Logan v. Neb. Moline Plow Co.

• Decision Date: 18 March 1903
• Citation: 3 Neb. [Unof.] 526,93 N.W. 1128
• Parties: LOGAN ET AL. v. NEBRASKA MOLINE PLOW CO.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

3 Neb. [Unof.] 526

93 N.W. 1128

LOGAN ET AL.

v.NEBRASKA MOLINE PLOW CO.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 18, 1903.

Commissioners' Opinion. Department No. 3.

“Not to be officially reported.”

On rehearing. Reversed.

AMES, C.

This is a rehearing granted from a former decision, published in 92 N. W., at page 129, where the facts are sufficiently stated. The case has been exhaustively rebriefed and reargued, with the effect to confirm in our minds the belief that the former decision is right. Nothing would be gained by repeating or recapitulating the arguments contained in that decision. It may suffice to say that they are fortified by more recent decisions of the courts of the United States, to whom is committed authority for the ultimate interpretation of the laws of Congress. It is admitted that, if the goods in controversy had been seized by a creditor of Mrs. Stoner by ordinary judicial process, such creditor would thus have acquired a right to them superior to that of the defendant in error. In Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. Ed. 405, the Supreme Court of the United States has held, subsequently to the announcement of the former decision, that “the filing of a petition in bankruptcy is a caveat to all the world, and, in effect, an attachment and injunction.” And in Re Rabenau (D. C.) 118 Fed. 471, Judge Phillips, of the United States Court for the Western District of Missouri, held that a trustee in bankruptcy stands in the same position as creditors of the estate pursuing the goods under legal process, and is entitled to claim them as against a vendor by a conditional sale. And in Missouri Moline Plow Company v. Spilman (D. C.) 117 Fed. 746, the beginning of a proceeding in bankruptcy was held to be a sequestration of the bankrupt's property, so as to extinguish the title of a conditional vendor of chattels under circumstances similar to those in the case at bar. To the same effect is In re Hammond (D. C.) 98 Fed. 845, in which the precise question now at issue is discussed at some length by Judge Lowell. In none of these cases is any discrimination attempted in this respect between voluntary and involuntary proceedings, nor do we think any good reason has been suggested why any should be. In view of these decisions, we are of opinion that the construction of the bankruptcy act in this regard ought to be considered as judicially settled, irrespective of whether, if unrestrained by authority, we should have...