Lonergan v. Ill. Cent. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1892
• Citation: 87 Iowa 755,53 N.W. 236
• Parties: LONERGAN v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

87 Iowa 755

53 N.W. 236

LONERGAN

v.ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 14, 1892.

On rehearing. For former report, see 49 N. W. Rep. 852.

ROTHROCK, J.

A petition for rehearing was granted in this case, and we have again examined the question involved in the light of reargument by counsel for the respective parties. It is claimed in the petition for rehearing that the cases cited in the opinion as sustaining the conclusion reached are not in point. It rarely occurs that cases are exactly alike in their facts. This can occur only when the cases arise out of the same transaction. But there are a multitude of adjudged cases which are so nearly alike that the same legal principles may be applied in deciding them. It is important that we keep in mind the precise relation that the plaintiff in this case sustained to the railroad company. He had driven his wagon loaded with corn upon the station ground for the purpose of placing the load in a crib, that the corn might be shipped on the defendant's road. It is a matter of common knowledge that grain elevators, corn cribs, coal sheds, and, in some instances, lumber yards, are located on station grounds of railroads. Every team which is driven upon the grounds for the purpose of loading or unloading grain or other freight received or to be shipped on the railroad must be regarded as on the depot ground by the invitation of the railroad company. It is an absolute necessity that they should be there to transact their business; otherwise, the railroad company could not transact the business of a common carrier. In the case of Wakefield v. Railway Co., 37 Vt. 330, the plaintiff had driven his team over a highway crossing and along a public road, about 35 rods south on the highway, parallel with the railroad, when a train going north frightened his horses. The negligence charged was that the crossing signal was not given. The question was whether, after having passed the crossing, a duty was due to him to give the signals. The court held that the purpose of the law is to secure as much safety as could be done by notice of the approach of an engine against accidents by reason of such crossings. But the court said: “While such accidents are in the main likely to happen to persons approaching and about passing such crossings, yet they are not confined to such persons, and we think it would be an unwarrantable restriction of this provision of the statute to hold that the duty thereby imposed has reference only to persons approaching or in the act of passing the crossing. In our judgment, that duty exists in reference to all persons who, being lawfully on or in the vicinity of the crossing, may be subjected to accident and injury by the passing of engines at that place.” In Railroad v. Williams, 74 Ga. 723, the case and question decided are well and tersely stated in a headnote as follows: “Where a person injured by a railroad train was walking on the track without the permission of the company, and had passed beyond the crossing of a public road about 200 yards, when he was injured by a train coming up behind him, a noncompliance on the part of the company with the law in regard to the duty of railroad companies in respect to the erection of blow posts, and the blowing, and continuing to blow, the whistle, and the checking, and continuing to check, the speed in running, may go to the jury as a circumstance showing negligence.” This case was approved in Railroad Co. v. Raiford, (Ga.) 9 S. E. Rep. 169. In Ransom v. Railroad Co., (Wis.) 22 N. W. Rep. 149, it was held that a statute similar to that in force in this state was designed to guard against danger of injury from the frightening of teams traveling upon the highway or crossing, as well as the danger of actual collision at the crossing; and a railroad company is therefore liable for injuries caused by a failure to comply with that statute to persons traveling upon a highway parallel to the railroad, and not intending to cross the track.

Now, it appears to us that these cases are in accord with the reasoning and result reached in the foregoing opinion. Indeed, they go further in their requirements as to the duty of the company to give the signals than it is necessary to go in the case at bar. In Williams Case the plaintiff was in no manner connected with the railroad company, and his position had no relation to the crossing, or to travel on a parallel road. He was walking on the railroad track without the permission or invitation of the railroad company. In the other cases the parties were not approaching a crossing, nor intending to cross, but were traveling lines of road parallel with the railroad. In the case at bar the plaintiff was upon the depot grounds, where it was actually necessary that he should be, to unload his corn, that the defendant might conveniently receive it...