Long v. District of Columbia, s. 86-5200
| Decision Date | 05 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 86-5200,86-5201,s. 86-5200 |
| Citation | 261 U.S. App. D.C. 1,820 F.2d 409 |
| Parties | , 8 Fed.R.Serv.3d 33 Amelia S. LONG, as personal representative of Lewis D. Long v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al. Potomac Electric Power Company, Appellant. Amelia S. LONG, as personal representative of Lewis D. Long v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellant, Potomac Electric Power Company, et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Patrick Kavanaugh, with whom Stephen A. Trimble, Washington, D.C., was on the brief for appellant, PEPCO.
Edward E. Schwab, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom John H. Suda, Acting Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellant, District of Columbia.
Norman H. Singer, Washington, D.C., for appellee.
Before WALD, Chief Judge, MIKVA, Circuit Judge, and GESELL, * District Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.
This case arises from an automobile accident occurring at an intersection whose traffic signals were nonfunctional. Amelia Long, the widow and personal representative of an automobile passenger killed in the accident, brought a wrongful death action against the District of Columbia and the Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCO). A jury returned a verdict in favor of Long and against each of the two defendants, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. After the court had denied their post-judgment motions, PEPCO and the District appealed. The District contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Long's claim that the District was liable for her husband's death. PEPCO claims that substantive tort law principles entitle it to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, at a minimum, to a new trial. We agree with the District's jurisdictional argument, but disagree with PEPCO's substantive claims. We accordingly reverse the entry of judgment against the District and affirm the entry of judgment against PEPCO.
The District of Columbia and PEPCO are parties to a contract concerning the maintenance of traffic signals. The parties' obligations to repair faulty traffic signals under this contract are not in dispute in this case. During weekday business hours, the District's traffic signal department is to repair all traffic signal control equipment and PEPCO is to repair all incoming cables. During evenings, weekends, and holidays, PEPCO continues to have responsibility for repairs to incoming cables and assumes primary responsibility for repairs to traffic signal control equipment. When signal control equipment malfunctions during these periods, PEPCO is to "perform temporary emergency repairs." If PEPCO is unable to repair the signal control equipment, it must notify either the District Operator or the Mayor's Command Center, which in turn must notify the District's "on-call" mechanic. The District's mechanic must then report to the intersection at which the malfunction has occurred and make the necessary repairs.
On the afternoon and evening of Saturday, July 31, 1982, PEPCO received five complaints (two of which came from the District's police department) that the traffic signals at the intersection of 13th and L Streets, N.W. were out. At 1:37 a.m. on Sunday morning, the PEPCO Control Center notified one of PEPCO's repair crews of the problem. At 3:05 a.m., the crew arrived at the intersection and began repairs. At first, the repairmen experienced difficulty in opening the door of the signal control cabinet, even though they had the proper key. Eventually, however, they gained access to the signal controls and decided to replace a fuse. After watching the lights work properly for several cycles, the repairmen closed the door of the control cabinet, whereupon the lights went dark once more. The repairment attempted, but proved unable to open the door a second time; they then notified PEPCO's dispatcher of the situation and advised him to refer the matter to the District.
The time at which PEPCO's dispatcher referred the problem to the District is in some doubt. PEPCO claimed at trial that the dispatcher had notified the District Operator on Sunday morning, at some time prior to 10:23 a.m. PEPCO, however, could not prove that it had made this call, because PEPCO's computer was nonfunctional at the time and PEPCO could not produce any handwritten records. Further, the District's on-call mechanic denied having received notice of the problem on Sunday morning. The evidence is undisputed that the police again notified PEPCO of the nonfunctioning traffic signals at 6:31 p.m. on Sunday and that PEPCO referred the complaint to the District 25 minutes later, explaining that PEPCO's repairmen had been unable to open the control cabinet. The District's Operator telephoned the District's on-call mechanic several minutes later, but the mechanic failed to report to the intersection and the lights remained completely dark.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. on Monday, August 2 an automobile accident occurred at the intersection, and Lewis Long, a passenger in one of the automobiles involved, was killed. Later that morning, the District's mechanic arrived at the intersection to fix the traffic signals. The mechanic easily opened the cabinet door and observed that the incoming cable had burned out. Although PEPCO has contractual responsibility to repair incoming cables at all times, the District's mechanic fixed the cable, and the traffic signals began to work.
Amelia Long, the widow and personal representative of the deceased, filed a wrongful death action in federal court against PEPCO and the District of Columbia. In her complaint, Long alleged that PEPCO and the District had negligently maintained the traffic signals at the intersection and that this negligence had caused her husband's death. The complaint stated that the court had diversity jurisdiction over the claim against PEPCO because Long and PEPCO were citizens of different states. The complaint then claimed that the court had pendent party jurisdiction over the claim against the District.
The District soon filed a motion to dismiss Long's complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The District's motion focused on the issue of diversity of citizenship: the District essentially argued that claims against it were not amenable to diversity jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. The court agreed that it did not have diversity jurisdiction over the claim against the District. The court stated, however, that Some time later, PEPCO filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that substantive tort law principles precluded finding PEPCO liable for the death of Lewis Long. The district court denied this motion as well and sent the case to trial.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants PEPCO and the District in the amount of $540,000. The court entered judgment on the verdict jointly and severally against the District and PEPCO. The court also granted the crossclaims of PEPCO and the District for contribution, finding that each was entitled to contribution from the other in the amount of half of the verdict. Both the District and PEPCO filed post-judgment motions with the court. The district again sought dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. PEPCO requested a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court denied these motions, and PEPCO and the District appealed.
In order to decide whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Long's claim against the District, we address two questions. We first consider whether diversity jurisdiction allowed the district court to hear the claim against the District. We next consider whether pendent party jurisdiction allowed the court to hear this claim. Our two-step approach to deciding the ultimate question requires some explanation. The parties in this case do not dispute the issue of diversity jurisdiction: the District contends that it is not amenable to diversity jurisdiction, and Long nowhere directly contests this point. The dearth of argument on this question suggests that we should assume, without discussing or deciding, that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over the claim against the District and consider only whether the court also lacked pendent party jurisdiction over the claim. Analysis of the relevant law, however, shows that we may not take this path. For reasons that will become clear in the course of this decision, we cannot sensibly discuss or decide the issue of pendent party jurisdiction in this case until we have addressed the issue of the District's amenability to diversity jurisdiction. We therefore undertake the two-step inquiry that we have outlined above.
We begin our consideration of whether the District of Columbia is subject to diversity jurisdiction by noting the established law regarding the capacity of states and their political subdivisions to sue and be sued in diversity. The statute conferring diversity jurisdiction provides, in relevant part, that federal district courts "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ... is between ... citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332. The Supreme Court long has held that states are not subject to diversity jurisdiction under this provision. In Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 15 S.Ct. 192, 39 L.Ed. 231 (1894), the Court wrot...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Service Employees Int'L Union v. Philip Morris, CIV.A 98-704 GK.
...Appeals and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Haynesworth v. D.H. Stevens Co., 645 A.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C.1994); Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 419 (D.C.Cir.1987). Consequently, since Plaintiffs have not alleged any physical harm, as defined by the Restatement, they cannot recov......
-
Newman-Green Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain
...guarantors with a strong incentive to have the case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 3 See, e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, 261 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 8-9, 820 F.2d 409, 416-417 (1987); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519, 1523, and n. 3 (CA9 1987); Caspa......
-
A.I. Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Intern. Banking Corp.
...law the statute of limitations on [indemnification] claims begins to run only after a judgment has been paid," Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 417 (D.C.Cir.1987), while "a cause of action against a maker or an acceptor accrues in the case of a time instrument on the day after ma......
-
In re Fort Totten Metrorail Cases Arising Out of the Events of June 22, 2009
...to befall appellant, created a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to appellant.Id. at 997;see also Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 418 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“Like Bechtel, PEPCO entered into a contract to perform services within its field of expertise; PEPCO thereby acquire......
-
Table of Authorities
...Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980), 377n78 Lincoln Tel. &. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 79n37 Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 61n142 Long Island Lighting Co. v. New York Pub. Util. Comm’n, 134 A.D.2d 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), 239n98 Lopez, United Stat......
-
2 The Traditional Utility Monopoly
...conduct was “mere negligent omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements”). But see Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (upholding jury award to widow of trafic accident victim; utility company, in contracting with city to maintain trafic l......