Lombardo v. City of Dallas
Decision Date | 30 June 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 6251.,6251. |
Citation | 73 S.W.2d 475 |
Parties | LOMBARDO v. CITY OF DALLAS et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
W. S. Bramlett, J. T. Kelly, and Angelo Piranio, all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.
James J. Collins, Hugh S. Grady, H. P. Kucera, A. A. Long, and W. Hughes Knight, all of Dallas, for defendants in error.
This case is before us by writ of error and involves primarily the validity of the zoning statutes of the state and the zoning ordinance of the city of Dallas. Both were upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals in an able opinion by Associate Justice Looney. 47 S.W.(2d) 495. We refer to that opinion for a sufficient statement of the case.
The legislative act, by virtue of which the zoning ordinance was adopted, was enacted in 1927 (Acts 40th Legislature, p. 424, c. 283), and may be found as articles 1011a to 1011j, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. The first three of the articles are the ones which contain the grants of power and are vitally involved in the case before us. These three articles read as follows:
The articles of the statute which follow the above contain elaborate provisions relative to the exercise of the power of zoning by a municipality; but since these are not involved, except as they are a part of the ones we have previously quoted, we shall not quote them, nor make a full statement with reference thereto. It is to be observed from the articles quoted that the zoning power is to be exercised for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, and that the zoning power of the municipality is to be exercised in accordance with some comprehensive plan designed:
(a) "To lessen congestion in the streets."
(b) "To secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers."
(c) "To promote health and general welfare."
(d) "To provide adequate light and air."
(e) "To prevent the over-crowding of land."
(f) "To avoid undue concentration of population."
(g) "To facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements."
By the terms of article 1011b it is obvious that the city may exercise the powers granted by dividing the municipality into districts and within the districts "it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land," etc. It is clear from a reading of this statute that the insistence that it is not broad enough to authorize the exclusion of business enterprises or gasoline filling stations from a residential district is untenable. The language employed is sufficient for such purpose. Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) vol. 2, § 665, p. 1002; Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend (N. Y.) 100; Cronin v. People, 82 N. Y. 318, 37 Am. Rep. 564; Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. 17, 4 So. 397, 5 Am. St. Rep. 328; State v. Beattie, 16 Mo. App. 131; City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, 7 So. 885, 9 L. R. A. 69, 23 Am. St. Rep. 558; People v. Pratt, 129 N. Y. 68, 29 N. E. 7. See also many additional cases cited by Dillon. City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill. 494, 44 N. E. 853, 35 L. R. A. 84, 53 Am. St. Rep. 325; St. Louis v. Russell, 116 Mo. 248, 22 S. W. 470, 20 L. R. A. 721.
The city of Dallas in compliance with the statute, and in accordance with a comprehensive plan, zoned the city. In the first section of the zoning ordinance the city declares:
Section 2 of the ordinance divided the city into zones and declared that except as provided in the ordinance no building should be erected or structurally altered except in conformity with the regulations prescribed for the use or area district in which such building was located. This section, in part, reads:
Following this section of the ordinance the various districts designated are defined. Section 3 defines a dwelling district, the one primarily involved in this litigation, as follows:
Following this, Apartment House Districts and the other districts named above are described. Area Districts are also regulated and defined, but we deem...
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