Lofthus v. Long Beach Veterans Hosp.

• Decision Date: 11 October 2016
• Docket Number: NO. SA CV 16–01482–VBF (AGR),SA CV 16–01482–VBF (AGR)
• Citation: 214 F.Supp.3d 908
• Parties: Peter Kent Lloyd LOFTHUS and Family, Plaintiffs, v. LONG BEACH VETERANS HOSPITAL, Orange County Family Court, Saint Joseph's Catholic Hospital, and Orange Hoag Hospital Newport Beach, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

214 F.Supp.3d 908

Peter Kent Lloyd LOFTHUS and Family, Plaintiffs,

v.LONG BEACH VETERANS HOSPITAL, Orange County Family Court, Saint Joseph's Catholic Hospital, and Orange Hoag Hospital Newport Beach, Defendants.

NO. SA CV 16–01482–VBF (AGR)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed October 11, 2016

Peter Kent Lloyd Lofthus, Long Beach, CA, Pro Se

ORDER Dismissing Complaint Without Prejudice;

Granting Plaintiff Leave to File A First Amended Complaint ("FAC") No Later Than Monday, November 28, 2016 and Warning that Action Will Be Dismissed With Prejudice if He Fails to File Timely Suitable FAC;

Directing Plaintiff Not to Assert Claims on Behalf of Other Persons

VALERIE BAKER FAIRBANK, Senior United States District Judge

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis , Peter Kent Lloyd Lofthus ("plaintiff") filed a civil-rights complaint on August 10, 2016. As required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 110 Stat. 1321–71 as amended, 42 U.S.C. section 1997e et seq. ("PLRA"), the Court has screened the complaint to determine whether it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Jones v. Bock , 549 U.S. 199, 202, 127 S.Ct. 910, 914, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ("Among other reforms, the PLRA mandates early judicial screening of prisoner complaints ....") (citing 28 U.S.C. section 1915A and 42 U.S.C. section 1997e(a) ); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii) and Olausen v. Murguia , 2014 WL 6065622, *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2014) (Miranda Du, J.) ("There is no question that the PLRA requires courts to engage in pre-answer screening of an inmate's complaint.").

The Court's initial PLRA screening is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts pled under a cognizable legal theory.

See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (citations omitted).

A pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam), and this duty of liberal construction "is particularly important in civil rights cases' ", Sierra v. Grannis , 2009 WL 160290, *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2009) (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet , 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) ), recon. denied , 2009 WL 1212788 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2009), aff'd , 450 Fed.Appx. 680 (9th Cir. 2011).

Before dismissing a pro se civil-rights complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, the plaintiff should be given a statement of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to cure them unless it is clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1987).

Even pro se plaintiffs, however, are not constitutionally or otherwise entitled to multiple opportunities to amend their pleadings. See Salazar v. McGillicuddy Works, LLC , 2013 WL 209210, *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 17, 2013) ("Courts are not required to give plaintiffs endless opportunities to amend, however.") (citing unpublished 2006 Eleventh Circuit decision holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing pro se plaintiff's first amended complaint with prejudice and was not required to allow him to file a second amended complaint); cf., e.g., Barnhart v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC , 2016 WL 424699, *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 2016) (Janet Neff, J.) ("Given the deficiencies of Plaintiff's current claims and the amorphous nature of his request to file an amended complaint, the Court determines that granting leave to amend would be futile and cause undue prejudice to Defendant and therefore is not a course in the interests of justice."), appeal filed , No. 16–1244 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 2016).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff purports to sue on behalf of himself and his family, apparently including his wife. (Compl. at 1.) The complaint contains disjointed factual allegations and requests "psychological remedy for wife, unification of family and financial retirement unobstructed." (Id. at 8.)

The complaint names four defendants: (1) Long Beach Veterans Hospital; (2) Orange County Family Court; (3) St. Joseph's Catholic Hospital; and (4) Hoag Hospital in Newport Beach. (Id. at 1–2.)

Plaintiff complains of a "§ 5150" that constituted false imprisonment in violation of Cal. Penal Code §§ 236 –37 and "trafficking" in violation of " section 7102(8) of Title 22 of U.S. Code." (Id. at 4–5.) The complaint does not disclose who was allegedly the subject of a § 5150 hold.

Plaintiff complains that the Orange County Family Court authorized major surgery for his son, who is younger than 2 years old, and "then taking custody from father domicile L.A. since birth, false arrests, imprisonment hospital or jail drugs or none, haunting letters threats [sic] from O.C. Family Court et al. who refused pro se representation [and] also did not appreciate [that] our son was circumcised, O.C.F.C." (Id.X at 5.)

III. CLAIMS AGAINST ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

Plaintiff's claims based on allegedly erroneous rulings by the Orange County Superior Court are barred for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, immunity from suit.

A. Lack of Jurisdiction Under Rooker –Feldman Doctrine

Under the Rooker –Feldman doctrine, this Court does not have jurisdiction over a complaint that is a de facto appeal of a state-court judgment, see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), because a federal court "does not possess direct oversight powers over [state] courts", Varner v. Bailey , 2015 WL 5254292, *4 n.4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2015) (Paul Lewis Maloney, J.) (citing In re Cook , 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009) ). " 'The Rooker –Feldman doctrine, as it has become known, is based on the negative inference that, if appellate court review of such state[-]court judgments is vested in the [United States] Supreme Court, then it follows that such review may not occur in the lower federal courts.' " Smith v. Manderfield , 2014 WL 3534083, *2 (W.D. Mich. July 16, 2014) (Maloney, C.J.) (quoting Kovacic v. Cuyahoga County Dep't of Children &Family Servs. , 606 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir, 2010) ).

The doctrine applies when "the federal plaintiff ... complain[s] of a legal injury caused by a state court judgment, based on an allegedly erroneous legal ruling, in a case in which the federal plaintiff was one of the litigants."¹ Noel v. Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal filed , No. 15–2368 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2015). In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 283–84, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker –Feldman doctrine, stating, "The Rooker –Feldman doctrine, we hold today, is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil , 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517.

B. Immunity

1. Eleventh Amendment

As an arm of the State of California, the County Superior Court is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[A] suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the state, barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). The Eleventh Amendment shields the state or its courts from suits for all types of relief. See Krainski v. State , 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Judicial immunity

Plaintiff is advised that he cannot correct these deficiencies by suing one or more family court judges or by suing the staff of those judges or the staff of the family court.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks monetary damages, "state judges are absolutely immune from liability for their judicial acts." Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U.S. 325, 334, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) ; Stump v. Sparkman , 435 U.S. 349, 355–56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). This is true "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump , 435 U.S. at 355–56, 98 S.Ct. 1099. Judicial immunity applies when a plaintiff alleges that the judge erred or failed to comply with due process. Id. at 359–60, 98 S.Ct. 1099 ; see also Cleavinger v. Saxner , 474 U.S. 193, 199–200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). "Nor is judicial immunity lost by allegations that a judge conspired with one party to rule against another party." Moore v. Brewster , 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996).

Judicial immunity can be overcome only in two circumstances: (1) the plaintiff seeks redress for "nonjudicial actions, i.e. , actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity," or (2) the plaintiff seeks redress for actions "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco , 502 U.S. 9, 11–12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam). Plaintiff's complaint challenges rulings of the state court and does not allege any non-judicial...