Logan v. United States

• Decision Date: 30 October 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-175.,83-175.
• Citation: 483 A.2d 664
• Parties: Darryl L. LOGAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 664

483 A.2d 664

Darryl L. LOGAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 83-175.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued May 17, 1984.

Decided October 30, 1984.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jennifer P. Lyman, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., with whom Judith Mroczka and James Klein, Public Defender Service, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellant.

Terence J. Keeney, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Joseph DiGenova, U.S. Atty., and Michael W. Farrell, Judith Hetherton, and Christopher A. Myers, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, FERREN and ROG-ERS, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

This appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation. D.C.Code § 16-2301(3)(A) (1981) provides, in part, that juveniles "sixteen years of age or older" who are charged with "assault with intent to commit . . . murder" may — in the discretion of the United States Attorney — be prosecuted in the Criminal Division of Superior Court as adult criminal defendants. We are asked to determine whether this provision authorizes such adult prosecution of juveniles charged with "assault with intent to kill," in violation of D.C.Code § 22-501 (1981).

The government and appellant propose alternative interpretations of § 16-2301(3)(A). The government contends that Congress viewed "assault with intent to commit murder" and "assault with intent to kill" as "synonymous terms," and thus intended § 16-2301(3)(A) to refer directly to § 22-501. Appellant counters by pointing out that the state of mind necessary for an "intent to commit murder" is different from that required for an "intent to kill." Appellant urges this court to construe § 16-2301(3)(A) strictly, according to its plain language, so as to authorize such adult criminal prosecution only when a juvenile is explicitly charged with the offense of "assault with intent to commit murder" — a charge that only can be brought under D.C.Code § 22-503 (1981) (providing maximum five-year sentence for assault with intent to commit any offense other than those specified in §§ 22-501, -502).

While each party maintains that its interpretation of § 16-2301(3)(A) most closely approximates the meaning intended by Congress, each also concedes that its reading of the statute will lead to anomalous results in certain cases. After reviewing the parties' alternative interpretations, as well as the legislative history of § 16-2301(3)(A), we conclude that there is no way — short of engaging in a wholesale redrafting of the District's statutes on criminal assaults — to avoid the possibility of anomalous results or to implement fully the congressional intent underlying § 16-2301(3)(A). Accordingly, in light of this court's previous holding that "§ 16-2301(3) should be strictly construed against the prosecution and in favor of the person being proceeded against," United States v. Tucker, 407 A.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C.1979), and in line with the well-established rule that "`ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity,'" Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971)), we are compelled to adopt appellant's position. We remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 26, 1982, the Criminal Division of the Superior Court issued a complaint charging appellant with assault with intent to kill while armed, in connection with a shooting at Armstrong Vocational School.¹ At the same time, a warrant issued for appellant's arrest. These two documents accurately reflected the fact that appellant was seventeen years old on the date of the shooting.

The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a person accused of committing a delinquent act before his or her eighteenth birthday — which act would be criminal if committed by an adult — is accorded noncriminal treatment in the Family Division of the Superior Court. See In re C. W.M., 407 A.2d 617, 621 (D.C.1979); Black v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 393, 394, 355 F.2d 104, 105 (1965). The belief underlying this separate juvenile justice system is that youthful offenders will benefit more from "measures of guidance and rehabilitation" than from a system that "fix[es] criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The statute governing proceedings in the Family Division, however, does create two exceptions to this general rule.

First, with respect to certain juvenile offenders at least fifteen years old, the Corporation Counsel may file a motion with the Family Division requesting transfer of the juvenile for criminal prosecution. D.C. Code § 16-2307(a) (1981).² A hearing must be held on such a motion, and the Family Division must determine whether "there are reasonable prospects for rehabilitating the child before his majority." D.C.Code § 16-2307(d)-(e) (1981). Unless the Division makes a finding that there is a reasonable prospect for rehabilitation, a transfer to the Criminal Division should be approved. Id. This type of transfer has long been permitted under District law. See D.C.Code (1929 & Supp. IV 1938).

In 1970, Congress created a second exception to the general rule favoring noncriminal treatment of persons under eighteen years of age by amending the definition of "child" in D.C.Code § 16-2301(3). The new definition provides that a person "sixteen years of age or older" will not be considered a "child," subject to Family Division jurisdiction, if that person has been:

(A) charged by the United States attorney with (i) murder, forcible rape, burglary in the first degree, robbery while armed, or assault with intent to commit any such offense, or (ii) an offense listed in clause (i) and any other offense properly joinable with such an offense;

D.C.Code § 16-2301(3)(A) (1981) (emphasis added).³ Sixteen- and seventeen-year-old persons charged with one of the offenses specified in this section may be indicted, tried, and sentenced as adults in the Criminal Division without prior judicial approval or determination of their individual prospects for rehabilitation. The decision whether to bring criminal charges and to prosecute such persons as adults is left to the discretion of the United States Attorney. See United States v. Bland, 153 U.S. App.D.C. 254, 261, 472 F.2d 1329, 1336 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 2294, 36 L.Ed.2d 975 (1973). In sum, the definition of "child" allows for the prosecution of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths in the Criminal Division, without leave of the Family Division, upon the filing of certain types of criminal charges, In re C.S., 384 A.2d 407, 411 n. 7 (D.C.1977).

After appellant's arrest on charges of assault with intent to kill, the United States Attorney's Office decided to try him as an adult in the Criminal Division. Believing that the charge is within the scope of the offenses listed in § 16-2301(3)(A), the prosecutor did not file a motion with the Family Division for a transfer. Instead, he proceeded, without prior judicial approval, to obtain an indictment charging appellant with assault with intent to kill while armed, D.C.Code §§ 22-501, -3202 (1981), and carrying a pistol without a license, D.C. Code § 22-3204 (1981).

Appellant's trial counsel negotiated a plea agreement with the government. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon, a lesser included offense of assault with intent to kill. In return, the government agreed to dismiss the other charges.

At the guilty plea hearing in the Criminal Division, however, appellant's counsel raised the issue of whether § 16-2301(3)(A) authorized appellant's prosecution as an adult:

I should call to the [c]ourt's attention before we proceed with this plea . . . I think there might be a problem with the [c]ourt's subject matter jurisdiction in this case . . . . I haven't completely researched the question, [but] it is not altogether clear to me that he [appellant] can be charged as an adult [f]or assault with intent to kill while armed . . . under the relevant jurisdictional statute.

Appellant nonetheless indicated a willingness to go forward with his guilty plea and to raise his jurisdictional challenge at a later date. The Assistant United States Attorney, after making clear that he believed the court did have jurisdiction, requested that "the [c]ourt go ahead with the plea, and if counsel has any legal authorities on that matter, he can present them at a later date." The court then accepted appellant's guilty plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

Before sentencing, appellant filed a written motion challenging the Criminal Division's jurisdiction on the ground that appellant had not been properly transferred from the Family Division. The trial court rejected appellant's strict construction of § 16-2301(3)(A) and denied the motion. It reasoned that the use of the word "murder" in § 16-2301(3)(A), instead of the word "kill" used in § 22-501, "appears to me to be just a question of pure semantics." The court nonetheless agreed to postpone sentencing and entry of judgment until after appellant had an opportunity to pursue an interlocutory appeal. See Choco v. United States, 383 A.2d 333, 334-35 (D.C.1978) (permitting interlocutory appeal of a trial court order denying appellant's motion for a transfer to the Family Division).

II. THE WAIVER ISSUE

As a preliminary matter, we must address the government's contention that appellant waived his right to challenge the trial court's ruling on § 16-2301(3)(A) because he failed to obtain the ruling and file an appeal before entering his guilty plea. The government bases its argument on D.C.Code § 16-2302 (1981), which governs the transfer of improperly...