LONE OAK RACING v. OREGON RACING COM'N
Decision Date | 04 August 1999 |
Parties | LONE OAK RACING, INC., an Oregon corporation, and Oregon Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Association, an Oregon nonprofit corporation, Respondents, v. STATE of Oregon, acting By and Through the Oregon Racing Commission, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John T. Bagg, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.
Timothy J. Sercombe, Portland, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Preston Gates & Ellis LLP.
Before EDMONDS, Presiding Judge, and DEITS, Chief Judge,1 and ARMSTRONG, Judge.
Defendant Oregon Racing Commission appeals from a judgment that awarded plaintiffs summary judgment on their first claim for declaratory relief under ORS 28.010 and declared plaintiffs' rights under ORS 462.125(2).2 ORCP 47. We remand for vacation of the judgment because we conclude that defendant had exclusive jurisdiction over the controversy that led to the declaratory judgment.
In January 1997, plaintiffs Lone Oak Racing, Inc. (Lone Oak) and the Oregon Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Association (HBPA) filed a complaint in circuit court for a declaratory judgment. As we understand it, the filing of the complaint was prompted by a meeting with defendant that concerned plaintiffs' request that defendant repeal a rule regarding simulcasting privileges. Simulcasting privileges are important to the economic viability of a race meet.3 Plaintiffs contended that the rule would "preclude simulcasting by" Lone Oak and could make a race meet financially unsuccessful. As a result of the meeting, plaintiffs apparently came to believe that the commission intended to deny any application by Lone Oak for a license for the 1997 racing season based on an interpretation of ORS 462.125. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Lone Oak "plan[ned] to apply for a license to conduct [its Salem] meet during the 1997 season." They sought to obtain a favorable declaration about the meaning of the statute from the circuit court, rather than proceeding through the administrative process with defendant. In its answer to the complaint, defendant admitted the following facts: Lone Oak is an Oregon corporation that has conducted a "horse race meet at the Oregon State Fairgrounds each year for the past several years." Defendant licensed Lone Oak to conduct those meets under the statutory authority for commercial horse race meets. Defendant allocated fewer than 80 days for the Lone Oak meet each year from 1992 to 1996. HBPA is an Oregon nonprofit corporation that is "devoted to furthering the welfare of persons in the horse racing industry, including horse owners, trainers and grooms." Defendant Additionally, defendant's answer admitted the following excerpt from plaintiffs' complaint:
Defendant moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs did not file a reply to defendant's counterclaim but received leave from the trial court to file an amended complaint. The first claim of plaintiffs' amended complaint requested declaratory and injunctive relief concerning ORS 462.125, and the amended complaint contained two additional claims. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant did not file an amended answer in response to plaintiffs' amended complaint.
The trial court entertained defendant's and plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. In a letter to the parties' attorneys, the trial court ruled that there were "no genuine issues of material fact in dispute" and that plaintiffs had stated a justiciable controversy and were justified in not filing a license application with defendant before they filed their claim for relief in circuit court. Eventually, the trial court entered a modified judgment that provided, in part:
Plaintiffs counter:
Initially, we discuss the claims for declaratory judgment as they pertain to plaintiff HBPA. In their brief, plaintiffs argue that a justiciable controversy exists between them and defendant for purposes of ORS chapter 28. Specifically, they contend:
Finally, the affidavit of HBPA's Executive Secretary in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment states, in part, that "[t]he purpose of this affidavit is to establish that the members of the HBPA will adversely be affected or aggrieved by the challenged actions and ...
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