Long v. Atl. City Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 13 February 2012
• Docket Number: No. 06–4732.,06–4732.
• Citation: 670 F.3d 436
• Parties: Ronald LONG, Appellant v. ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; James Scoppa; Ernest Jubilee; New Jersey State Police; Nancy J. Taylor; Laura A. Barbato.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

670 F.3d 436

Ronald LONG, Appellant

v.ATLANTIC CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; James Scoppa; Ernest Jubilee; New Jersey State Police; Nancy J. Taylor; Laura A. Barbato.

No. 06–4732.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 9, 2011.File: Feb. 13, 2012.

Alexander Bilus [Argued], Carolyn H. Feeney, Dechert, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Matthew H. Duncan [Argued], Fine, Kaplan & Black, Philadelphia, PA, Amicus Curiae Counsel.

Before: RENDELL, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Ronald Long, a New Jersey state prisoner who proceeded pro se before the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, appeals an order of that Court denying his untimely motion for reconsideration of a prior order dismissing his complaint. Long relies on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A), which provides that, if a timely motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is filed, the time to appeal begins to run from the district court's disposition of the motion. He reasons that, here, we can review the underlying dismissal order because his motion for reconsideration should be deemed timely since mail delay within the prison caused him to file the motion late.

For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Long that, in cases where the record supports a finding of delay in prison mail delivery, such delay may make an untimely Rule 59(e) motion timely so as to permit the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over an order we would otherwise lack jurisdiction to review. When the record is insufficient to support a prisoner's allegations of prison delay, we may remand to the District Court for appropriate fact-finding. Ultimately, however, we rule that the issue of delay need not be resolved on remand because we have jurisdiction over the District Court's denial of reconsideration which, in this case, proves sufficient.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On February 21, 2006, Long filed an in forma pauperis complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Atlantic City Police Department, the New Jersey State Police, two police officers, and two forensic chemists. He alleged that the defendants conspired to obtain a capital murder conviction against him by knowingly presenting false evidence at his trial, and deliberately preventing him from obtaining DNA testing that would prove his innocence.¹ The complaint sought monetary damages to compensate him for the consequences of the alleged conspiracy.

On August 16, 2006, after screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,² the District Court issued a memorandum concluding that Long's claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), unless and until Long could demonstrate that his state court conviction was invalid. Accordingly, the District Court dismissed the complaint sua sponte, even though the defendants had not yet been served. The Court issued an accompanying order closing the case that same day. On August 21, 2006, the memorandum and the order were entered on the District Court's docket. Thus, under the rules then in effect,³ Long had until September 4, 2006 to file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (stating the deadline by reference to the “entry of the judgment”).

He did not do so. Instead, on September 25, 2006, Long filed ⁴ a motion for reconsideration along with a letter brief explaining that he had not received the District Court's filings until September 22, 2006—after the 30–day period to file an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) had lapsed. ⁵ The motion for reconsideration claimed that the delay was caused, in part, by Long's transfer from one state prison to another. Specifically, Long claimed that although he had informed the District Court of his transfer to a new prison, he received the District Court's memorandum and order only after they were sent to his old prison and then forwarded to him. He also attributed his delayed receipt of those documents to the fact that officials at his new prison “open Legal Mail outside of the inmate's presence.” (Amicus App. at 149.)

On October 4, 2006, the District Court issued a memorandum treating Long's motion for reconsideration as timely because he had “executed his motion on September 25, 2006, within three days of receipt” (Amicus App. at 155), but rejecting Long's motion for reconsideration on the merits, based on Heck. The District Court's memorandum, as well as its accompanying order, were entered on the docket on October 6, 2006. On October 31, 2006, Long signed a notice of appeal that was therefore timely as measured from the denial of reconsideration, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed within “30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from” in a case in which the United States or its agent is not a party), but untimely as measured from the August 16, 2006 order dismissing the case.

We consolidated Long's appeal with other cases presenting similar issues implicating Appellate Rule 4(a) for the purpose of determining whether, and to what extent, we have appellate jurisdiction to consider it.⁶

II. Discussion⁷

The parties agree that we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order denying Long's motion for reconsideration.⁸ Long contends that we also have jurisdiction to review the underlying dismissal order because his motion for reconsideration should, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A), toll his time to file an appeal. That Appellate Rule provides, in pertinent part, that certain “timely file[d]” post-judgment motions, including motions to reconsider under Rule 59(e), serve to postpone “the time to file an appeal ... [until] the entry of the order disposing of the last ... remaining motion.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Although Long acknowledges that his motion for reconsideration was late, he asks us to treat it as timely, due to the mail handling in prison that allegedly delayed his filing.

Our Amicus, Fine Kaplan, takes a contrary view regarding Long's attempt to appeal the underlying order of dismissal. According to Amicus's view of the law, when Long did not receive a copy of the District Court's dismissal order until after the 30–day time limit for filing a notice of appeal had lapsed, his only recourse was to file a motion under Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) for an extension of time to appeal,⁹ or a motion under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen the time to file an appeal.¹⁰ Because Long filed neither of those motions and instead filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e), Amicus argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court's underlying dismissal order.

A. Our Jurisdiction to Review the District Court's Initial Dismissal Order

We therefore begin our analysis by evaluating whether we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order dismissing Long's complaint. That inquiry leads us to examine two distinct questions.

First, we address whether allegations of prison delay can excuse the untimeliness of a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) so as to permit us to exercise jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to review the underlying dismissal. If an untimely Rule 59(e) motion can be considered “timely” as a result of prison delay, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) permits “the time to file an appeal [to] run[ ] ... from the entry of the order disposing of ... [that] motion.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Second, assuming Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) does provide an avenue for us to reach the underlying dismissal order, we consider whether there is a temporal limitation on the operation of that rule that would prevent its application in circumstances where a Rule 59(e) motion is filed after the otherwise applicable time period for filing a notice of appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), has lapsed.

We address those questions in turn.

1. Whether Prison Delay Can Render an Untimely Rule 59(e) Motion Timely

The idea that prison delay may serve to toll the time to appeal stems from our holding in United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds by Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321 (3d Cir.2010). There, we held that delay by prison authorities in delivering mail to a prisoner should be excluded in calculating the time for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case. See id. at 313. Although the prisoner in Grana filed a pro se appeal “fifteen days out of time” under Appellate Rule 4(b), Grana alleged that the prison had “negligently handled his incoming mail, and as a result he did not receive the district court's final order until May 5, 1988, after the expiration of the appeal period.” Id. at 314. He consequently argued that, for purposes of jurisdiction, his appeal should be treated as having been filed on time. We agreed.

Pointing to the Supreme Court's adoption of the prison mailbox rule,¹¹ we observed that “prison delay beyond the litigant's control cannot fairly be used in computing time for appeal” and we “perceive[d] no difference between delay in transmitting the prisoner's papers to the court and transmitting the court's final judgment to him so that he may prepare his appeal.” Id. at 316. We therefore held that, “in computing the timeliness of pro se prisoners' appeals, any prison delay in transmitting to the prisoner notice of the district court's final order or judgment shall be excluded from the computation of an appellant's time for taking an appeal.” Id. We remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the appeal was timely under that standard because “the record d[id] not show the date the prison received notice of the district court's final order or conclusively establish the date the prison transmitted the notice to [the] appellant.” Id. We instructed that, on remand, the prison would have “the burden ... of establishing the relevant dates”...