Lohss v. State
| Decision Date | 27 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 297,297 |
| Citation | 321 A.2d 534,272 Md. 113 |
| Parties | Lawrence H. LOHSS and Donald M. Sprenkle, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. * |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Theodore G. Bloom, Annapolis (Albert J. Goodman and Goodman & Bloom, Annapolis, on the brief), for Donald M. Sprenkle, Jr.
Joseph H. Rouse, Asst. Public Defender, Annapolis, for Lawrence H. Lohss.
James G. Klair, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE and O'DONNELL, JJ.
The question presented in these two cases is whether the State has a right of appeal from the dismissal of indictments by the circuit court where the State acquiesced in one case and moved for dismissal in the other. The Court of Special Appeals held that it did in State v. Lohss and Sprenkle, 19 Md.App. 489, 313 A.2d 87 (1973), and also decided that the trial court had erred in granting motions to suppress certain key evidence which led directly to the dismissals. We granted appellants' petitions for writs of certiorari in order that we might review the correctness of those decisions. We reverse because we have concluded that the Court of Special Appeals lacked jurisdiction to entertain the State's appeal, but, unlike that court, we shall not reach the trial court's ruling on the motions to suppress.
In the waning moments of August 31, 1972, appellant, Sprenkle, disembarked from a plane at Friendship International Airport, which he had boarded at Dallas, Texas after commencing his travels at Austin earlier that evening. He was met at the airport by appellant, Lohss, and a young lady with a small child. This seemingly happy reunion was marred by the arrival of several members of the Maryland State Police who, in addition to also greeting Sprenkle, promptly relieved him of his luggage consisting of three suitcases. The contents disgorged by a search of the luggage led to the indictment of appellants, and became the object of their motions to suppress.
The motions came on for hearing before Judge Wray of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. After receiving extensive testimony concerning the events preceding and culminating in the seizure of the suitcases, he granted the motions, ruling that the 'search was illegal,' and thereby foreclosed the State 'from introducing into evidence the contents of the suitcases taken from (appellants).' As we do not reach the correctness of that decision, it is unnecessary for us to dwell upon the reasons which produced that result. They are detailed in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.
Shortly after the circuit court ruling, appellant, Lohss, filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in which he alleged that '. . . the State has no admissible evidence to support the charges contained in the indictment . . ..' After communicating with the prosecuting attorney and formally noting that he 'concede(d)' and had 'no objection,' the trial court passed an order dismissing the indictment as to Lohss. Later, after an intervening skirmish, the State filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as to Sprenkle, in which it alleged '(t)hat without the said suppressed evidence the State is unable to present any facts to support the charges contained in the above referenced indictment and has no means of obtaining further evidence.' There being no objection by Sprenkle, the trial court ordered that the indictment be dismissed as to him. It is upon the appeals which the State took from those two orders that we focus our attention. 1
The Court of Special Appeals rested its decision on an interpretation of Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol.) Art. 5, § 14, then applicable to this case, which has now been recodified, in essentially the same language, as Code (1974), § 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Article 5, § 14 provided 'The State may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from a final order or judgment granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing any indictment, information, presentment or inquisition in a criminal action, but the State shall have no right of appeal in any criminal action where the defendant has been tried and acquitted.' (emphasis added.)
Construing this language to mean that 'the State may appeal . . . from the dismissal of an indictment irrespective of the reasons motivating such dismissal,' and finding 'nothing in the unambiguous language of the statute to indicate that the Legislature intended to exclude from the right of the State to appeal from any order dismissing an indictment, an order in which the dismissal was predicated upon the grant(ing) of a motion to suppress evidence,' the Court of Special Appeals held that its jurisdiction was unaffected 'by who initiates the order of dismissal,' 19 Md.App. at 493-494, 313 A.2d at 90; and further held that it possessed jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.
Our consideration of the question presented here necessarily commences with a recognition of the principle that in Maryland, appellate jurisdiction is dependent upon a statutory grant of power, Mace Produce v. State's Attorney, 251 Md. 503, 508-509, 248 A.2d 346 (1968); Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 250 Md. 306, 309, 242 A.2d 506 (1968); Switkes v. John McShain, 202 Md. 340, 343, 96 A.2d 617 (1953); Johnson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 196 Md. 400, 406-407, 76 A.2d 736 (1950); State v. North. Cent. Railway Co., 18 Md. 193, 210 (1862); see Insurance Comm'r v. Allstate Ins., 268 Md. 428, 444-445, 302 A.2d 200 (1973); this is no less true, of course, in criminal cases, State v. Denisio, Md.App., 318 A.2d 559 (1974); Neal v. State, 20 Md.App. 20, 22, 314 A.2d 710 (1974); State v. Mather, 7 Md.App. 549, 552, 256 A.2d 532 (1969); see State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341, 351, 76 A.2d 575 (1950).
Not since the enactment in 1957 of Art. 5, § 14, in its original form, have we had occasion to consider the question whether the State has a right to appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has flatly held that it does not. State v. Lohss and Sprenkle, supra, 19 Md.App. at 496, 313 A.2d 87; State v. Graziano et al., 17 Md.App. 276, 284, 301 A.2d 36 (1973); State v. Siegel, 13 Md.App. 444, 470-471, 285 A.2d 671 (1971), aff'd on other grounds, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972); State v. Mather, 7 Md.App. 549, 552-553, 256 A.2d 532 (1969); State v. Campbell and Reeves, 7 Md.App. 538, 542, 256 A.2d 537 (1969); see Pearce v. State, 8 Md.App. 477, 478, 261 A.2d 39 (1970); and Harris v. State, 6 Md.App. 7, 19, 249 A.2d 723 (1969), cert. denied, 255 Md. 741 (1969). In State v. Barshack, 197 Md. 543, 80 A.2d 32 (1951) and State v. Adams, supra, both decided prior to the enactment of § 14, we held that the State's common law right of appeal did not afford it the right to appellate review of the granting of either a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence or a motion to quash a search warrant. Cf. State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167, 28 A.2d 829 (1942).
In Adams, supra, Judge Markell, for the Court, concluded his scholarly summary of the common law right of appeal in criminal cases by stating that '(i)f a broader right of review is necessary in the interest of criminal justice, it must be granted by the legislature,' 196 Md. at 351, 76 A.2d at 579. The same statement was quoted with approval in Barshack,supra, where we dismissed an appeal from the granting of a motion to quash a search warrant. The rationale for that holding was succinctly stated: 'The granting of the motion (to quash) was no more final than would be any other ruling excluding testimony at a trial.' 197 Md. at 544, 80 A.2d at 33. We agree with the observation by then Chief Judge Murphy, for the Court of Special Appeals, in State v. Mather, supra, 7 Md.App. at 552, 256 A.2d at 534, '. . . that the Legislature, in enacting Section 14, did not grant the 'broader right of review' mentioned in Adams, but, on the contrary, limited the scope of the State's right to appeal to final orders or judgments granting a motion to dismiss or quashing the indictment.' In any event, we regard it as well-settled that the State has no right of appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress evidence alleged to have been obtained as the result of an unlawful search and seizure.
The State readily concedes that its appeal from the circuit court was merely a 'vehicle' for obtaining review of the trial judge's ruling on the motions to suppress. Nevertheless, it clings to the argument-successfully maintained in the Court of Special Appeals-that its appeal was '. . . from a final order or judgment granting a motion to dismiss . . .' the indictment. To be sure, as the Court of Special Appeals noted, if that court did possess jurisdiction under § 14, it could properly review the trial court ruling on the pretrial motion to suppress to the same extent that it might have reached any other interlocutory order under Maryland Rule 1087.
The question presented here, therefore, is whether this was an appeal '. . . from a final order or judgment granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing any indictment, . . .' within the meaning of Art. 5, § 14; and, even if it were, whether the State was precluded from prosecuting its appeal by having effectively agreed to one dismissal and having initiated the other. In the view we take of this case, it becomes unnecessary for us to decide the first part of the question, since we think the State was barred from appealing even if we assume arguendo that this was a dismissal within the contemplation of § 14.
As we see it, the State is in the anomalous position of appealing from two orders to which it consented. In civil cases this Court has adhered to the rule that, to have standing for maintaining an appeal, one must be aggrieved by the decision from which the appeal is taken, Adm'r, Motor Veh. Adm. v. Vogt, ...
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