Logner v. State of North Carolina

Decision Date29 November 1966
Docket NumberNo. C-130-G-66.,C-130-G-66.
Citation260 F. Supp. 970
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
PartiesLouis Anthony LOGNER, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent.

Norman E. Williams and Richard M. Hutson, II, Durham, N. C., for petitioner.

Thomas Wade Bruton, Atty. Gen. of North Carolina, and Theodore C. Brown, Jr., Staff Atty., North Carolina Dept. of Justice, Raleigh, N. C., for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GORDON, District Judge.

The petitioner, Louis Anthony Logner, a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, has filed with this Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 2254. The petitioner contends that:

1. The admission of incriminating statements obtained while he was illegally detained without the benefit of counsel and while he was in an extreme state of intoxication due to over-indulgence in alcohol and narcotics was a violation of the due process requirements of the Constitution of the United States.

2. His state of intoxication at the time of the alleged incriminating statements was such as to deprive him of any meaningful capacity to make a free and intentional choice to incriminate himself.

3. The state court's application of the standard of voluntariness, which primarily considered the reliability of the confession as the test for its voluntariness and not the "totality of circumstances," denied him the correct constitutional standard of voluntariness required by due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The petitioner was tried for the offense of safecracking and safe robbery at the July, 1965, Special Criminal Term of the Superior Court, Durham, North Carolina. The petitioner was found guilty on his plea of not guilty and sentenced to not less than ten nor more than fifteen years in prison.

On the night of November 16, 1964, thieves broke into the office of the McCracken Oil Company in Oxford, North Carolina. They removed the safe containing over $10,000.00 in cash and checks from its concrete foundation and carried it away. At the petitioner's trial in connection with this offense the state offered into evidence certain alleged statements petitioner made on November 18, 1964. The petitioner objected to the use of these statements. He contended that he was so intoxicated at the time that all such statements were involuntary, and that any waiver of his constitutional rights had been ineffectual. The trial judge, in the absence of the jury, heard evidence and made specific findings of fact as to the confessions and determined that all were voluntary under the applicable standards. After the judge had determined that the statements were admissible, the evidence which had been heard to determine their admissibility was repeated in more detail before the jury.

After the finding of guilty, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, objecting to the use of these statements. In the decision, State v. Logner, 266 N.C. 238, 145 S.E.2d 867 (1966), the Supreme Court held that the evidence supported the trial judge's findings that the defendant's statements to the police were voluntary and that the defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be represented by counsel.

After certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied in Logner v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 1013, 86 S.Ct. 1983, 16 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1966), the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court on July 12, 1966.

Even though a full factual hearing had been given in the trial court on the contentions of the petitioner now before us, a plenary hearing was granted and was held in Durham, North Carolina, on October 20, 1966. From the testimony at the hearing and from consideration of the transcript from the original trial in the Superior Court of Durham, North Carolina, the following facts were developed.

Petitioner at the time was forty-three years of age. He had recently been released from prison in June of 1964. He has had a serious drinking problem since childhood. Petitioner started drinking at the age of six or seven and will drink anything with any alcoholic content; it makes no difference. In addition, he takes stimulants of all kinds in large quantities. He has a number of arrests for public drunkenness and the records of Duke Hospital reflect treatment for alcoholism in 1954.

On the date in question, November 18, 1964, the petitioner had been drinking and taking stimulants over an extended period of time. That particular morning, in addition to consuming liquor, petitioner had been taking Syndrox, an amphetamine, in large quantities. At about 11:30 A.M. on November 18, 1964, Detectives Hartley and Morris of the Police Department of the City of Durham, observed the petitioner in downtown Durham and noted that "he wasn't walking like a sober man." The officers thought the petitioner was drunk, but not drunk enough to warrant being arrested for public drunkenness. However, when he drove away in his car, they followed him fearing an accident might result. Their apprehension was justified, because the petitioner had gone only two or three blocks before he was involved in a traffic accident. After failing to negotiate a left turn properly, he hit two cars in the line of approaching traffic. The police officers were immediately behind the petitioner and observed the wreck take place. The driver of one of the cars in the accident testified that the petitioner was obviously drunk and was even unable to put his car in reverse to back away from the cars with which he had just collided. Also, that he had to be assisted from his car by the police officers when he was taken to their car.

Detectives Morris and Hartley called for a patrolman to investigate the accident and took the petitioner into custody for driving under the influence. Patrolman Watson, who investigated the accident, noted in his report, "The driver of Vehicle # 1 (petitioner) was drunk and was unable to give a statement as to what happen (sic)."

Once in the police car, the petitioner stated to the effect that he could pay for the damage to the other cars and that they (meaning the police officers) knew where the money came from. At this time, the petitioner was in custody for drunken driving only, and was not in custody for safe robbery, although the police officers admitted the petitioner would have to be a natural suspect in any safe job. After this initial statement by the petitioner, the officers stated that the petitioner was warned of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel.

When the petitioner arrived at the police station, he was not placed in jail after the initial processing, but was taken to an interrogation room. One of the police officers stated that the purpose in taking the petitioner to the interrogation room was to amplify the statements the petitioner had made earlier in the patrol car. Both officers testified the petitioner was under the influence of intoxicants at this time. Further warnings as to his constitutional rights were repeated and to this the petitioner replied, "I can tell you anything I want to. You still have to prove it." After some questioning the petitioner made a statement implicating himself in the McCracken Oil Company robbery and a local safe robbery at the residence of one Johnson on Indian Trail Road in Durham. This initial interrogation lasted approximately thirty minutes, from 12:00 to around 12:30 P.M.

About 2:30 P.M. the same date, the prisoner was interrogated again by the same two police officers. In response to an accusation that the petitioner was given liquor by the police, one police officer testified, "He didn't need any liquor to loosen him up, he was already gone." With encouragement, the petitioner repeated his earlier statement implicating himself in the two safe robberies and told the police officers that he could show them where a safe was located. So the two police officers left the police station and made a trip to Orange County, in the vicinity of Murphy School. The petitioner could not locate the safe from the McCracken Oil Company. During this search, petitioner was confused and unsure of the location of the safe. Both officers testified that they had little patience with the petitioner because he was drunk. On the way back to town, the petitioner brought up the Johnson safe again and directed the officers to where it was located.

At approximately 7:30 P.M. that night, the petitioner was interrogated for a third time in one of the interrogation rooms at the Durham Police Station. On this occasion there were four law enforcement officers present, the two police officers who had been with the petitioner all day, plus the Police Chief of the City of Oxford and a Special Agent from the State Bureau of Investigation. The S.B.I. agent testified that upon his arrival the petitioner was warned as to his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The Police Chief and the S.B.I. agent testified that the petitioner had been drinking previously and that he had an odor of alcohol about him; that his eyes were red and his hair was mussed and out of place. The officers testified that at this time the petitioner asked repeatedly that he be given a drink. This period of interrogation lasted until around midnight and during the course of the questioning, the petitioner made the same statement that he had made earlier to the other police officers; however, the petitioner had not previously made a written statement and refused to sign one at that time.

The next morning, November 19, 1964, the petitioner was taken from the Durham Jail for a second trip to Orange County for the purpose of finding the McCracken Oil Company safe. At this time, the petitioner was suffering from an acute hangover after his extended drunk and was noticeably nervous and sick. After a search of...

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