Londe v. Hubbard
| Decision Date | 15 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 625.,625. |
| Citation | 164 S.E. 359,202 N.C. 771 |
| Parties | LA LONDE . v. HUBBARD et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Sink, Judge.
Action by Mabel La Londe against Samuel A. Hubbard and another. Plaintiff submitted to a voluntary nonsuit, and appeals.
Affirmed.
This is an action to recover damages resulting from injuries caused by a collision on March 23, 1930, at the intersection of two streets in the city of Asheville, N. C, between an automobile owned and driven by the plaintiff, and an automobile owned by the defendant, Sallie B. Hubbard, and, with her consent, driven by her minor daughter. The action was begun in the superior court of Buncombe county, on October 27, 1927.
It is alleged in the complaint that the collision between the two automobiles was caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile owned by the defendant Sallie B. Hubbard. This allegation is denied in the answer of the defendants, who allege in their further answer that the collision was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff, and that for this reason plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this action.
In addition to other defenses set up in their answer, the defendants pleaded in bar of plaintiff's recovery in this action a judgment by consent, entered in an action brought by the defendant herein, Sallie B. Hubbard, as plaintiff, against the plaintiff herein, as defendant, in the general county court of Buncombe county to recover damages resulting from injuries caused by the same collision as that out of which the cause of action alleged in the complaint in this action arose. The plaintiff herein, as defendant in that action, denied the allegations of negligence in the complaint therein, and in her answer set up a counterclaim founded upon the identical facta alleged in her complaint in this action as the cause of action on which she demands judgment against the defendants.
When this action was called for trial, it was agreed by the parties that the judge, without the intervention of a jury, and before the trial of the action on its merits, should hear the evidence pertinent to defendant's plea in bar, and determine the validity of said plea.
The complaint in said action was signed by R. R. Williams, attorney, and was duly verified by the plaintiff therein, Sallie B. Hubbard. The answer was signed by Lee & Lee, and Alfred S. Barnard, attorneys, and was duly verified by the defendant therein, Mabel La Londe. The judgment does not show that Alfred S. Barnard, one of the attorneys who signed the answer, consented thereto. The pleadings in the action in the general county court show that the cause of action alleged in the complaint, and the counterclaim alleged in the answer, are founded upon theidentical facts alleged in the pleadings in this action.
The plaintiff in this action offered evidence tending to show that Lee & Lee, who consented to the judgment entered in the action in the general county court, as her attorneys, were not employed by her to defend said action, but were employed for that purpose by an insurance company, which had issued to plaintiff, as the owner of the automobile involved in the collision, a policy of liability insurance; that said attorneys were employed...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Holden v. Holden
...in order to vacate such order, an independent action must be instituted. Spruill v. Nixon, supra; King v. King, supra; LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359; Weaver v. Hampton, 201 N.C. 798, 161 S.E. 480; Board of Education of Sampson County v. Board of Commissioners, 192 N.C. 274,......
-
Stanley v. Cox, 597
...did not sign the consent part of the divorce judgment does not affect its validity as a consent part of the judgment. LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359. A consent judgment is the contract of the parties entered upon the records with the approval and sanction of a court of compe......
-
Herring v. Queen City Coach Co., 747
...as valid and binding as a judgment rendered after the trial of a cause.' Simmons v. McCullin, 163 N.C. 409, 79 S.E. 625; LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359; Gibson v. Gordon, 213 N.C. 666, 197 S.E. This rule, however, would not apply here to the consent judgments entered in the ......
-
Law v. Cleveland
...is well settled that a consent judgment is just as valid and binding as a judgment rendered after the trial of a cause. LaLonde v. Hubbard, 202 N.C. 771, 164 S.E. 359. The full faith and credit clause was recently stated by Devin, J., in Dansby v. Ins. Co., 209 N.C. 127, 129, 130, 183 S.E. ......