Long Flame Coal Co. v. State Compensation Com'r
| Decision Date | 19 January 1932 |
| Docket Number | 7043,7040. |
| Citation | 163 S.E. 16,111 W.Va. 409 |
| Parties | LONG FLAME COAL CO. v. STATE COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER. PETTRY v. SAME. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted January 14, 1932.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1932.
Syllabus by the Court.
Dependents of employee who died more than one year after fatal injury held not entitled to compensation for death (Code 1931, 23-4-4, 23-4-10).
"Prohibition" lies in all cases where inferior tribunal is without jurisdiction of subject-matter, or, having jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.
Ruling of compensation commissioner awarding compensation to dependents of employee who died more than one year after fatal injury held beyond commissioner's legitimate power, warranting prohibition (Code 1931, 23-4-4 23-4-10).
1. Properly construed, the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913 and the subsequent amendments thereto deny payment of compensation to the dependents of a fatally injured employee who dies more than one year from the date of the injury as the proximate result of the injury received in the course of and resulting from his employment.
2. Prohibition lies as a writ of right in all cases where the lower court or tribunal has not jurisdiction of the subject-matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers.
3. A case (Long Flame Coal Co. v. Compensation Commissioner) wherein the compensation commissioner has exceeded his legitimate power.
Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation for the death of Cabell Thomas, an employee of the Long Flame Coal Company, and proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation for the death of Harrison Pettry, an employee of the Glogora Coal Company. In the first case, the State Compensation Commissioner awarded compensation to the widow and children, and the employer appeals, and prays for a writ of prohibition; in the second case, the State Compensation Commissioner denied compensation to the widow and minor children, and the widow appeals.
Ruling in the second case affirmed, and writ of prohibition awarded in the first case.
Goodykoontz & Slaven, for Long Flame Coal Company. W. H. Pettry, for Alice B. Pettry. Howard B. Lee, Attorney General, and R. Dennis Steed, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent State Compensation Com'r. Rummel, Blagg & Stone, Greever & Gillespie, and Goodykoontz & Slaven, for West Virginia Coal Association and others, amici curiae. Dillon, Mahan & Holt, for New River Company and others. amici curiae.
These two appeals from the rulings of the state compensation commissioner, and prayer for prohibition in No. 7043, present one controlling question of law, and will be considered together.
In the Long Flame Case, the employee, Cabell Thomas, was injured by a slate fall in the mine on November 29, 1929, and died on November 30, 1930, at about 10 o'clock a. m., more than one year from the date of his injury. In the Pettry Case, Harrison Pettry, the husband of Alice B. Pettry, and an employee of Glogora Coal Company, was injured in the employment on September 30, 1926, and died on December 9, 1930, more than one year from the date of his injury. In the Long Flame Case, the commissioner awarded compensation to the widow of Thomas of $30 per month and to three children $5 each per month until they arrived at the age of 16 years. In the Pettry Case, the widow and minor children were refused compensation on the ground that Pettry's death occurred more than one year from the date of his injury. The question presented is this: Does the commissioner have power under the Compensation Act to make awards to dependents where the death of the employee occurs more than one year from the date of the injury? In the first case, the commissioner awarded compensation to the widow and infant children, while in the Pettry Case compensation was denied to the widow and infant children. In the Pettry Case, the death of the injured workman occurred a little over four years from the date of his injury; while in the Long Flame Case Thomas died one day after the expiration of one year from the date of his injury.
Here we have two rulings which are apparently inconsistent. It is true that in the Long Flame Case the commissioner takes the position that the award to the widow and minor children was based on the theory that Thomas, the employee, died less than one year from the date of his fatal injury. We find no basis of fact for that contention. There is no controversy of fact as to the time when he received his injury on November 29, 1929, and there is no question but that he died on November 30, 1930, about 10 o'clock a. m. If no compensation can be awarded to dependents where the death of the employee occurs more than one year from the date of injury, then it is immaterial whether the employee died one day or four years after the one-year period. One day is as effective to prevent awards as four years.
When and to whom shall death benefits be paid under the Compensation Act? Code 1931, 23-4-10, provides: "In case the personal injury causes death within the period of one year from the date of the original injury, and the disability is continuous from date of such injury until date of death, the benefits shall be in the amounts, and to the persons, as follows:" (Then follows the amounts to be paid to dependents according to the variant facts in each particular case.) This is the only express authority for payment of death benefits. There is no express provision for paying death benefits where the death occurs more than one year from the date of the fatal injury. On the other hand, there is no express provision that death benefits shall not be paid after one year from the fatal injury. What was the intention of the Legislature in that regard? We are constrained to hold that the proper construction is that no benefits shall be paid unless death ensues within one year from the fatal injury for the following reasons: (1) In nearly all of the Compensation Acts in the states there are similar provisions to that above quoted, and we are unable to find (and we have not been cited to) any decision construing those acts so as to grant compensation after the time stated in the statutes. On the contrary, those courts which have had occasion to consider the question have denied compensation where the death occurred later than the time stated in the act. Partusch v. Kaufman-Straus Co., 209 Ky. 345, 272 S.W. 884; Industrial Commission v. Kamrath, 118 Ohio St. 1, 160 N.E. 470; Proops v. Twohey Bros., 29 Ariz. 164, 240 P. 277; Monvoisin v. Plant, 147 La. 464, 85 So. 206; and In re Comstock, 129 Me. 467, 152 A. 618. (2) When we look to the legislative history of the act, we find that in the original act of 1913 death benefits to the dependents were awarded if the injury to the workman resulted in death within ninety days. In 1915, the time was extended to 26 weeks; in 1919, to one year, which is the present statute. In 1927, the time was extended to four years if the injury was continuous to the date of death within that time. This act did not become effective because it was vetoed by the Governor for other reasons. The question of the limitation of time in which awards could be made in case of death from the injury was before the Legislature and discussed in the passage of the act of 1927 (vetoed), wherein it was argued that one-year limitation was too short. See Senate Journal 1927, p. 1083. This legislative history impels the conclusion that the Legislature construed the various acts to mean that no compensation was awardable after the time fixed therein, namely, 90 days in 1913, 26 weeks in 1915, and one year in the act of 1919. If compensation was awardable after the 90 days fixed in the act of 1913, then there would have been no necessity in extending the time mentioned in the other acts. By the Compensation Act a new remedy to the workmen, unknown to the common law, was provided, and the Legislature had power to prescribe a limitation of time in which it could be asserted. The legislative history of the Compensation Law, which we may consider (15 R. C. L. 1110), is very persuasive of the interpretation given by the Legislature to the right to awards of dependents within the time stated in the acts, which is now fixed at one year from the date of the fatal injury. The intent of the Legislature governs.
It is argued that the commissioner has always interpreted the act to mean that no award can be made to dependents after one year from the date of the fatal accident, and therefore the practical administrative construction over a long period of years should not be disturbed except for cogent reasons. Daniel v. Simms, 49 W.Va. 554, 39 S.E. 690. We are not impressed with this argument, for we have before us the ruling in the Long Flame Case which is inconsistent with the alleged uniform administrative interpretation.
It is argued on behalf of the dependents that the statute should be construed to give them compensation after the one-year period because the act is in derogation of common-law principles and of existing statute law, especially Lord Campbell's Act (Code 1931, 55-7-5), and that the Compensation Act should be liberally construed in their favor. The compensation laws embody such radical changes of common-law principles and of Lord Campbell's Act (Code 1931, 55-7-5), that a consideration of common-law principles and the act giving right to sue at law for wrongful death can have little weight in construing the limitation of time for the assertion of benefits in the Compensation Act. Cudahy Packing Co. v....
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