Long County Bd. of Ed. v. Owen, 57655
| Decision Date | 07 June 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 57655,57655 |
| Citation | 257 S.E.2d 212,150 Ga.App. 245 |
| Parties | LONG COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. OWEN. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Richard D. Phillips, Ludowici, for appellant.
James David Dunham, Decatur, for appellee.
The appellee in this case, William T. Owen, was the principal of the only school in the school system of Long County. He was a tenured teacher and as such could have his contract of employment terminated only in accordance with Ga.L.1975, pp. 360, 364 (Code Ann. § 32-2103c). That statute in pertinent part provides that when the local board of education has Tentatively decided not to renew the contract of a tenured employee, written notification shall be given to the employee of that tentative decision not later than April 15, prior to the ensuing school year. The employee has the right to demand, by not later than May 1, a written statement of the reasons for the non-renewal and a hearing to inquire into those reasons. A reasonable time must be afforded before the hearing but not less than ten days. The hearing shall be before the local board, or the board may designate a tribunal or may refer the matter to a tribunal constituted by the Professional Practices Commission.
In this case, the local board in Long County informed Owen prior to April 15 that his contract would not be renewed in the ensuing school year. Thus, the board indicated that it had formed more than a tentative decision to non-renew the contract but had expressly determined not to renew. Four days later, the board hired a new principal for the ensuing year, thus confirming its intent not to renew Owen's contract. Owen demanded a listing of charges and the local board supplied a list of 17 charges. A hearing was conducted by the local board in early June. After three days of hearings at which many witnesses were called and subjected to direct and cross examination by counsel for Owen, the local board sustained nine of the charges and rejected eight. Owen's principal defense was an attempt to show that the evidence did not support any of the charges. At no time did Owen attempt to show that the local board was biased or seek the members to recuse themselves, or request that the local board refer the hearing to one of the other tribunals authorized by statute. The local board upheld the decision to non-renew Owen's contract in the ensuing school year. Owen, being dissatisfied with the decision of the board, sought an appeal to the State Board of Education. That board appointed a hearing officer. After a review of the evidence and considering the objections made by Owen, the hearing officer reversed the decision of the local board, holding that the local board was not impartial in its decision. The decision was not based upon an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the local board (which is governed by the "any evidence" rule), but was in response to an enumeration of bias and prejudice raised by Owen for the first time upon appeal. The local board appealed to the State Board of Education which adopted the findings and conclusions made by the hearing officer. The local board then appealed to the superior court which likewise affirmed the State Board of Education on the sole ground that Owen had been denied due process of law in that the local board had already made up its mind prior to the hearing. The appeal to this court then followed. Held :
1. The appellant, Long County Board of Education, strenuously contends that Owen cannot raise the matter of due process for the first time upon appeal. Our examination of the record discloses that Owen was advised by the Long County Board of Education that he was not acceptable after the completion of the school year. The record is replete with evidence that Owen previously had been at dispute with the chairman of the board on many issues in the administration of the school system. Owen was aware that a new principal had been hired. He was aware that at his request the board had prepared a list of 17 charges. He sought a hearing and was granted a hearing before the board with whom he had been at loggerheads, and which had prepared the list of charges. He did not challenge the partiality of these board members but sought to prove to their satisfaction that the charges could not be supported. Only after he lost half the battle (but including his job) did he complain about their alleged predisposition. We cannot help but observe that Owen could find himself in the enviable position of defending himself before the local board with hopes of defeating the charges, but also believing that if he were unsuccessful, he could challenge the board's findings based upon bias and have a "second bite of the apple" before a second...
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