Logan v. Matveevskii
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
| Writing for the Court | KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge |
| Citation | Logan v. Matveevskii, 57 F. Supp. 3d 234 (S.D. N.Y. 2014) |
| Decision Date | 29 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10–CV–9247 KMK. |
| Parties | Thomas LOGAN, Plaintiff, v. Irina MATVEEVSKII, Jeff Zuckerman, Mark Kamensky, Tuckahoe Housing Authority, Adolfo Carrión, and Mirza Orriols, Defendants. |
Thomas Logan, Tuckahoe, NY, pro se.
Joan M. Gilbride, Esq., Kaufman, Borgeest & Ryan, L.L.P., New York, NY, for Defendant.
Plaintiff Thomas Logan (“Logan”), proceeding pro se, brings this Action against Defendants Irina Matveevskii (“Matveevskii”), Jeff Zuckerman (“Zuckerman”), Mark Kamensky (“Kamensky”), Tuckahoe Housing Authority (“THA”), Adolfo Carrión (“Carrión”), and Mirza Orriols (“Orriols”).1 Matveevskii, Zuckerman, Kamensky, and THA (collectively, “the THA Defendants”) move for summary judgment, while Carrión and Morales (collectively, “the HUD Defendants”) move to dismiss the claims asserted against them. For the following reasons, the THA Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, as is the HUD Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff is a resident of 31 Midland Place in Tuckahoe, New York, where he has lived for “[a]pproximately 27 to 30 years.” (Thomas Logan Dep. Tr. 8, Apr. 22, 2013 (“Logan Dep. Tr.”); see also THA Defs.' Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local R. 56.1 ( ) Plaintiff lives in a third-floor apartment at 31 Midland Place with his mother, Anne Gunther, and his brother, John Gunther. (THA Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1–2.) 31 Midland Place is one of “nine residential buildings containing approximately 149 units” that THA “owns and operates” as “federal subsidized housing for the Tuckahoe community.” (THA Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 3; see also Logan Dep. Tr. 18 ( ).) Matveevskii is THA's Executive Director, which position she assumed on January 1, 2008, while Zuckerman is Chairman of the THA Board of Commissioners. (See THA Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 4–6.) Kamensky is THA's General Counsel, and Adalgisa Jones (“Jones”), not named as a defendant in this Action, is a THA Office Assistant.
Plaintiff claims that he has been diagnosed with multiple disabilities, the first of which relates to a heart condition for which he underwent quadruple bypass surgery. (Logan Dep. Tr. 17.) At some point, he also “fell down a flight of stairs,” which accident required him to undergo a knee-replacement operation. (Id. ) “The combination of [these] two things left [Plaintiff] very disabled.” (Id. ) For the purposes of their Motions, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff is currently disabled, nor do they dispute that Plaintiff was disabled at all times relevant to the instant Action.
In his deposition, Plaintiff stated that at some point, in order to accommodate his disabilities, he “request[ed] a lower floor apartment” in correspondence with Eric De Esso (“De Esso”), who preceded Matveevskii as THA Executive Director. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff included this correspondence in his Amended Complaint. In a March 27, 1996 letter to Plaintiff, De Esso wrote that, “[i]n review of [Plaintiff's] file and current family composition, [Plaintiff's] family require[d] a one bedroom apartment unit,” but at the time that the letter was written, Plaintiff's family “occup[ied] a two bedroom apartment unit.” (Pl.'s Ex. 7, at 5.)2 Because “Federal Regulations for Public Housing provide that Family Composition must be commensurate with size of dwelling unit,” De Esso “advised [Plaintiff] that [he] [would] be relocated to the first available one bedroom apartment unit to accommodate [his] family status.” (Id. )
Plaintiff appears to have responded on the same day, in a letter in which he referenced the fall that led to his knee injury, and the existence of a civil suit against THA based on that fall. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff then wrote the following:
(Id. )
In his deposition, Plaintiff characterized this letter as follows:
I had sent documentations ... requesting a lower floor apartment with the prior director, Mr. De Esso. He informed me that I needed ... a one-bedroom apartment, and I informed him that just prior to that, I added my mother to the lease, so we kept the two-bedroom, but because of my disability, I asked him, requested for a lower floor apartment. And I was the next person on the list.
The next document in Plaintiff's submissions that could potentially be construed as a communication between Plaintiff and THA is what appears to be a letter from Plaintiff addressed to Matveevskii and dated August 7, 2008, more than 12 years after Plaintiff's communication with De Esso:
(Pl.'s Ex. 7, at 22 (alteration in original).)
Plaintiff submitted a similar document addressed to Matveevskii dated March 7, 2010:
Plaintiff further submitted another such letter, also dated March 7, 2010, but this time addressed to the “THA Broad [sic] of Commissioner,” in which he repeated much of what he wrote in the preceding documents:
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