date | 04 March 1929 |
Docket Number | No. 175.,175. |
Citation | 31 F.2d 268 |
Parties | LOEWER REALTY CO. v. ANDERSON, Collector of Internal Revenue. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Charles H. Tuttle, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Walter H. Schulman, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Paskus, Gordon & Hyman, of New York City (Arthur B. Hyman, of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The question before us is whether the taxes were exacted at a time when the right to collect them was barred by the statute of limitations. When the taxpayer's return was filed on April 14, 1921, the Revenue Act of 1918 was in effect. That act (section 250 (d), 40 Stat. 1083) provided that the amount of the tax should be assessed by the Commissioner within five years after the return was made, and that no suit or proceeding for collection should be begun after five years after the date when the return was due or was made. Revenue Act 1921, § 250 (d), contained similar provisions relating to the assessment and collection of taxes due under prior income tax acts, and provided that taxes for prior years should be assessed within five years after the return was filed, unless the Commissioner and taxpayer consented to a later assessment, and added "that no suit or proceeding for the collection of any such taxes * * * shall be begun, after the expiration of five years after such return was filed. When the waiver was signed in December, 1925, about four months still remained under both the act of 1918 and the act of 1921 (42 Stat. 227), within which the collector might assess and collect the additional taxes.
Prior, however, to the time when the waiver was obtained, the Revenue Act of 1924 had taken effect. By that act it was similarly provided in section 277 (a) (2), 43 Stat. 299 (26 USCA § 1057, note), that income taxes imposed by prior acts should be assessed within five years after the return was filed. It also provided in section 278 (c), 26 USCA § 1060, that, where the Commissioner and the taxpayer consented in writing to the assessment of the tax after the time prescribed in section 277 for its assessment, the tax might be assessed at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. In section 278 (d), 26 USCA § 1061, note, the act went on to say that, where the assessment of the tax was made within the period prescribed in section 277 "or in this section," the tax might be collected by a proceeding begun within six years after the assessment of the tax. It is entirely clear that the words "or in this section" were placed in the statute in order to give the government six years within which to collect the tax after an assessment made either within five years succeeding the filing of the return, or within any extended period agreed to by the Commissioner and the taxpayer. So, when the waiver was signed on December 21, 1925, it had full warrant under section 278 (c) of the act of 1924. By its terms, the Commissioner had until December 31, 1926, to make the assessment for additional taxes, and he made the assessment in July, 1926, and collected the tax in September, 1926, while the time called for by the waiver was still running.
But on February 26, 1926, a new Revenue Act went into effect, known as the "Revenue Act of 1926." That act provided that assessment of income taxes imposed under prior acts should be assessed within five years after the return was filed. It went on in section 278 (c), (d), and (e), 26 USCA §§ 1060-1062, to say:
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