Long v. Garey Inv. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1906
• Citation: 110 N.W. 26
• Parties: LONG v. GAREY INV. CO. ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

110 N.W. 26

LONG

v.GAREY INV. CO. ET AL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 15, 1906.

Appeal from District Court, Taylor County; H. M. Towner, Judge.

J. H. Hooker died March 9, 1904. On the 4th day of that month he executed conveyances of certain lots in Clearfield, Taylor county, and of a farm of 218 acres in Ringgold county, and a bill of sale of his personal property to his son, H. M. Hooker. The latter conveyed the lots to L. E. Yaryan June 27, 1904, who mortgaged them to J. F. McGinty. He deeded the farm to the Carey Investment Company July 8th of the same year. W. M. Long was appointed administrator of the estate of deceased May 12, 1904. But $2 came into his hands as such, and claims, aggregating nearly $2,000, were filed and allowed. This action was begun in the district court of Taylor county, January 26, 1905, by direction of said court, and therein plaintiff prayed that the conveyances be set aside and the property be sold to satisfy said claims. The defendants, save Yaryan and McGinty, were nonresidents, and served with notice by publication only. As the widow and H. M. Hooker did not appear, decree by default was entered against them. The Garey Investment Company answered, as did Yaryan and McGinty, who also, in a cross-petition, prayed that title be quieted in them. Some time after all the evidence had been introduced, plaintiff dismissed the cause of action as to Yaryan and McGinty and as to the lots in Clearfield. Thereupon, the Garey Investment Company moved that the action be dismissed as to the land in Ringgold county. This motion was overruled, whereupon decree was entered ordering that the conveyance from J. H. Hooker to his son, and from the latter to the Garey Investment Company be set aside, and the administrator sell the land, or so much thereof as should be necessary, to satisfy the claims together with the costs of administration, provided the company did not pay the same within 90 days. The Garey Investment Company appeals. Affirmed.Wm. M. Jackson, for appellant.

Crum, Jaqua & Crum and J. R. Plummer, for appellee.

LADD, J.

Five days before his death the deceased conveyed all his property, real and personal, to his son, who in turn deeded a farm of 218 acres in Ringgold county to the Garey Investment Company. To set aside these transfers and subject the land to the satisfaction of the claims allowed by the administrator is the object of this suit. The circumstances were such as plainly to indicate that no consideration passed from the son to his father, but the evidence fell short of showing any fraudulent purpose on the part of the grantor. There is nothing in the record from which a design to defraud subsequent creditors may be inferred, and if there were any existing creditors, that fact was not proven. True, claims were filed and allowed against the estate amounting to about $2,000, but the nature of these was not shown, nor the date when any of them accrued. For all that appears, they may have been in large part or wholly for services of attending physicians rendered during the last five days of deceased's life, and for funeral charges. The deceased might have incurred debts during this time. Courts are not to presume fraud, but rather to assume the existence of an honest purpose in all transactions, not inconsistent therewith, until the contrary appears. As the administrator could not find any property of the deceased save $2 in money after service in that capacity several months, and these claims had been established against the estate, it may be safely assumed that J. H. Hooker was insolvent at the time of his death. But it does not follow from this that he was in that condition when the conveyances were made. Conditions, when once proven, are presumed to continue, but not ordinarily to relate backwards. Sigler v. Murphy, 107 Iowa, 128, 77 N. W. 577. For these reasons, it cannot be said that the transfers were fraudulent as to creditors.

2. The petition also alleged that the deceased was mentally incapable of executing the deeds and bill of sale at the time he signed them. But three witnesses testified on this issue, the attending physician, L. U. Singer, and the defendants, L. E. Yaryan and J. F. McGinty. Dr. Singer was first called February 28th, and was in attendance as a physician several times thereafter up to the time of his death. He testified that the patient was suffering from a complication of diseases, among which was a renal trouble, and that the poison in his urine was carried into his blood and affected the convolutions of the brain, thereby weakening it; that he became drowsy and dormant, and wanted to be let alone; that this condition grew worse and on March 4th (the day the instruments were signed), he “had to work quite a little bit” before he got him to talk, and that what he said was not very rational; that he then fell off to sleep again; that he gave him a hypodermic injection of strychnine to stimulate the circulation, and waited to ascertain its effect and, upon discovering this produced no effect, advised the family that nothing could be done for him, and that he would pass away in a few days; that, in his opinion, the deceased did not possess sufficient mental capacity on that day to understand the nature of conveyances, or of the effect of what he was doing in signing the same. On the other hand, McGinty testified that he had called upon deceased about a week before his death, talked with him some time, and that he seemed rational. Yaryan also testified that he had visited with deceased several hours the day before his death, and that he was in full possession of his faculties. Even though the several witnesses may have been of equal credibility, the evidence of this physician of long experience and whose professional duty it was to closely observe the condition of deceased, that he was mentally incapable of transacting business on a particular day might well have been accepted by the district court as against the inference to the contrary to be drawn from the opinions of the two nonexperts that he was rational when they visited him about the same time. Moreover, deceased was shown to have been punctilious in meeting all his obligations during life, and it is not reasonable to suppose that he would voluntarily put all his property in a situation to defeat...