Loges v. Mack Trucks, Inc.

• Citation: 417 S.E.2d 538,308 S.C. 134
• Decision Date: 06 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 23617,23617
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Parties: , 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1009, 7 IER Cases 666 Tina LOGES, Appellant, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC., and Steven T. Grove, of whom Mack Trucks, Inc., is Respondent. Steven T. GROVE, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Ralph LOGES, Third-Party Defendant.

Page 538

417 S.E.2d 538

308 S.C. 134, 58 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1009,

7 IER Cases 666

Tina LOGES, Appellant, v. MACK TRUCKS, INC., and Steven T. Grove, of whom Mack Trucks, Inc., is Respondent.

Steven T. GROVE, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. Ralph LOGES, Third-Party Defendant.

No. 23617.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Submitted Feb. 20, 1991.

Decided April 6, 1992.

Stephen R. Fitzer, Columbia, for appellant.

Henry S. Knight, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

FINNEY, Justice:

Appellant Tina Loges appeals the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to respondent Mack Trucks, Inc., in her action for negligent supervision alleging, inter alia, slander by Steven T. Grove, its employee. We affirm so much of the ruling as grants summary judgment on the allegations of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the cause of action for slander.

This action resulted from allegations of harassment of the appellant by Grove during late 1988 and early 1989 while both were employed by Mack Trucks. Initially, appellant and Grove shared a car pool to work. The appellant asserts that after four or five weeks, she ended the car pool arrangement because Grove was infatuated with her; and thereafter, he commenced harassing her.

The complaint alleges that on various occasions Grove publicly called the appellant a slut, bitch, whore; accused her of committing adultery and of having contracted Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS); that Grove used his car in an attempt to run her car off the road, threw hardware at her, physically pushed her, and anonymously sent flowers to her on Valentine's Day, then denied doing so. The incidents are alleged to have occurred either on the premises of Mack Trucks, while Grove and the appellant were traveling to or from work, or had their origin at Mack Trucks.

It is undisputed that appellant reported incidents of harassment to the management of Mack Trucks several times. According to the record, Mack Trucks assured appellant that the necessary action was being taken to end the offensive behavior. During the period of the complaints, Mack Trucks issued Grove disciplinary notices as well as written and verbal warnings to avoid all contact with the appellant.

On Mack Truck's motion for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the claim was precluded by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-540 (1985). Appellant argues that her action does not fall under the scope of the Act.

Section 42-1-540 provides:

The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death.

Recovery under the Act is the exclusive means of settling personal injury claims which come under the Act. Doe v. S.C. State Hospital, 285 S.C. 183, 328 S.E.2d 652 (Ct.App.1985). However, only other actions arising from personal injury or death are barred. In Dockins v. Ingles Markets, Inc., --- S.C. ----, 411 S.E.2d 437 (1991) this Court held that slander actions are not barred by the Act's exclusivity provision since the gravamen of a slander action is injury to one's reputation, although damages for emotional injuries are recoverable under the Act.

Thus, to the extent appellant alleges Mack Trucks' negligence was the proximate cause of injury arising from the slanderous conduct of Grove, her claim is not barred by the Act.

We hold that summary judgment is appropriate on the allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery as these constitute personal injuries within the scope of the Act. See Powell v. Vulcan Materials Co., 299 S.C. 325, 384 S.E.2d 725 (1989); Thompson v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 199 S.C. 304, 19 S.E.2d 226 (1942).

Relying upon Stewart v. McLellan's Stores Co., 194 S.C. 50, 9 S.E.2d 35 (1940), appellant contends the Act is inapplicable because she suffered no physical disability or loss compensable thereunder. In Doe, supra, the Court of Appeals held that physical disability is not a prerequisite to invoking the exclusivity provision of the Act. The Court reasoned:

Stewart was decided primarily upon the basis of an employer's assault upon an employee. The case carefully distinguished assaults upon employees by "outsiders." While Stewart does not contain language indicating that a "physical disability" is necessary for the Act to constitute the exclusive remedy, Thompson v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., decided immediately after Stewart, not only limits Stewart to its facts, but casts a considerable doubt upon any conclusion in Stewart regarding disability as a prerequisite to exclusivity. No mention was made in Thompson, except by the dissent, of any additional requirement of disability to make the Act exclusive. A majority in Thompson implicitly rejected the dissent's reliance upon Stewart for the idea that, without a showing in the complaint of physical disability, a tort action against the employer would lie.

Doe v....