Lohan v. Walgreens Co.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-1305,84-1305
• Citation: 488 N.E.2d 679,140 Ill.App.3d 171,94 Ill.Dec. 680
• Parties: , 94 Ill.Dec. 680 Helen LOHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALGREENS COMPANY and Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 679

488 N.E.2d 679

140 Ill.App.3d 171, 94 Ill.Dec. 680

Helen LOHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WALGREENS COMPANY and Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. Defendants-Appellees.

No. 84-1305.

Appellate Court of Illinois First District, Fifth Division.

Jan. 17, 1986.

Bruce A. Dickman, and Michael D. Gerstein, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Tyrrell & Flynn, Chicago (Michael A. Tyrrell, Marcia L. Cohen, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

LORENZ, Justice:

Plaintiff Helen Lohan appeals from a circuit court order granting summary judgment for defendants Walgreens Company and Dominick's Finer Foods, Incorporated, in plaintiff's suit for personal injuries sustained when she slipped and fell in the vestibule of a common entranceway to the defendants' stores.

We affirm.

In her second amended complaint the plaintiff alleged that on October 15, 1978 she slipped and fell on the wet surface of a common entranceway to the defendants' stores on 87th Street and Cicero Avenue in Chicago. Plaintiff further alleged that although it was the duty of the defendants to keep the area in a safe condition and it was their custom and practice to set out safety mats in inclement weather, they did not do so on the date in question. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were negligent in having permitted water to remain on the floor and in failing to warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition of the wet floor.

In her deposition the plaintiff stated that there was a "nice downpour" on the day of the accident, a rain which continued until she fell. As she approached the outer electronically-controlled door to the defendants' vestibule she observed a rubber mat on each side of the door. These mats were wet, as was the concrete leading up to the mat. She entered the first door and stepped onto the inside mat. The surface of the floor inside the vestibule was also wet. As she stepped off the mat onto that floor she slipped and fell.

The plaintiff said she did not know why her foot slipped. "It was like an impression like you slip on a small piece of paper, or, you know, just wet cement or tile." However, she neither saw nor felt any paper when she fell. Nor did she observe any debris or any puddles on the floor.

Willis Browning, store manager for Dominick's at the time of the accident, stated in his deposition that in his eight years at the store it had always been the practice and policy to put down additional safety mats in the vestibule when it snowed or rained.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff admittedly could not establish the cause of her fall and that even assuming the evidence could establish a fall caused by tracked-in water, defendants were not liable for injuries arising from such a natural accumulation. The trial court initially denied the motions, but subsequently, upon the defendants' motion for reconsideration, granted summary judgment for the defendants. Plaintiff appealed from that latter order.

In this court the plaintiff has asked for leave to file a supplementary report of proceedings containing a transcript of the original hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment. The trial court refused to certify this transcript and defendants have objected to its filing in this court. Plaintiff has failed to inform this court of the basis of the trial court's refusal. Furthermore, plaintiff has represented to this court that the transcript at issue contains no evidentiary matters, only legal argument. Plaintiff was of course free to present the same legal arguments to this court. Under these circumstances we deny plaintiff's motion. Supreme Court Rule 329, 87 Ill.2d R. 329.

As we have noted it is defendants' contention that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiff could not even identify the cause of her fall. We need not reach this question, however, because we find that even assuming, as plaintiff contends, that plaintiff slipped because the floor was wet from tracked-in moisture, defendants as a matter of law are not liable for this natural accumulation.

It is undisputed that as a general rule a landowner has no liability for injuries resulting from natural accumulations of substances such as ice, snow or water. (Wolter v. Chicago Melrose Park Associates (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 1011, 25 Ill.Dec. 224, 386 N.E.2d 495.) Nor does the owner have a duty to continuously remove the tracks left by customers who have walked through such natural accumulations. Bakeman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1974), 16 Ill.App.3d 1065, 307 N.E.2d 449. Contrary to plaintiff's contentions these principles also apply to snow or water that is tracked inside a building from natural accumulations outside. Walker v. Chicago Transit Authority (1980), 92 Ill.App.3d 120, 48 Ill.Dec. 115, 416 N.E.2d 10; Moran v. St. Paul Federal Savings & Loan Association (1967), 83 Ill.App.2d 478, 228 N.E.2d 97.

In Walker the plaintiff had entered a CTA station on a rainy day and slipped on a puddle of water that had accumulated at the bottom of a stairway. The evidence established that the entire station was wet due to tracked-in water. In affirming a directed verdict for the defendant this court found that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the puddle of water was anything other than a natural accumulation caused by the weather, for which a landowner was not liable.

In Moran v. St. Paul Federal Savings & Loan Association (1967), 83 Ill.App.2d 478, 228 N.E.2d 97, the plaintiff had slipped on stairs in defendant's building. The evidence established that snow had been tracked in to the point where the plaintiff slipped. Plaintiff had also introduced some conflicting testimony concerning a foreign substance on the stairs, but the court held the evidence insufficient to present a jury question on the issue of negligence. As to the tracked-in snow the reviewing court found that the presence of this wetness, plainly visible to all persons, could not establish negligence on the defendant's part,...