Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura

Decision Date27 June 1991
Docket NumberNos. B045047,B046558,s. B045047
Citation282 Cal.Rptr. 877,231 Cal.App.3d 1016
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesLONG BEACH EQUITIES, INC., etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF VENTURA, et al., Defendants and Respondents. The CITY OF SIMI VALLEY, et al., Petitioners, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the County of Ventura, Respondent. LONG BEACH EQUITIES, INC., et al., Real Parties in Interest. Civ.

Hamilton & Samuels and Paul R. Hamilton, Karen J. Lee and Deborah M. Rosenthal, Newport Beach, for plaintiff, appellant and real party in interest Long Beach Equities, Inc.

James L. McBride, County Counsel, Dennis L. Slivinski, Asst. County Counsel, for defendant and respondent, County of Ventura.

John Torrance, City Atty., Marjorie Baxter, Asst. City Atty., Simi Valley, Freilich, Stone, Leitner & Carlisle and Katherine E. Stone and Margaret A. Sohagi, Los Angeles, for defendants, respondents, and petitioners City of Simi Valley and City Council of City of Simi Valley.

No appearance for respondent Superior Court of County of Ventura.

Baker & McKenzie and Robert H. Philibosian, Los Angeles, for real party in interest Marr Ranch Associates, Inc.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen and J. Robert Flandrick, Virginia R. Pesola as amici curiae, Los Angeles, on behalf of petitioner City of Simi Valley.

Pacific Legal Foundation and Ronald A. Zumbrun, Edward J. Connor, Jr., Timothy V. Kassouni as amici curiae on behalf of real party in interest Long Beach Equities, Inc.

OPINION ON REHEARING

GILBERT, Acting Presiding Justice.

Long Beach Equities, Inc. (LBE) desires to build 249 single-family residences on a 250-acre parcel of land it owns adjacent to the City of Simi Valley (City). LBE contends that land use regulations of the County of Ventura (County) and City, on their face and as applied, will so greatly delay its development plans as to render them economically infeasible.

We hold that this suit is not ripe for adjudication. We affirm the judgment for County and grant City's petition for issuance of a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to enter an order sustaining City's demurrer without leave to amend.

LBE sued these entities seeking damages for inverse condemnation, among other things. 1 The trial court sustained County's demurrer to LBE's first amended complaint without leave to amend. LBE moved for reconsideration and proffered a second amended complaint. The court denied the motion and sustained City's demurrer without leave as to several counts, but overruled that demurrer on counts for inverse condemnation, denial of due process and declaratory and injunctive relief.

LBE appealed the judgment entered on County's demurrer and the ruling rendered on its motion for reconsideration. City filed a petition for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer. We have consolidated these actions on appeal in the interest of judicial economy and to aid in the resolution of this lawsuit. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1272, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66; see 9 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 62, pp. 86-87, § 64, pp. 88-89, § 65, pp. 89-90.)

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

LBE has the burden to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining County's demurrer without leave to amend. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349, 134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737.) The City has the burden to show that the trial court's order is erroneous as a matter of law and that it will suffer harm which cannot be corrected on further appeal. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 209 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1273-1274, 258 Cal.Rptr. 66.)

We must construe the allegations of LBE's voluminous complaint liberally to attain substantial justice among the parties. (Code Civ.Proc., § 452.) We deem true all material and properly pleaded facts. (Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 244, 251, 146 Cal.Rptr. 428.) We also consider all documents which have been determined by the trial court as appropriate for judicial notice, many of which are mentioned in the complaint. (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.30; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1368, 258 Cal.Rptr. 893.) 2 They include resolutions, reports and other official acts of County and City. (Pan Pacific, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at p. 255, fn. 2, 146 Cal.Rptr. 428.)

We may not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation or allegations which are contrary either to law or to judicially-noticed facts. (See Pan Pacific Properties, Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d at pp. 251, 255, fn. 2, 146 Cal.Rptr. 428; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 259, fn. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, fn. 6, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

The Complaint--The Facts

On June 25, 1969, the Ventura County Planning Commission first adopted Guidelines for Orderly Urban Development (Guidelines). The Guidelines provide policies, standards and criteria to evaluate applications for zone changes from rural to urban land use classifications and for "related land use development matters."

The Guidelines initially were adopted to assure the "efficient provision of urban services and sound urban land use planning" and to avoid "the problems and costs associated with urban sprawl" through coordinated planning with other local government entities.

Those Guidelines provided that urban growth of developing communities in Ventura County should proceed in a compact and logically expanding form which includes satisfactory permanent open space areas within physically developed land.

The revised Guidelines of 1976 and 1985 continued the theme that urban development should occur within existing, incorporated cities because cities provide a full range of municipal services. County removed the language regarding retention of permanent open space within developed land in its revised Guidelines.

According to the Guidelines, land uses which would be allowed by County should be equal to or more restrictive than those uses allowed by City within a city's sphere of influence. Before new urban development proceeds, the land should be annexed to City to ensure that the full range of urban services are provided by municipalities. Within "areas of interest" to a City, as here, such development should be allowed only within existing communities.

The Ventura County General Plan, with its discussion of stages of development, may be used as a tool to evaluate proposals for urban development.

As of 1980, City's General Plan designated the subject area for residential development of a maximum of 1,100 units and for a shopping center. On September 15, 1981, County's Open Space Plan designated the subject property as having an "Urban Reserve overlay." This overlay contemplates residential development, but it encourages developers to deal directly with the appropriate city to proceed. County also adopted City's General Plan as the Simi Valley Area Plan (the SVAP) portion of the County's General Plan.

LBE alleges that in adopting the SVAP, the County expressly recognized that the property should be developed with urban uses in the densities stated in the text because: (1) the SVAP showed that over 80 percent of the area's valley floor had already been developed; (2) private and public utility and sewer infrastructure had been extended to meet the needs of the development and is more than adequate to provide service at comfortable levels of safety, adequacy and efficiency; (3) development at the density designated is necessary to meet the residential housing needs of the area and to fulfill the County's regional housing obligations; (4) the County recognized the City's desire that the property be developed as shown in the City's General Plan.

In 1984 LBE purchased the subject 250 acres of land located in unincorporated territory adjacent to and within the "area of interest" of City. 3

LBE alleges that before it purchased the property, the City agreed that if LBE submitted a specific plan for 1,100 units, it would be approved. Pursuant to City's request, LBE prepared such a specific plan. It paid all fees for that plan and for an environmental impact report (EIR) on the plan.

The City Council then became the applicant for the specific plan which provided for development of 1,730 units. To accommodate new grading ordinances, the specific plan and a proposed General Plan amendment were modified to reduce the number of units to 1,059 and to eliminate the shopping center.

LBE helped to pay for oversized infrastructure adjacent to its property which could service the development project at the density set forth above. LBE shared in engineering costs for easements it granted. All necessary infrastructure and public services for the projected residents of the property are now in place. LBE asserts that the property could be serviced by county service districts.

In late 1985, City passed an urgency interim ordinance. The ordinance imposed a partial moratorium on providing approval for various land use permits, particularly in hillside areas, until City could review and revise its General Plan. City enacted the ordinance after it monitored development and land use trends in the community. It realized that various land uses then permitted might conflict with proposed revisions to its General Plan. City wanted to consider those uses "in an atmosphere of land use stability...." LBE alleges that the ordinance "effectively imposed a moratorium on all processing of major new projects" including its own project, "until the City could review and revise its General Plan."

In July 1986, City adopted a temporary growth management plan which would severely limit the number of building permits to be issued annually. The plan takes note of population trends and includes...

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