Logan v. Miss. Dep't of Transp.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013–CA–00258–COA.,2013–CA–00258–COA. |
| Citation | 174 So.3d 264 |
| Parties | Terry H. LOGAN, Sr. and Beverly W. Logan, Appellants v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION and Mississippi Transportation Commission, Appellees. |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
Charles Jones Swayze III, Charles J. Swayze Jr., Greenwood, attorneys for appellants.
Robert J. Dambrino III, Grenada, attorney for appellees.
Before LEE, C.J., BARNES and FAIR, JJ.
BARNES, J., for the Court:
¶ 1. Terry and Beverly Logan filed a negligence claim against the Mississippi Department of Transportation (MDOT) and the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) after the Logans' car hit a metal plate protruding upwards from the road on Highway 49 in Tallahatchie County, causing a single-car accident and injuries to the Logans. The Tallahatchie County Circuit Court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the MDOT and the MTC (the Appellees), and the Logans now appeal. Finding that the Appellees were not immune from liability for the failure to maintain the bridge in a safe manner, we reverse the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in part and remand for a determination of whether the repair of the bridge was performed in a negligent manner. As to the Logans' other claim regarding the failure to warn of the “dangerous condition,” we find that summary judgment is appropriate as there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Appellees had notice that a dangerous condition existed on the bridge/road.
¶ 2. On March 12, 2011, the Logans were returning home from a trip to Memphis, Tennessee when they were involved in a single-car accident on Highway 49 South in Tallahatchie County. As the Logans were crossing a bridge, the undercarriage of their vehicle became caught on a large metal plate bolted to the road, which was protruding upward.1 The metal plate cut the bottom of the Logans' car from the front axle to the rear axle, which caused Terry to lose control over the vehicle and crash. The couple's daughter-in-law, Mauri Logan, arrived at the scene post-accident; she claimed that two MDOT employees at the scene informed her that MDOT had been notified earlier in the day of the metal plate sticking up from the road. The Logans suffered physical injuries as a result of the accident.2
¶ 3. On August 4, 2011, the Logans filed a complaint against the Appellees, alleging that they were negligent (1) by failing to maintain the bridge in a safe manner; (2) by allowing a “defective and dangerous condition” to exist; and (3) by failing to warn of the dangerous condition and negligent bridge repair. The Logans asserted that as a result of the Appellees' negligence, they suffered damages, including pain and suffering; medical expenses; mental anguish and emotional distress, loss of consortium, and extensive property damage.
¶ 4. The Appellees responded with numerous defenses, including an averment that, as governmental entities, they were immune from liability because the maintenance of highways is a “discretionary function” under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–46–9(1)(d) (Rev. 2012) of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), which provides immunity from claims “[b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused[.]”
¶ 5. The Appellees subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on August 21, 2012, on the basis that they were immune from liability because bridge maintenance and repair is a “discretionary act.” They further asserted there was no evidence of “why the steel plate was bent upward” and that they had no notice of the “dangerous” condition. The Logans responded, arguing that the MDOT was not immune under 11–46–9(1)(d) and additionally asserting that the Appellees had knowledge of the dangerous condition and their failure to warn deprived them of immunity under Mississippi Code Annotated section 11–46–9(1)(v) (Rev. 2012), which provides immunity from any claim:
Arising out of an injury caused by a dangerous condition on property of the governmental entity that was not caused by the negligent or other wrongful conduct of an employee of the governmental entity or of which the governmental entity did not have notice, either actual or constructive, and adequate opportunity to protect or warn against; provided, however, that a governmental entity shall not be liable for the failure to warn of a dangerous condition which is obvious to one exercising due care[.]
¶ 6. The circuit court granted the Appellees' summary-judgment motion, finding that the maintenance of the bridge is a discretionary function under section 11–46–9(1)(d) ; therefore, the Appellees were “completely immune from liability.” Addressing the failure-to-warn claim, the circuit court's order simply concluded that even if the bridge repair “presented a dangerous condition, known by these defendants, against which they did not warn the public, nevertheless they are completely immune by virtue of Mississippi Code Annotated [section] 11–46–9(1)(d).” The Logans filed a motion to reconsider the judgment, which the circuit court denied, and they now appeal.
¶ 7. We reverse the circuit court's finding that the Appellees were immune from liability for the bridge maintenance and remand for a determination of whether the repair of the bridge was performed in a negligent manner, and caused or contributed to the accident injuring the Logans. However, as to the Logans' separate claim regarding the failure to warn, we find that summary judgment is appropriate, as there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Appellees had notice of the “dangerous condition.”
¶ 8. A circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Davis v. Office Max, 131 So.3d 588, 590 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2013) (citing Busby v. Mazzeo, 929 So.2d 369, 372 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) ). “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Ladner v. Holleman, 90 So.3d 655, 657 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2012) (quoting M.R.C.P. 56(c) ). Viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” we will reverse only if “triable issues of material fact” exist. Triplett v. River Reg. Med. Corp., 50 So.3d 1032, 1037 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) .
¶ 9. The Logans asserted two distinct bases for liability in this matter: (1) the MDOT's bridge maintenance/repair was negligently performed, and (2) the MDOT failed to warn motorists of the negligent bridge repair and the resulting dangerous condition (the bent metal plate). The Appellees argued in their motion for summary judgment they were immune from liability because the maintenance of highways and bridges is a discretionary act. The circuit court granted the Appellees' motion, finding that they were entitled to complete immunity under section 11–46–9(1)(d).
¶ 10. Prior to 2012, our appellate courts had consistently found road maintenance to be a discretionary function under the MTCA. See Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So.2d 258, 269 (¶ 44) (Miss.2003) (); Mohundro v. Alcorn Cnty., 675 So.2d 848, 853 (Miss.1996) (); Knight v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 10 So.3d 962, 970 (¶ 27) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (). However, in Mississippi Transportation Commission v. Montgomery,
80 So.3d 789, 798 (¶ 32) (Miss.2012), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the maintenance of state highways is not a discretionary function under Mississippi Code Annotated section 65–1–65 (Rev. 2005).3 “[W]here a statute mandates the government or its employees to act, all acts fulfilling that duty are considered mandated as well, and neither the government nor its employees enjoys immunity.” Montgomery, 80 So.3d at 798 (¶ 31). The Montgomery court determined that section 65–1–65 “impose[d] a statutory duty on the highway department to maintain all state highways.” Montgomery, 80 So.3d at 798 (¶ 32).4
¶ 11. Acknowledging Montgomery in his order, the circuit judge determined that an additional statute, Mississippi Code Annotated section 65–1–61 (Rev. 2012),5 provided the MDOT with discretion in the performance of the duty to repair the bridge and stated that “it is without dispute that policy considerations were undertaken by the [Appellees] in the performance of this maintenance.” During the summary-judgment hearing, it was also noted that this Court had issued a recent opinion, Little v. Mississippi Department of Transportation, 129 So.3d 192, 195 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2012), in which we observed “that the court in Montgomery did not expressly overrule its prior decisions holding that road maintenance and repair are discretionary functions” and concluded “that our supreme court did not intend to change existing law regarding its earlier holdings that road maintenance and repair are discretionary functions.”
¶ 12. However, after the circuit court's order, the Mississippi Supreme Court overturned our decision in Little, and addressed Montgomery 's deviation from the “bright-line rule that road maintenance and repair [are] discretionary,”6 stating:
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