Long v. Horton
| Decision Date | 09 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 18765,18765 |
| Citation | 133 N.E.2d 568,126 Ind.App. 651 |
| Parties | Glenn C. LONG and Donald L. Long, Administrators of the Estate of Lewis J. Long, Deceased; May Bassler, Glenn C. Long, Onis W. Long, Donald L. Long, Appellants, v. Davis HORTON, Lola Allen, Otha Etycheson, George Washington, Cora Landis, Sophia P. Chenworth, Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Cook & Cook (Floyd F. Cook), Kokomo, for appellant.
Hurst & Grund, Hurd J. Hurst, Peru, Eugene M. Weesner, Wabash, for appellee.
Appellants brought this action in the lower court to quiet title to forty acres of land in Miami County. The appellees filed cross complaint to quiet title in themselves.
By appellants' amended complaint in two paragraphs, they allege ownership of the land in fee simple; and by right of adverse possession for occupancy for more than fifty years. The appellees answered such allegations in denial alleging fee simple title to three-fifths (3/5) of the land; for an accounting and partition; lack of knowledge of their ownership until a short time prior to the action being filed. Appellants replied to the appellees' answer in denial; pleading of the fifty and fifteen-year statute of limitations, Burns' Ann.St. §§ 2-603, 2-628; alleging adverse and open possession of the land from October 20, 1886, and affirmatively alleged that appellees were guilty of laches. To this answer appellees filed their reply in denial.
Trial by court resulted in a judgment adverse to appellants on their amended complaint and in favor of appellees on their cross complaint, quieting title in them to a three-fifths interest in said real estate.
New trial motion, which was overruled, contended that the decision was not sustained by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law. In view of the court's decision, on appeal, we are only concerned as to the specification that the decision is contrary to law.
The assignment of errors is the overruling of the new trial motion. The evidence which is uncontradicted reveals the following facts.
Thomas D. Coffing and his wife, Sophia Coffing, on October 20, 1886, executed a deed, which pertinent portion is as follows:
'This Indenture Witnesseth, That Thomas D. Coffing and Sophia Coffing, his wife, of Miami County, Indiana, convey and warrant to Lucy A. Sanders and at her death to her husband Josephus Sanders, his lifetime, the following real estate in Miami County, in the State of Indiana, to-wit: * * *' (Here real estate is described.)
The grantee, Lucy A. Sanders, was the daughter of the grantor, Thomas D. Coffing. She and her husband entered upon the real estate for purpose of occupancy and occupied the same until her death, December 4, 1938, said Josephs Sanders having preceded Sophia Sanders in death. She left two heirs, namely, Thomas and William A. Sanders. Thomas Sanders conveyed his interest in said real estate by warranty deed to his brother, William A. Sanders, on February 17, 1939, who, on March 15, 1946, executed a warranty deed conveying the real estate in question to Lewis J. Long and Dora B. Long, husband and wife. Dora B. Long died December 29, 1947, and Lewis J. Long died interstate, October 11, 1953. The appellants in this action are the sole heirs of Lewis J. Long. The appellees herein are the grandchildren of the original grantor, Thomas D. Coffing who died testate, July, 1907. By the terms of his will, he gave his second wife a life estate and the residue of his estate to his children, share and share alike, with the provision that heirs of any deceased children should inherit the parent share. During the administration of his estate, no dispute or mention was made of the real estate involved. The estate of Lucy A. Sanders was administered upon and was closed in 1938.
The appellees lived in the community, not far distant from the situated real estate and none of them, or their ancestors, ever claimed ownership to the disputed real estate until a short time prior to the appellants' filing this action. The evidence reveals that Lucy A. Sanders and her husband made permanent improvements on the real estate which included remodeling the house and other buildings, ditches and fences were constructed, and that said William A. Sanders likewise made permanent improvements from 1938 until the time he conveyed it in 1946.
Appellants contend that the Coffing deed of 1886 granted a fee simple title to Lucy A. Sanders, which by transfer of warranty deed, now vests in appellants; while it is the appellees' contention they have title thereto by right of inheritance from the grantor, Thomas D. Coffing, he having conveyed only a life estate to Lucy A. Sanders. If appellees' theory be correct, then the grantor merely conveyed two life estates, never divesting himself of the fee simple title.
The stipulation which gave the relationship of the parties further provided that the appellees had no knowledge of any interest they had in the real estate until about the time this action was commenced in the lower court.
It becomes our duty by proper interpretation of the deed to ascertain the true intention of the testator so as to give effect to each portion thereof. Where one clause in a deed purports to convey an estate by inheritance, and another clause indicates an intention to convey a life estate, it becomes necessary to resort to rules of construction in order to determine the intention of the grantor. First of all, an attempt must be made to reconcile the apparently inconsistent phrases thereof, if any there be. If harmony cannot be established within the four corners of the instrument, then one clause must prevail over the other. The principal rule of construction is that a deed must be construed strictly against the grantor because he had the advantage of drafting the instrument. Nicholson v. Caress 1877, 59 Ind. 39. Therefore, as a general proposition, the grantee is entitled to the greater estate. Meacham v. Blaess, 1905, 141 Mich. 258, 104 N.W. 579. It is generally held that if there are any inconsistences between the granting clause and the habendum clause, the granting clause will prevail, which clause in the interpretation of a deed is the most dependable expression of the grantor's intention. It is so drawn because it is considered to be the very essence of the deed. Dickson v. Wildman, 5 Cir., 1910, 183 F. 398.
As Lord Mansfield said:
'The rules laid down in the construction of deeds are founded in law, reason and common sense.' Goodtitle Ex. Dim. Robert Edwards v. Peter Bailey, 98 Eng.Reports, 1260.
Likewise, where there is no ambiguity in the language used in a deed, the intention of the parties must be arrived at from the language alone. Rules of construction exist as aids to arrive at the intention, not as a means to defeat it. American Law of Property, Vol. I, § 2.15, p. 125, and cases cited therein.
A life estate is a freehold interest in land, the duration of which is confined to the life, or lives of some particular person, or persons, or to the happening or not happening of some uncertain event. In arriving at our decision, we are guided by the general rule that where words of inheritance are not used, the entire context of the instrument may be considered and every word used, wherever found, must, if possible, be given weight in determining the estate granted. Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 1929, 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349, 73 A.L.R. 173.
It is significant to note the usage by the grantor of the phrase, 'convey and warrant,' and that the grantor made no provision in the deed for any undisposed part of the fee to revert to him (grantor) or to anyone else.
Sec. 56-115, Burns' Stat., 1951 Replacement, Part I, provides what shall constitute a conveyance, and is as follows:
In Illinois, the words, "convey and warrant," are declared by statute, S.H.A. ch. 30, § 8, to convey a fee simple title. Palmer v. Cook, 1896, 159 Ill. 300, 42 N.E. 796.
Sec. 56-105, Burns' Stat., 1951 Repl...
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