Logan v. O'Neill

• Decision Date: 03 August 1982
• Citation: 187 Conn. 721,448 A.2d 1306
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John J. LOGAN et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al. Warren P. JOHNSON et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.

Page 1306

448 A.2d 1306

187 Conn. 721

John J. LOGAN et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.

Warren P. JOHNSON et al. v. William A. O'NEILL et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 13, 1982.

Decided Aug. 3, 1982.

Theodore M. Space, with whom were Frederick U. Conard, Jr., Douglas S. Lavine, Hartford, and, on the brief, Robert J. Cathcart, Hartford, for appellants (plaintiffs in each case).

Ralph G. Elliot, Hartford, for appellees (defendant George L. Gunther et al. in each case).

Daniel R. Schaefer, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Barney Lapp, Paul M. Shapiro and David M. Teed, Asst. Attys. Gen., and, on the brief, Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants in each case).

James A. Wade, Hartford, for appellees (defendant James J. Murphy et al. in each case).

Before SPEZIALE, C. J., and HEALEY, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO and SHEA, JJ.

SPEZIALE, Chief Justice.

This appeal concerns the plan for the reapportionment of the house of representatives of the General Assembly which was adopted by the General Assembly in special session on July 31, 1981. In these two consolidated cases the plaintiffs, who are citizens and electors of the state, have challenged the plan adopted by the General Assembly on various constitutional grounds. The only claim of the plaintiffs which is relevant to this appeal, however, is that the plan violates the town integrity principle contained in article third, § 4 of the Connecticut constitution because the plan excessively and unnecessarily divides towns in the districts for the house of representatives. The defendants are the governor, the secretary of state, the treasurer, the comptroller, the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house of representatives, and the minority leaders of both houses.

It is important to note at the outset the limited nature of the question presented by this appeal. For procedural reasons hereinafter explained, the principal issue before us is whether the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to the trial court to establish a prima facie case that the town integrity principle has been violated by the reapportionment plan. The question of whether the plan actually violates the town integrity principle, therefore, is not before us.

The decennial reapportionment of General Assembly and Congressional districts is required by article third, § 6 of the constitution, as amended by articles XII and XVI of the amendments to the constitution. ¹

Pursuant to this requirement, a plan [187 Conn. 724] revising the house and senate districts of the General Assembly was adopted by votes exceeding two-[187 Conn. 725] thirds of the membership of each house. ² The dispute in this case concerns that part of the plan which establishes the revised districts for the house of representatives.

In revising the districts for the Connecticut house of representatives, the General Assembly is constrained by certain constitutional principles. For example, article third, § 4 of the constitution contains a contiguity principle which requires that each house district "be contiguous as to territory ...."

Underlying the present dispute is the need to harmonize two conflicting constitutional principles. Article third, § 4 of the constitution ³ requires, inter alia, that In the trial court, the plaintiffs contended that the plan adopted by the General Assembly is unconstitutional as violative of the town integrity principle because the plan divides more towns than necessary to meet the federal requirements. After the plaintiffs presented their case to the trial court, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 302 ⁵ because the plaintiffs "failed to make a prima facie showing that ..." the reapportionment plan "does not consider the provisions of town integrity in the state constitution ...." ⁶ From the judgment rendered, the plaintiffs have appealed to this court.

"[f]or the purpose of forming assembly districts no town shall be divided except for the purpose of forming assembly districts wholly within the town." This requirement has been termed the "town integrity principle." See Miller v. Schaffer, 164 Conn. 8, 17, 320 A.2d 1 (1972). Article third, § 5, as amended, however, conflicts with the town integrity principle because it requires that "[t]he establishment ... of districts in the general assembly shall be consistent with federal constitutional standards," namely, the federal equal population [187 Conn. 727] principle. Miller v. Schaffer, supra, 17, 320 A.2d 1. ⁴ As a practical matter, the federal one-person, one-vote principle; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1389, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); makes it impossible for a reapportionment plan to comply fully with the town integrity principle. See Miller v. Schaffer, supra, 164 Conn. at 24, 320 A.2d 1. Except to the extent to which the town integrity principle must be infringed upon because of the federal equal population requirement, however, the town integrity principle remains a significant constraint on the General Assembly's revision of house districts. Miller v. Schaffer, supra, 24-25, 320 A.2d 1. "Effect must be given to every part of and each word in our constitution ...." Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 21, 103 A.2d 818 (1954). It is upon this continued viability of the town integrity principle that the plaintiffs base their challenge to the reapportionment plan.

A motion for judgment of dismissal under § 302 of the Practice Book has taken the place of the former motion for nonsuit for failure to make out a prima Therefore, as previously noted, the limited question before us is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence presented by the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case.

                facie case.   Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v. Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544, 547-48, --- A.2d ---- (1982);   Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corporation, --- Conn. ---, --- (43 Conn.L.J., No. 3, pp. 14, 15), 440 A.2d 810 (1981).   The question on appeal from the granting of such a motion is whether the plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case.   Ibid.  "Such a disposition of a case may be resorted to only when a plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case, that is, when the evidence produced by the plaintiff, if fully believed, would not permit the trier in reason to find the essential issues on the complaint in favor of the plaintiff."  Minicozzi v. Atlantic Refining Co., 143 [187 Conn. 729] Conn. 226, 230, 120 A.2d 924 (1956).  "The evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to him [or her], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in his [or her] favor.   Ace-High Dresses, Inc. v. J. C. Trucking Co., 122 Conn. 578, 579, 191 A. 536 (1937).   A party has the same right to submit a weak case as he [or she] has to submit a strong one.   Fritz v. Gaudet, 101 Conn. 52, 53, 124 A. 841 (1924).   See  Lukas v. New Haven, [--- Conn. ---, --- - --- (42 Conn.L.J., No. 46, pp. 25, 26-27) 439 A.2d 949 (1981) ];   Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 505, 58 A.2d 729 (1948);  Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc. §§ 215 and 217;  Stephenson, Conn.Civ.Proc.  (2d Ed.) § 192f."   Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corporation, supra
                

In evaluating whether the plaintiffs' evidence makes out a prima facie case, it is appropriate to note initially the burden of proof which the plaintiffs have undertaken by challenging the constitutionality of the reapportionment plan. Although, here, the legislative action being challenged is not a statute because it is not subject to the approval of the governor, it is entitled to at least the same judicial respect as a statute. "The burden on one attacking the constitutionality of a statute is great. There is a presumption of constitutionality which attaches to a statutory enactment; the burden which rests upon a party asserting its invalidity is to establish that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 569, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979); Engle v. Personnel Appeal Board, 175 Conn. 127, 134, 394 A.2d 731 (1978); State v. Warren, 169 Conn. 207, 217, 363 A.2d 91 (1975); Wilson v. Connecticut Product Development Corporation, 167 Conn. 111, 114, 355 A.2d 72 (1974); Kellems v. Brown, [163 Conn. 478, 486, 313 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S.Ct. 911, 34 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973) ]." United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 179 Conn. 627, 641-42, 427 A.2d 830 (1980). The plaintiffs acknowledge this burden and maintain that their evidence met the burden at least to the extent of making out a prima facie case.

The 1980 census data indicates that the total population of Connecticut is 3,107,576. Under the plan adopted by the General Assembly, the number of districts for the house of representatives is 151. ⁷ Therefore, the ideal or perfect number of people in each district is 20,580. The plan as adopted has a maximum plus deviation of 4.42 percent and a maximum minus deviation of 3.94 percent, making the total maximum deviation 8.36 percent. ⁸

The plan adopted by the General Assembly cuts the boundary lines of fifty-four As proof that the reapportionment plan violates the town integrity principle, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of an expert witness with expertise in mathematics, statistics, and computer science ¹¹ and introduced various alternative "plans" ¹² which were drafted by the plaintiffs' expert. These "plans," each of which resulted in fewer town segments than the adopted plan, included a "plan" for a house of 151 seats (designated at CT 151), three "plans" for a house of 125 seats (CT 125, CT 125-1A, and CT 125X), a "plan" for a house of 144 seats (CT 144), two "plans" for a house of 180 seats (CT 180 and CT 180X), and a "plan" for a house of 225 seats (CT 225). A summary of these "plans" in comparison with the 1971 reapportionment plan and the...