Logan v. State
| Decision Date | 31 December 1871 |
| Parties | Leroy Logan v. The State. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Circuit Court, February Term, 1871. W. P. MARTIN, J.
W. H. Wisener and J. H. Lewis, insisted that the act took effect forty days from the Governor's signature.
Attorney General HEISKELL, for the State.
The plaintiff in error was presented by the grand jury, at October Term, 1870, of the Circuit Court of Marshall county, for unlawfully carrying a pistol, under the act, approved June 16th, 1870.
The presentment charges, and the proof shows, that the alleged offense was committed 22d July, 1870.
The statute, under which the presentment was made, was passed by both houses of the General Assembly, June 11th, 1870, and was approved by the Governor, 16th June, 1870, and provides that it shall “take effect forty days from and after its passage.”
Counting from the 11th of June, the forty days had expired; but counting from the 16th June, the forty days had not expired on 22d July. The Circuit Judge held the act took effect forty days after 11th June, 1870, the time when it passed both branches of the Legislature, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty against the defendant.
Motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment having been made, and overruled by the Court, the defendant appealed, in error, to this Court.
The Constitution of 1834, Art. 2, s. 18, provided, that no bill shall become a law, until it shall be read and passed on three different days, in each house, and be signed by the respective Speakers.
Being so read, passed and signed by the Speakers, it became a law; it not being required, under that Constitution, that the Governor should approve or sign it. Art. 2, sec. 18, of the Constitution of 1870, contains the same provisions; with the addition, that “the bill shall not become a law, unless it shall have received, on its final passage, in each house, the assent of a majority of all the members to which that house is entitled, and shall have been signed, in open session, by the respective Speakers, and shall have been approved by the Governor, or shall have been otherwise passed under the provisions of this Constitution.” It will be observed, that this clause of the Constitution does not treat the bill as passed, without the approval of the Governor, although signed by the Speakers, unless by one of the two other modes by which it may become a law without his approval. One of...
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