Long v. ARKANSAS FOUNDRY COMPANY
Decision Date | 05 January 1956 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2849. |
Citation | 137 F. Supp. 835 |
Parties | Russell E. LONG, and Virgle Coleman, James R. Guerin and Earl Van Horn, partners d/b/a Crossville Tool & Machine Co., Plaintiffs, v. ARKANSAS FOUNDRY COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
Kingsland, Rogers & Ezell, St. Louis, Mo., Roy F. Hough, Sikeston, Mo., J. W. Barron, Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiffs.
Barber, Henry & Thurman, E. A. Henry, Charles S. Harley, Little Rock, Ark., for defendant.
This action was begun on August 2, 1954, by Russell E. Long, patentee, and Virgle Coleman, James R. Guerin and Earl Van Horn, partners doing business as Crossville Tool & Machine Co., licensees, against Arkansas Foundry Company, a corporation, alleging infringement of a patent. This patent, being No. 2,650,628 was issued to Long on September 1, 1953, for a Tree Feller and Land Clearing Attachment. The complaint is short and does no more than advise the defendant that it is being sued for infringement of the numbered patent.
Pursuant to notice and agreement of parties the defendant took the discovery deposition of Long on October 22, 1954, and thereafter filed its answer. The answer denied the validity of the patent and denied that Long was the inventor of the subject matter of the patent. Defendant filed a request for admission of facts. The time for response was extended by the court, on motion of plaintiffs, and again extended by agreement of parties. Forty-five days after the expiration of this last extension plaintiffs filed their response. Defendant moved for an order declaring the response came too late, that the responses did not comply with the rule, and that the requests for admissions had been made. Upon this motion the parties filed briefs and upon consideration thereof the court entered an order that the admissions as requested had been made. Defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment under Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56, 28 U.S. C.A. In accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of Practice for the District Court, the defendant filed a brief in support of its motion, and plaintiffs filed a brief in response. A hearing was had upon this motion on December 28, 1955, when the motion was argued orally by counsel for both parties.
So far as pertinent on this motion the subject matter of the patent is described as follows in the patent.
In the specifications:
And in Claim No. 1 of the patent:
There was also a description of the second pusher boom and the jacks. A description of the jacks and their function is immaterial in view of the decision of the court on this motion. There was the usual repetition and elaboration of these claims, but the portions of the patent set out above was not in any way enlarged.
If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact then the court should not grant a motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment should be considered with great care by the trial judge. Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 130. It is not the function of the trial judge to decide issues of fact on a motion for summary judgment, but only to decide if there is any genuine issue as to any material fact. Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 3 Cir., 130 F.2d 1016. Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., 8 Cir., 135 F.2d 101, 103. And the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact is on the movant. Walling v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 8 Cir., 139 F.2d 318. "A summary judgment upon motion therefor by a defendant in an action should never be entered except where the defendant is entitled to its allowance beyond all doubt." Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, 8 Cir., 189 F.2d 213, 216. The court has taken all of these well established principles into consideration, and finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The court is of the opinion that if the case proceeded to trial the plaintiffs could introduce no evidence which would entitle them to recover.
When the defendant took its discovery deposition Long testified that before he made the first attachment for which he later applied for a patent, he had seen an attachment in the possession of one McMullen, which was then in operation near his home and shop, and had inspected this attachment. According to his testimony there was no material difference between the McMullen attachment and the one described in his specifications and claims for a patent and for which he received a patent, except that the McMullen attachment did not have a pusher boom or booms and did not have the jacks. It is not known who was the inventor or even the maker of the attachment which was in the possession of McMullen. It had been operating in the vicinity for quite some time before Long applied for his patent.
In the admissions of fact it is admitted that the language in claim No. 1 of the patent describes the McMullen attachment, with the exception of the so-called pusher boom or booms. Long admitted in his deposition that the jacks were old and in use before his patent, and in the admissions of fact it was admitted that the jacks are mechanical devices well known in the art and were manufactured and used by one or more tractor and machinery manufacturers before Long patented his attachment, and that the jacks were not the invention of Long.
In plaintiffs' brief on this motion for summary judgment there are certain admissions made that bear directly upon the questions presented. On page 7 of the brief it is said:
And again:
(Emphasis theirs.)
By these admissions the plaintiffs have restricted their claims in this patent to a combination patent. About that there can be no genuine issue.
Did the patentee Long have a valid combination patent? It is the contention of the defendant that he did not. With that contention the court must agree.
Title 35 U.S.C.A. § 111, provides:
Section 112 provides:
"* * * The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention." (Emphasis ours.)
Long did not comply with the provisions of the statute as set out. Giving to the language used its usual and ordinary meaning it is clearly evident that Long claimed as his invention all of the old elements in the claims of the patent. He did not distinguish what was new from what was old; he did not limit the claims of his patent in any way; he did not particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter or elements which he regarded as his invention, but claimed the entire subject matter; he did not clearly distinguish what he claimed from what went before in the art, and did not clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future enterprise.
It is incumbent upon the applicant for a patent to carefully and clearly comply with the requirements of the statute, and to set out the new from the old, and to fix the limits of his claims to apprise the public of what is foreclosed from future enterprise.
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