Lomax v. Officer Reynolds of Miami Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 28 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 3D13–1133.,3D13–1133.
• Parties: Mattie LOMAX, Petitioner, v. Officer REYNOLDS of the City of Miami Police Department and Winn–Dixie Stores, Inc., Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

119 So.3d 562

Mattie LOMAX, Petitioner,
v.
Officer REYNOLDS of the City of Miami Police Department and Winn–Dixie Stores, Inc., Respondents.

No. 3D13–1133.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Third District.

Aug. 28, 2013.

[119 So.3d 563]

Mattie Lomax, pro se.

Julie O. Bru, City Attorney, Christopher A. Green and John A. Greco, Assistant City Attorneys, Miami, for Respondent, Officer Reynolds of the City of Miami Police Department.

Before, SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and SUAREZ, JJ.

WELLS, Judge.

Mattie Lomax appeals from the denial of her motion to disqualify the trial judge hearing this action against a City of Miami Police Officer which stems from the officer's purported tortious conduct.¹ Lomax's underlying complaint recounts how Lomax allegedly was threatened by City of Miami Police Officer Reynolds in a Winn–Dixie supermarket when Lomax came to the defense of a young child, who, according to Lomax, was being yelled at by the officer. Lomax maintains that when she spoke up on the child's behalf, the officer threatened her. Here, she appeals the denial of her motion to disqualify the trial judge hearing her claim based on the assertion that the trial judge had ruled against her in another proceeding. That declaration standing alone being an insufficient basis for disqualification, we affirm. See Williams v. State, 689 So.2d 393, 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“It is well-settled law that a judge's adverse rulings may not serve as a sufficient basis for recusal.”); Heier v. Fleet, 642 So.2d 669, 670 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“Adverse judicial rulings are not a proper basis for disqualification of the judge.”).

We now add the instant appeal to those numerous appeals filed by Lomax which this Court has found to be wholly without merit and/or in violation of the

[119 So.3d 564]

Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.² Having reviewed the record in this case

[119 So.3d 565]

and the most recent spate of appeals by Lomax, and having given Lomax full opportunity to set out her positions on the merits in many of those cases—all of which we have concluded were unmeritorious and/or in violation of the appellate rules—we now conclude, as have a number of trial judges before us—that Lomax is a vexatious litigant. See Lomax v. Miami–Dade State Attorney's Office, ––– So.3d –––– (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (3D13–370, affirming a trial court order finding Lomax to be a vexatious litigant and precluding further pro se filings absent first making a meritorious showing before an administrative judge); Lomax v. City of Hialeah Gardens, –––So.3d –––– (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (affirming consolidated appeals from four orders rendered by four different circuit court judges (3D13–362, 3D13–364, 3D13–369, and 3D13–783) arising out of a single incident at a local Walmart, each order finding Lomax to be a vexatious litigant and precluding further pro se filings).

This determination broadens our prior prohibition on Lomax's self-representation in this Court, set forth in Lomax v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 100 So.3d 168 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012):

After consideration of Appellee's motion to require pro se Appellant to obtain counsel, Appellant's response thereto, and independent review of Appellant's multiple filings in this court, we grant Appellee's motion under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410. See also May v. Barthet, 934 So.2d 1184 (Fla.2006) (prohibiting future pro se filings as sanctions for filing frivolous appeals); Jenkins v. Motorola, Inc., 62 So.3d 1210 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So.2d 980, 985–88 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Appellant, Mattie Lomax, is hereby prohibited from filing further pro se proceedings in this court regarding foreclosure and/or eviction from property located at 123 and 1391/2 NW 15 Street, Miami, Florida, unless represented by a member in good standing of the Florida Bar.

Our observations in Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So.2d 980 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), are directly applicable to the situation at hand. There we observed:

The Florida Supreme Court has said:

Abuse of the legal system is a serious matter, one that requires this Court to exercise its inherent authority to prevent. As we held in Rivera v. State, 728 So.2d 1165, 1166 (Fla.1998): “This Court has a responsibility to ensure every citizen's access to courts. To further that end, this Court has prevented abusive litigants from continuously filing frivolous petitions, thus enabling the Court to devote its finite resources to those who have not abused the system.”

Although rare, we have not hesitated to sanction petitioners who abuse the legal process by requiring them to be represented by counsel in future actions. In

[119 So.3d 566]

Jackson v. Florida Department of Corrections, 790 So.2d 398 (Fla.2001), the sanction of requiring a member of The Florida Bar to sign all of petitioner's filings with this Court and dismissing all other pending cases was imposed on a litigious inmate who repeatedly filed frivolous lawsuits that disrupted the Court's proceedings. In Martin v. State, 747 So.2d 386, 389 (Fla.2000), the sanction was imposed against a petitioner who, like Lussy, repeatedly filed lawsuits that included personal attacks on judges, were “abusive,” “malicious,” “insulting,” and demeaning to the judiciary. In Attwood v. Singletary, 661 So.2d 1216 (Fla.1995), the petitioner was sanctioned for filing numerous frivolous petitions, including one that was filed shortly after the Court's order to show cause was issued.

Like the individual in Attwood, Lussy has abused the processes of this Court with his constant filings. Accordingly, a limitation on Lussy's ability to file would further the constitutional right of access because it would permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the consideration of legitimate claims filed by others. See generally In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158 (1989) (finding that “[e]very paper filed...