Lonergan, Application of
| Decision Date | 05 October 1945 |
| Docket Number | C. D. 2778. |
| Citation | 23 Wn.2d 767,162 P.2d 289 |
| Parties | Application of LONERGAN. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Original action in the matter of the application of Pierce Lonergan for reinstatement as an attorney at law.
Application granted.
We have Before us for disposition the third petition of Mr. Pierce Lonergan for reinstatement to the bar of the state of Washington. In all three instances, the granting of his petition has been recommended by the board of governors of the state bar association. In the first two instances, the board's recommendation was not followed. No formal opinion was filed in either of these cases. In this instance since we have concluded to grant the petition, an opinion must be written. The whole matter will be reviewed, for two reasons: First, in justice to the petitioner, lest inferences unduly unfavorable to him may be drawn from the fact that the first two petitions were denied; and second, because the course which this matter has taken is illustrative of an apparently general lack of appreciation of the problem which confronts the court when a disbarred attorney applies for reinstatement.
Mr Lonergan was admitted to the bar of Washington in 1914, and practiced law as a successful and well-respected member thereof for a period of twenty years. In 1934, however, he was indicted in a federal mail fraud case growing out of his participation in an effort to establish in Seattle a speculative market in silver futures. He was convicted in the federal district court for the western district of Washington in May, 1936, and sentenced to three years in a federal penitentiary. On appeal to the circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit, his conviction was affirmed. Lonergan v. United States, 88 F.2d 591. The supreme court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari, but, on an examination of the record, instead of passing upon the merits, reversed the judgment of the circuit court of appeals and remanded the case to that court, with instructions to give further consideration to certain assignments of error. Lonergan v. United States, 303 U.S. 33, 58 S.Ct. 430, 82 L.Ed. 630. The circuit court again affirmed the judgment of the district court, but, in passing upon a petition for rehearing, one of the three judges who sat in the case filed a dissent, stating that, upon a reexamination of the record, he had concluded that hearsay statements had been admitted in evidence 'so extremely damaging in character that they could not have failed to improperly influence the jury.' Lonergan v. United States, 9 Cir., 95 F.2d 642, 646. A second petition to the supreme court of the United States for a writ of certiorari was denied. 304 U.S. 581, 58 S.Ct. 1061, 82 L.Ed. 1543.
Shortly after the final disposition of the matter by the supreme court of the United States, Mr. Lonergan filed his resignation as a member of the bar, and it was accepted by this court. In his first petition for reinstatement filed with the board of governors in July, 1941, Mr. Lonergan accounted for his resignation as follows:
'The petitioner was forced to tender his resignation in order to avoid disbarment proceedings by reason of his conviction and sentence charged with violation of the mail fraud statutes of the United States.'
He no doubt had in mind the following provision of Rule XI of our Rules for Discipline of Attorneys:
'An attorney or counsel may be reprimanded, suspended or disbarred for any of the following causes:
'(1) His conviction of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in which case the record of conviction shall be conclusive evidence.' 193 Wash. 92-a.
The petitioner began his term at the federal penitentiary on June 17, 1938, and was paroled in December, 1939, although his sentence did not expire until June 16, 1941. His first petition for reinstatement was filed with the board of governors less than a month thereafter, to be exact on July 14, 1941, and the recommendation of the board approving the petition was filed in this court Before the end of that year. Attached to the recommendation were some twenty letters, addressed to the board, all certifying to the confidence of their authors in Mr. Lonergan's character, and a number of them, in his innocence of the charge of which he had been convicted. Of these letters five were written by judges of the superior court in and for King county Before whom the petitioner had practiced for many years, and the remainder by leading and prominent members of the Seattle bar. Doubtless, these letters greatly influenced the board in recommending Mr. Lonergan's reinstatement, although it did not so state. It did, however, say:
'The board of governors, by resolution, adopted the report of its investigator as setting out in more detail its reasons for the approval of said petition and recommendation of the said reinstatement.'
This report was attached as the first exhibit to the recommendation. It consisted of a single page, reciting the background of the case, and stated the following reasons for its conclusions:
Manifestly, this court could not reinstate the petitioner, by a decision and opinion based upon the above reasons, without directly violating every rule relating to the sanctity and finality of judgments, as well as every canon of judicial comity, courtesy, and respect. Baldly stated, the petitioner requested this court to review the decision of the federal courts, or, rather, to accept the result of a review made by the investigator for the board of governors, and declare those decisions erroneous; for, how otherwise could we reinstate the petitioner on the ground of innocence? When one who has been disbarred on account of having been convicted of a crime applies for reinstatement, whatever opinions members of the court may hold as individuals as to his guilt or innocence is entirely irrelevant. In exercising their judicial functions, they must treat his guilt as an established fact. Many decisions could be cited to this effect, but we think that of In re Finch, 156 Wash. 609, 287 P. 677, is all that is necessary.
The first petition was denied for another sound reason. It was prematurely filed. It is universally held that one who has been disbarred--and one who has resigned in order to forestall disbarment is in the same position--should not be reinstated until sufficient time has elapsed to enable him to actually demonstrate, by conduct, that he is, in fact, worthy of trust and confidence. In effect, he is expected, and required, to establish a new reputation.
A petition for reinstatement is literally a request for the entry of a judgment certifying to the public that the petitioner is worthy of trust and confidence. The judges who...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Rosellini, Matter of
...e.g., In re Batali, 98 Wash.2d 610, 615, 657 P.2d 775 (1983); In re Egger, supra 93 Wash.2d at 708, 611 P.2d 1260; In re Lonergan, 23 Wash.2d 767, 773-74, 162 P.2d 289 (1945). Rosellini's community activities have reflected a consistently high reputation prior to his 1980 defeat. He served ......
-
Reinstatement of Walgren, Matter of
...agree with it. (Italics ours.) The question of innocence and guilt is not at issue in a reinstatement proceeding. In re Lonergan, 23 Wash.2d 767, 771, 162 P.2d 289 (1945). The purpose of securing the attorney's repentance, moreover, is not to coerce the attorney into admitting intentional m......
-
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, Matter of
...by conduct, that he is, in fact, worthy of trust and confidence." Walgren, at 565, 708 P.2d 380 (quoting In re Lonergan, 23 Wash.2d 767, 771, 162 P.2d 289 (1945)). In the Walgren case, we [A]ttorneys will not be reinstated into the bar until they have successfully completed the conditions o......
-
Reinstatement of Stroh, Matter of
...disbarment resulting from a criminal conviction, this court must treat guilt of the crime as an established fact. In re Lonergan, 23 Wash.2d 767, 771, 162 P.2d 289 (1945). Nevertheless, we do not believe that Stroh demonstrated such moral turpitude as to forever bar him from the practice of......
-
Table of Cases
...In re, 94 Wn.2d 251, 615 P.2d 1294 (1980): 16–64 Lockhart v. Greive, 66 Wn.App. 735, 834 P.2d 64 (1992): 4–42 n.274 Lonergan, In re, 23 Wn.2d 767, 162 P.2d 289 (1945): 16–63 Longacre, In re, 155 Wn.2d 723, 122 P.3d 710 (2005): 4–12 n.77; 5–13; 5–13 n.85; 5–18 n.121; 12–14; 12–14 nn.62, 63; ......