Lombard v. Lennox

• Decision Date: 25 November 1891
• Citation: 155 Mass. 70,28 N.E. 1125
• Parties: LOMBARD v. LENNOX.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

155 Mass. 70

28 N.E. 1125

LOMBARD v. LENNOX.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

November 25, 1891

It appeared in evidence that plaintiff was employed by Waldo L. Pevear, a manufacturer of boots and shoes; that there was a general understanding between such manufacturers, in case an apprentice to one went to work for another, that upon that fact being called to the attention of the latter he should discharge the apprentice. Defendant being also a manufacturer, believing plaintiff to be an apprentice of his, so informed said Pevear, who thereupon discharged plaintiff. As a matter of fact, plaintiff had been an apprentice of defendant, but was not at that time. Upon these facts plaintiff requested the court to rule that plaintiff was entitled to damages for the injury to his feelings, but the judge refused so to rule.

COUNSEL

Wm. D Northend, for plaintiff.

M.P Moulton and J.F. Hannan, for defendant.

OPINION

KNOWLTON J.

We understand the plaintiff's counsel and the presiding justice to have intended to present by this bill of exceptions the question whether, on the facts found, the court might properly infer that there was an injury to the plaintiff's feelings for which he should have compensation, and not the question whether these facts conclusively establish the existence of such an injury. If the ordinary and natural consequence of the acts set out in a declaration and proved in an action of tort is to cause an injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, and if the acts are done willfully, or with gross carelessness of the rights of the plaintiff, damages may be recovered for mental suffering. This rule has been applied in actions of trespass to real estate as well as in others. Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281; Fillebrown v. Hoar, 124 Mass. 580, 585. The wrongful act of the defendant in the present case was analogous to an ordinary actionable slander. It was a false statement, unjustifiably made, which imputed to the plaintiff a disregard of his obligations as apprentice to the defendant, and which had the effect to deprive the plaintiff of the employment on which he relied for his support. In Markham v. Russell, 12 Allen, 573, Chief Justice BIGELOW says: "Undoubtedly the material element of damage in an action for slander is the injury done to character. But it is not the sole element. A jury have a right also to consider the mental suffering which may have been occasioned to ...