Logan v. Steele
| Decision Date | 30 November 1809 |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Logan <I>vs.</I> Steele. |
THIS was an action for slanderous words. Three counts were laid in the declaration. On the second, a verdict was found for the defendant in the court below, who is appellant in this court. On the first and third, there was a verdict for the plaintiff, for two hundred dollars, and judgment rendered thereon, from which the defendant appealed. The sole question made in this court is, whether the words laid in the first and third counts of the declaration are actionable or not?
The first count, after stating a colloquium concerning a barn of the defendant, which had lately been burnt, charges the defendant with having spoken and published of, and concerning the plaintiff, the following words, to wit: "that he had every reason to believe that the said plaintiff had burnt the barn aforesaid." The third count, after stating a similar colloquium, alleges the words spoken by the defendant of the plaintiff, to be the following, to wit: "from the evidence he had concerning the burning of said barn, he the said defendant, believed that the said plaintiff had burnt the said barn."
It was contended by the appellant's counsel, that the words laid in these counts are not actionable, because they do not necessarily import guilt, as the barn may have been burnt by accident and not by design.
This objection is predicated upon the old rule of construing words in mitiori sensu. But this rule has long since been exploded, and has given way to one which accords more with reason and the common sense of mankind. It is now settled that words are to be taken in that sense in which they would be understood by those who hear or read them(a). The judge will neither torture them into guilt, nor explain them into innocence, but take them in their usual acceptation, and understand them according to their obvious import and meaning.
Tested by this doctrine, the words in question are clearly actionable. They carry with them an evident imputation of guilt, and it requires the most forced and farfetched construction, to give to them an innocent meaning. We are aware, that in Barham's case, 4 Co. Rep. 20, it was holden, that the words "he burnt my barn," were not actionable. But upon that case it is to be remarked: 1st, that it was decided during the prevalence of the ancient and now exploded rule of construing words in their mildest sense, and 2dly, that by construing...
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