Loftin v. Bryan
| Decision Date | 27 January 1953 |
| Citation | 63 So.2d 310 |
| Parties | LOFTIN et al. v. BRYAN. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Loftin, Anderson, Scott, McCarthy & Preston, Robert H. Anderson, William S. Frates, William C. Steel, Don G. Nicholson, Miami, and Russell L. Frink, Jacksonville, for appellants.
Cushman, Gay & Woodard, Miami, and Caldwell, Parker, Foster & Wigginton, Tallahassee, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a final judgment assessing damages against the appellants growing out of a collision between an automobile and an engine of the appellants at Northwest Seventh Avenue in the City of Miami.
The case was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of all of the testimony for the appellee and again before the case was submitted to the jury the appellants made appropriate motions for an instructed verdict, which were denied.
This is the same crossing where an accident occurred which is described in the opinion of this Court in Loftin v. McGregor, 152 Fla. 813, 14 So.2d 574. The two cases are very similar.
In the case now before the Court the record shows that the following facts are undisputed.
At the time of the collision the engine was backing in an Easterly direction across Northwest Seventh Avenue. There were two identical headlights on the locomotive--one in front, and one in the rear. The whistle of the locomotive was blown twice--once, when it was about 12 carlengths from the crossing and, again, when it was right at the crossing. The bell was rung for some distance from the crossing and until the engine was completely on the crossing. There is some negative testimony of some of the witnesses that they did not hear the bell or the whistle. The engineer testified that when he first saw the car, the locomotive had almost blocked Northwest Seventh Avenue, extending all the way across the south-bound lane and half way across the north-bound lane. At the time he first saw the car, it was passing another car. The locomotive did not run into the automobile but the automobile ran into and hit the engine under the cab where the engineer sat. The locomotive traveled about 35 feet after the impact.
The automobile, a 1939 Lincoln, was being driven by a man by the name of Hughes. It was not Hughes' car but was owned by the mother of Nancy Henderson. Those sitting on the front seat of the automobile were Jack Hughes, Nancy Henderson and Reginald Bryan, the appellee. Cabell Carrier and Tony Carrero were sitting on the back seat.
Hughes was familiar with this particular crossing and on the night in question he had driven over this crossing four times prior to the accident. Hughes admits that there was a car stopped, or going very slowly, approximately 70 feet from this crossing and that in order to pass the car, he pulled to the left over the center line of the street at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour and that he increased his speed in passing the automobile. He did not see the engine until he passed this car. He remembered the car being there and passed it just before he had the accident. He further testified that just after he passed the car, he saw a big black object in front of him over the crossing.
The contention is made that this was a heavily traveled crossing and that the appellant was, therefore, called upon to exercise extraordinary care and caution. It is true that it was heavily traveled, but this accident happened after three o'clock in the morning and the only automobile in the vicinity of the crossing at that time was the one which was passed by Hughes.
The engine was traveling at a speed of between three and eight miles per hour. Hughes was going 35 miles per hour as he passed the automobile and his speed picked up. A picture is in the record which shows the skid marks of Hughes' automobile as he passed back onto his side of the street of approximately 70 feet. His brakes were applied and he was still skidding at the time his automobile struck the engine.
There is a photograph in the record showing the condition of the car Hughes was driving immediately after the accident. A...
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Hoisington v. Kulchin, 33609
...10 So.2d 326; City of Miami v. Fuller, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 198; Henley v. Carter, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 192, 44 A.L.R.2d 1339; Loftin v. Bryan, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 310; Herring v. Eiland, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 645; Dye v. Freeman, Fla.App.1959, 116 So.2d which is reported in 164 So.2d 833, affirmin......
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Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co. v. Church
...argument upon which it relies to bring the case within the wild party rule, discussed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Loftin v. Bryan, 63 So.2d 310, that while the negligence of the driver is not ordinarily imputable to a passenger, where driver and passenger were on a wild party togethe......
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Kuklis v. Hancock, 28776 Summary Calendar.
...quantity of alcohol consumed and the resulting effect. Thus aware, they assert Dennis assumed the risk and may not recover. Loftin v. Bryan, 63 So.2d 310 (Fla., 1953). Each of these involves an inference that is not justified from the evidence. Additionally, to infer the quantity consumed w......
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Hoisington v. Kulchin
...326; City of Miami v. Fuller, Fla.1951, 54 So.2d 198; Henley v. Carter, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 192, 44 A.L.R.2d 1339; Loftin v . Bryan, Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 310; Herring v. Eiland, Fla.1955, 81 So.2d 645; Dye v. Freeman, Fla.App.1959, 116 So.2d The matter is now before us, subsequent to our decis......