Long Const. Co. v. Ryals
| Decision Date | 21 June 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 38342,38342,2 |
| Citation | 102 Ga.App. 66,115 S.E.2d 726 |
| Parties | LONG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. C. W. RYALS |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
The amended petition in this case alleged that the defendant's agent and servant was operating the defendant's pickup truck along a public street in the City of Atlanta approaching the intersection of another street; that both of said streets were approximately 40 feet in width, providing for 'two lanes of motor vehicular traffic running in opposite directions'; that the driver's view of the intersection was unobstructed for a distance of 150 feet as he approached the same; that the driver observed the plaintiff and another person engaged in an altercation on a sidewalk and curb adjacent to the street, and generally conducting themselves in an angry and boisterous manner, which actions indicated that the plaintiff and the other man were "tipsy,' intoxicated, under the influence of intoxicating beverages, [and] not in full and complete possession of their normal faculties'; that the plaintiff was pushed by said other man into the path of the defendant's truck which struck him and inflicted the injuries sued for; that the driver of the truck could have avoided striking the plaintiff after becoming aware of his intoxicated condition had he turned his truck to the left of its path or to the right into the intersecting street, since there was no other traffic on the street which would have prevented him from doing so. The petition alleged that the defendant's driver was negligent in operating his truck at a speed greater than 25 miles per hour in violation of a valid municipal ordinance of the City of Atlanta; in driving his truck at a dangerous, reckless and unlawful speed of 35 miles per hour without due caution under the circumstances existing at the time and place and when he had knowledge of the condition of the plaintiff and the other man and of the existence of the altercation between them; in failing to exercise ordinary care by turning his vehicle so as to avoid striking the plaintiff; in failing to have his truck under control so as to stop it before striking the plaintiff; in failing to sound his horn to warn the plaintiff; and in maintaining and operating the truck without adequate brakes.
Dudley Cook, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
Roland Neeson, Atlanta, for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court.
1. Questions of negligence, of contributory negligence, of cause and proximate cause, and of whose negligence or of what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury are, except in plain, palpable and indisputable cases, solely for the jury. Montgomery v. Southern Ry. Co., 78 Ga.App. 370(1-d), 51 S.E.2d 66; Harvey v. Zell, 87 Ga.App. 280, 284(1-a), 73 S.E.2d 605. Unless the allegations of the petition set up facts from which reasonable minds cannot differ as to the cause of the injury, they are sufficient to carry the case to the jury. Bazemore v. McDougald Construction Co., 85 Ga.App. 107, 110, 68 S.E.2d 163.
2. "It is no defense in an action for an injury resulting from negligence that the negligence or willful wrong of third persons, or an inevitable accident, or an inanimate thing, contributed to cause the injury, if the negligence of the defendant was an efficient cause without which the injury would not have occurred. A juridical cause need not be the sole cause.' Jaggard on Torts, 67. 'If the damage has resulted directly from concurrent wrongful...
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Stern v. Wyatt
...cannot differ as to the conclusions to be reached.' Hardy v. Brooks, 103 Ga.App. 124(1), 118 S.E.2d 492 (1961); Long Const. Co. v. Ryals, 102 Ga.App. 66(1), 115 S.E.2d 726 (1960). In Georgia, the law regarding proximate cause has been stated as follows: "A defendant may be held liable where......
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Chastain v. Atlanta Gas Light Co.
...cause of the damages incurred in tort cases, except in plain and palpable cases, are solely for the jury. Long Constr. Co. v. Ryals, 102 Ga.App. 66(1), 115 S.E.2d 726; Malcolm v. Malcolm, 112 Ga.App. 151, 153, 144 S.E.2d 3. A party who moves for summary judgment in a case premised on neglig......
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Harper v. Plunkett
...jury's determination except in plain and palpable cases. Parker v. Johnson, 97 Ga.App. 261(1), 102 S.E.2d 917; Long Construction Co. v. Ryals, 102 Ga.App. 66(1), 115 S.E.2d 726, and cit. It is true that Code Ann. § 68-1626(a) (Ga.L.1953, Nov.Sess., pp. 556, 577, as last amended by Ga.L.1968......
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Jarrett v. Parker
...of whose negligence or of what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury are for jury determination. Long Const. Co. v. Ryals, 102 Ga.App. 66(1), 115 S.E.2d 726; Montgomery v. Southern Ry. Co., 78 Ga.App. 370(1d), 51 S.E.2d 66. Under the evidence and law applicable, these case......