Long v. Chelsea Community Hosp.

• Decision Date: 25 October 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 182219
• Citation: 557 N.W.2d 157,219 Mich.App. 578
• Parties: , 12 IER Cases 1468 Reuel S. LONG, M.D., and Judith A. Long, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHELSEA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, John R.C. Wheeler, Ph.D., Susan M. Cischke, Frank X. Colligan, M.D., C. Wendell Dunbar, William C. Emhiser, John W. Merkel, Charles A. Skelton, Sally A. Stommen, D.D.S., Willard H. Johnson, Michael W. Smith, M.D., and F.S. Van Reesema, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 157

557 N.W.2d 157

219 Mich.App. 578, 12 IER Cases 1468

Reuel S. LONG, M.D., and Judith A. Long, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CHELSEA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, John R.C. Wheeler, Ph.D., Susan M. Cischke, Frank X. Colligan, M.D., C. Wendell Dunbar William C. Emhiser, John W. Merkel, Charles A. Skelton Sally A. Stommen, D.D.S., Willard H. Johnson, Michael W Smith, M.D., and F.S. Van Reesema, M.D., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 182219.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted June 11, 1996, at Lansing.

Decided Oct. 25, 1996, at 9:15 a.m.

Released for Publication Jan. 2, 1997.

Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian by Richard A. Soble and Elizabeth A. Stafford, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kitch, Drutchas, Wagner & Kenney, P.C. by Susan Healy Zitterman and Brian R. Garves, Detroit, for defendants-appellees.

Before YOUNG, P.J., and CORRIGAN and M.J. CALLAHAN, ^* JJ.

CORRIGAN, Judge.

In this action alleging that a private hospital revoked medical staff privileges with malice, plaintiffs appeal by right the order granting defendants' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). This case raises an issue of first impression: whether M.C.L. § 331.531; M.S.A. § 14.57(21) creates a private cause of action for malice. Because no such cause of action exists, we affirm.

In 1979, plaintiff ¹ Reuel S. Long, M.D., accepted defendant Chelsea Community Hospital's offer to become the Director of Anesthesia and Operating Room Services, a staff position. Defendant hospital is a nonprofit Michigan corporation and a private hospital. After Long joined the staff, he related various accusations to the hospital board (the individual defendants comprise the hospital's board) ² about purported misconduct of defendant Willard H. Johnson, then the hospital's president. In response, Johnson allegedly sought to have Long removed from the staff by changing the anesthesia services at the hospital. The board ultimately voted to award an exclusive contract for anesthesia services to Anesthesia Associates of Ann Arbor. Plaintiff was not associated with the Ann Arbor anesthesiologists. Following that award, the board voted to terminate plaintiff's position in 1991.

Plaintiff then sued the hospital for, among other things, wrongful discharge and breach of contract. While that litigation was pending, the board voted to terminate plaintiff's staff privileges at the hospital. The hospital settled with plaintiff for $150,000; the settlement specifically excluded any claims arising from the termination of plaintiff's staff privileges.

Plaintiffs then filed a second action, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, loss of consortium, and that defendants acted with malice under M.C.L. § 331.531; M.S.A. § 14.57(21) (hereinafter § 531). Defendants moved for summary disposition rather than answering plaintiff's complaint. The court determined that the statute upon which plaintiff relied did not give rise to a private cause of action for malice and noted that plaintiff had failed to support his allegation that defendants acted with malice. The court also declined to review plaintiff's breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims because it would interfere with the hospital's staffing decisions. The court granted defendants' motion and plaintiff appeals.

Defendants brought their motion in part under MCR 2.116(C)(8). A summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests a complaint's legal sufficiency on the pleadings alone. Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648, 654, 532 N.W.2d 842 (1995). If no cause of action exists under the statute, then plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted, and summary disposition is appropriate because that count would be unenforceable as a matter of law and because no amount of factual development could possibly justify a right to recovery. Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 163, 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992).

Plaintiff first asserts that defendants are not immune from liability because they acted with malice and contends that Michigan statutory law creates a private cause of action for malice under such circumstances. Whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute presents a question of statutory interpretation. Grand Traverse Co. v. Michigan, 450 Mich. 457, 463-464, 538 N.W.2d 1 (1995). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo. DeKoning v. Dep't of Treasury, 211 Mich.App. 359, 361, 536 N.W.2d 231 (1995).

When courts construe statutes, their primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 442 Mich. 201, 212, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993); State Treasurer v. Schuster, 215 Mich.App. 347, 351, 547 N.W.2d 332 (1996). This Court should first look at the specific statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). The Legislature is presumed to intend the meaning plainly expressed in the statute. In re Austin Estate, 218 Mich.App. 72, 553 N.W.2d 632 (1996). Judicial construction of a statute is not permitted where the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear. Id.; Dep't of Treasury v. Comerica Bank, 201 Mich.App. 318, 322, 506 N.W.2d 283 (1993).

The statute at issue, M.C.L. § 331.531; M.S.A. § 14.57(21), provides:

(1) A person, organization, or entity may provide to a review entity information or data relating to the physical or psychological condition of a person, the necessity, appropriateness, or quality of health care rendered to a person, or the qualifications, competence, or performance of a health care provider.

(2) As used in this section, "review entity" means 1 of the following:

(a) A duly appointed peer review committee of the state, of a state or county association of health care professionals, of an officially constituted health care facility, or of a health care association.

* * * * * *

(3) A person, organization, or entity is not civilly or criminally liable;

(a) For providing information or data pursuant to subsection (1).

(b) For an act or communication within its scope as a review entity.

(c) For releasing or publishing a record of the proceedings, or the reports, findings, or conclusions of a review entity, subject to [M.C.L. § 331.532; M.S.A. § 14.57(22) and M.C.L. § 331.533; M.S.A. § 14.57(23).]

(4) The immunity from liability provided under subsection (3) does not apply to a person, organization, or entity that acts with malice.

Plaintiff argues that the statute creates a private right of action for malice under the present circumstances. The common law recognizes no cause of action for malice on these facts. If the common law provides no right to relief, and the right to such relief is instead provided by statute, then plaintiffs have no private cause of action for enforcement of the right unless: (1) the statute expressly creates a private cause of action or (2) a cause of action can be inferred from the fact that the statute provides no adequate means of enforcement of its provisions. Bell v. League Life Ins. Co., 149 Mich.App. 481, 482-483, 387 N.W.2d 154 (1986). It follows that courts must dismiss a private cause of action under a statute creating a new right unless the statute expressly created the private cause of action or the cause of action may be inferred because the statute does not provide adequate means to enforce its provisions. Forster v. Delton School Dist., 176 Mich.App. 582, 585, 440 N.W.2d 421 (1989).

The statute does not expressly create a private cause of action for malice. Accordingly, the second condition is in question here: whether a private cause of action may be inferred because the statute does not provide adequate means to enforce its provisions. As evidenced by the statutory language, § 531 provides immunity to entities unless they act with malice. The statute's implicit purpose is to protect the participants in the peer review process. Indeed, the statute offers immunity to entities for their actions involving peer review. The statute is not designed to provide a comprehensive scheme of enforcement of the rights and duties it creates for the simple reason that it creates no right of action for malice. The statute is designed to protect entities from liability, not to create a new right of a private cause of action for malice. Accordingly, whether the statute provides adequate means to enforce its provisions regarding malice is not at issue here.

Moreover, recognition of a private cause of action for malice under the statute would frustrate and undermine the legislative purpose of providing immunity. A court's decision regarding private rights of action must be consistent with legislative intent while furthering the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. Gardner v. Wood, 429 Mich. 290, 301, 414 N.W.2d 706 (1987). The Legislature plainly did not intend to create a private cause of action. Its intent to confer certain immunities would be frustrated if this Court distorted its careful choice of language by recognizing a private cause of action for malice. We decline to recognize such a private cause of action under the statute. Accordingly, plaintiff has no cause of action for malice and the circuit court correctly granted summary disposition to defendants.

Plaintiff next alleges that this Court previously has reviewed such malice claims, citing Veldhuis v. Allan, 164 Mich.App. 131, 416 N.W.2d 347 (1987), and Regualos v. Community Hosp., 140 Mich.App. 455, 364 N.W.2d 723 (1985). Plaintiff contends that those cases support the availability of private causes of action under § 531. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, neither case held that a private cause of action exists. In Veldhuis, this Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to present evidentiary support for the malice allegations. Veldhuis, supra at 137, 416 N.W.2d 347. Similarly, in Regualos, this Court found that the plaintiff...