Logan v. State

Decision Date07 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2361,2361
PartiesJames Ramiah LOGAN v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Fred Warren Bennett (Rachel M. Kamins on the brief), Greenbelt, for Appellant.

Edward J. Kelley (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellee.

Panel: HOLLANDER, JAMES R. EYLER, LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.

HOLLANDER, Judge.

This appeal arises from the tragic shooting deaths of Prince George's County Deputy Sheriffs James Arnaud and Elizabeth Magruder, who were gunned down on August 29, 2002, while attempting to serve an Emergency Psychiatric Commitment Order (the "Emergency Order") on James Ramiah Logan, appellant. Logan, who was then twenty-four years of age, was subsequently charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and two counts of use of a handgun during the commission of a crime of violence.

Appellant filed a notice of his intent to raise the defense of not criminally responsible ("NCR"), pursuant to Md.Code (2001), § 3-109 of the Criminal Procedure Article ("C.P."). He later moved to suppress his post-arrest statements. At the conclusion of the hearing in October 2003, the court denied Logan's motion.1 A jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County subsequently found appellant criminally responsible and convicted him of two counts of second degree murder and two counts of the handgun offense. The court sentenced appellant to a total term of imprisonment of 100 years.

Logan presents seven questions for our review, which we quote:2

QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO PRETRIAL MOTIONS
I. Did the trial court err in denying [appellant's] motion to suppress his statement where the police violated his Miranda3 rights by telling [appellant] that he did not need a lawyer during questioning because the truth could not jeopardize him?
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO VOIR DIRE
I. Did the trial court err in failing to inquire of the venire whether any of them would have difficulty following the court's instructions on the defense of not criminally responsible?
II. Was the trial court's questioning on pretrial publicity inadequate?
QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO TRIAL AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS
I. Did the trial court violate [appellant's] right of confrontation when the court permitted the State to question one of [appellant's] experts about the fact that a Prince George's County Detention Center psychiatrist had failed to find that [appellant] suffered from paranoid schizophrenia?
II. Did the trial court err in failing to permit [appellant's] several expert witnesses from explaining to the jury that "appreciating" the criminality of one's conduct is different from "knowing" that one's conduct is criminal and in failing to instruct the jury on this distinction?
III. Did the trial court err in failing [to] instruct the jury on the defense of "settled insanity?"
IV. Did the trial court err in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the distinction between intent and criminal responsibility?

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the advice of rights was defective, but any error in failing to suppress appellant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we agree with appellant that the court erred or abused its discretion in regard to the questions posed on voir dire concerning his NCR defense and pretrial publicity. Because we shall vacate appellant's convictions and remand for a new trial, we decline to reach appellant's remaining contentions.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY
A. Trial4

On August 29, 2002, Valencia Logan, appellant's wife, filed an ex parte Petition for Emergency Evaluation (the "Petition"), seeking hospitalization of appellant, claiming he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. In the Petition, which was admitted at trial, Ms. Logan alleged that appellant's "condition is worsening each day." She asserted in the Petition that appellant "sees, hears messages from ([G]od)—someone. Keeps refering [sic] to the bible, and is saying we are in Revelations." Further, she averred that there was a "clear and imminent danger" of appellant "doing harm to self or others," because he "thinks that death is imminent." That same day, the District Court for Prince George's County issued an Emergency Order, directing that appellant "be taken into custody by any peace officer and transported to Prince George's Hospital Center for examination and emergency care and treatment if necessary."

Appellant's father, James Logan, Sr., recalled that on the night of August 29, 2002, Deputies Arnaud and Magruder arrived at his home with the Emergency Order. He directed them to the basement, where appellant and his friend were "having a bible study." "After a period of time," Mr. Logan heard the male sheriff tell appellant, "`You've got to come and go with me now.'" He also heard appellant reply, "`I told you I'm not going with you anywhere.'" According to Mr. Logan, appellant came up from the basement, went into the guest bedroom, and closed the door. Arnaud and Magruder followed appellant. While Mr. Logan was in the master bedroom with his wife, he "heard something that sounded like loud pops, a few pops or something." He and his wife mistakenly thought that the deputies had shot appellant. Mr. Logan saw appellant exiting the home with what "appeared to be a weapon" in his hands.

Dr. Jack Matthew Titus, M.D., the Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, testified that Magruder died as the result of a single gunshot wound to the head. Titus further opined that Arnaud died from "[m]ultiple gunshot wounds," one of which "hit the carotid artery . . .," which "is the one that goes up to the brain and gives the brain most of its blood supply." Another gunshot wound "injured the liver," and was "associated with internal bleeding. . . ." Other wounds caused Arnaud to "hemorrhage."

Appellant was apprehended in the early morning hours of August 31, 2002, several miles from his home, in a shed adjacent to an apartment building. After being treated at Prince George's Hospital Center (the "Hospital") for injuries inflicted by the police dog deployed during the apprehension, appellant was taken to the Criminal Investigation Division ("CID") of the Prince George's County Police Department for questioning. After signing an Advice of Rights and Waiver form, appellant confessed to the shootings. Although appellant admitted that he intended to kill the sheriffs, he insisted that he was "commanded" to do so by God.

In support of his NCR defense, appellant presented the testimony of three expert witnesses: Neil Blumberg, M.D., a general and forensic psychiatrist; Joanna Brandt, M.D., a general and forensic psychiatrist; and Lawrence Donner, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist. The defense experts testified that, at the time of the shootings, appellant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, which prevented him from appreciating the criminality of his conduct or conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.

In rebuttal, the State produced the expert testimony of Scott Uithol, M.D., a general psychiatrist; Marc Tabackman, Ph.D., a psychologist; Christiane Tellefsen, M.D., a forensic psychiatrist; and Robert Phillips, M.D., a general and forensic psychologist. In general, the State's experts opined that appellant was suffering from a substance induced psychosis at the time of the shootings and was criminally responsible for his actions.

We shall include additional facts in our discussion of the issues.

B. Suppression Motion

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the statements he made during his interrogation. Logan claimed, inter alia, that he "was not properly advised of his Miranda rights, nor did he waive these rights."5 In a supplemental memorandum, appellant focused on statements made by Detective Ismael Canales of the Prince George's County Police Department. He alleged that the Miranda warnings were defective because Canales "made false and misleading statements" before and during the advisement, and these deceptive and "contradictory" statements "eviscerate[d]" the Miranda warnings.

In its opposition, the State argued that the colloquy between Detective Canales and appellant was merely "an exhortation to tell the truth and in light of the follow up conversations and advices, can in no way be said to be a promise of any sort that [appellant] relied upon." It maintains that, under Maryland law, "exhortations to tell the truth are permissible approaches for police to encourage a suspect to give a statement." Moreover, the State asserts that "[a]ny doubt as to whether Canales had promised Logan anything was soon dispelled a few moments later," when appellant stated that he had neither been promised anything nor threatened by Detective Canales.

What follows is a summary of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing with respect to the Miranda issue.6

Prince George's County Police Corporal Thomas Brown, Jr. was assigned to the "Special Operations Division K9 Unit" on the date in question. He stated that, "sometime after 1:30 a.m." on August 31, 2002, he "responded to assist" in the apprehension of appellant. Brown recalled:

We ended up tracking to a shed and a dumpster area. At that point the dog indicated the presence of a person inside the building. At that point we set up a perimeter. Several warnings were issued [to appellant] with no results. We used a pepper ball gun to deploy into the building. Several rounds were fired. Once again it [sic] was no response. We breached the doorway and sent the K9 to make apprehension.

According to Corporal Brown, appellant was in the corner of the shed and the dog was "engaged on" appellant. Brown told appellant "to stop resisting and fighting the dog, which he failed to do. . . ." At that time, "Sergeant Lipsey came in and used a Taser gun" on appellant. Appellant was then arrested. Prince George's County Police Corporal Michael Seyfried helped transport a...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Warren v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • May 2, 2012
    ...by a review of the totality of the circumstances.(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted).Miranda Waivers In Logan v. State, 164 Md.App. 1, 41, 882 A.2d 330 (2005), aff'd, 394 Md. 378, 906 A.2d 374 (2006), this Court discussed what constitutes a waiver of the Miranda rights: Althoug......
  • In re Lavar D.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 30, 2009
    ...For ease, we shall address the contention without singling out Ronald B. 15. This case is also distinguishable from Logan v. State, 164 Md.App. 1, 47-48, 882 A.2d 330 (2005), aff'd State v. Logan, 394 Md. 378, 906 A.2d 374 (2006) (statement by police officer that telling the truth would not......
  • Lee v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 7, 2009
    ...Trickery or deception that interferes with a suspect's understanding of his or her Miranda rights is prohibited. Logan v. State, 164 Md.App. 1, 41, 882 A.2d 330 (2005) ("in contrast to traditional voluntariness, `there is an absolute prohibition upon any trickery which misleads the suspect ......
  • Moore v. State, No. 27, September Term, 2009 (Md. App. 2/26/2010), 27, September Term, 2009.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 26, 2010
    ...defenses are available to a defendant who used a handgun to shoot the alleged victim. Had this test been applied in Logan v. State, 164 Md. App. 1, 882 A.2d 330 (2005), the circuit court would have concluded that, in a murder case in which the defendant has filed a plea of not criminally re......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT