Long v. Illinois Municipal Elec. Agency

• Decision Date: 30 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-CV-2108.,99-CV-2108.
• Citation: 90 F.Supp.2d 181
• Parties: Dan LONG, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AGENCY, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

90 F.Supp.2d 181

Dan LONG, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AGENCY, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant.

No. 99-CV-2108.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

March 30, 2000.

Thomas H. Wilson, Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Springfield, IL, for plaintiff.

Ronald L. Lipinski, Jill D. Leka, Michael R. Gotzler, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, IL, for defendant.

ORDER

McCUSKEY, District Judge.

On August 13, 1998, Plaintiff, Dan Long, filed a Complaint (# 1) against Defendant, Illinois Municipal Electric Agency (IMEA). Long alleged that he was entitled to damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he had a property interest in continued employment with IMEA and he was terminated in violation of his procedural due process rights. Long also claimed that he was entitled to damages under Illinois law for breach of contract. On August 6, 1999, IMEA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (# 15). Long also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to three of IMEA's Affirmative Defenses (# 19). Following a careful review of both IMEA's and Long's arguments and all of the documentary evidence presented by the parties, IMEA's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 15) is GRANTED. Because judgment is entered in favor of IMEA as a matter of law, Long's Motion for Summary Judgment on IMEA's Affirmative Defenses (# 19) is DENIED as moot.

FACTS

Long began working for Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS) in January 1978. In 1995, CIPS was going through a merger. Long spoke to Frank Madonia, the General Manager of IMEA, sometime after he heard about the merger in August 1995. At Madonia's request, Long sent a letter to Madonia on September 8, 1995, in which Long set forth his job skills and what he could offer to IMEA. At that time, Madonia told Long that IMEA did not have any existing openings. In October 1995, Long and Madonia both attended a function in Peoria. Long told Madonia that he had been assured that his job was not going to be eliminated following the merger. Long then agreed to Madonia's request that he contact Madonia before he did anything. In early 1996, Long called Madonia and told Madonia he was not sure he wanted to stay at CIPS after the merger. Long testified at his deposition that he was concerned that things could get worse at CIPS after the completion of the merger. He also stated that he wanted to stay in Springfield.

In July 1996, Madonia asked Long to come to IMEA to talk to a few of IMEA's Board members about what he had to offer. Madonia then offered Long a position with IMEA as Assistant General Manager. This was a new position created for Long. The executive board of IMEA had voted to hire an additional employee as Assistant General Manager. Long received a letter from Madonia formalizing the job offer. The letter was dated July 19, 1996, and set out Long's starting salary and benefits package. The letter also stated, "[t]he first six months of employment is a probationary period and either the employee or employer may terminate employment without any adverse effect on the employee's record and the employer shall be held harmless." Long also received a copy of IMEA's Employee Policy and Procedures Manual (policy manual). Long testified that he read the policy manual from cover to cover.

The policy manual included a statement that "[p]ersons hired by IMEA shall be subject to an informal probationary period during the first six (6) months of their employment." Long testified that he discussed the probationary period with Madonia because he "didn't see a very good explanation of that in the manual." Long stated that Madonia told him that "it just means that after six months, they've got to have a reason to get rid of you." Long accepted the offer of employment and began working for IMEA on August 26, 1996. IMEA is a municipal corporation and is a public employer.

On April 7, 1997, Long received a letter from Madonia which stated that he would be given a 3.08% raise effective May 1, 1997. May 1 was the beginning of IMEA's fiscal year. The letter also stated that Long would receive a one-time bonus of $2,100. The letter stated that Madonia personally thanked Long for his "individual contribution to the team effort that has made the success of IMEA possible."

Beginning around June 1997, the executive board of IMEA had concerns regarding Madonia's performance as General Manager. On August 27, 1997, the executive board held a meeting to discuss their concerns. George Q. Smith, the president of IMEA's Board of Directors, was a member of the executive board. He testified that, at the meeting, they decided to ask Madonia to resign and take early retirement. Smith testified that the executive board felt that Long should go with him because Long was Madonia's choice for Assistant General Manager. Several members of the executive board did not think that IMEA needed an Assistant General Manager. They wanted to let the new General Manager decide whether an Assistant General Manager was needed. Madonia was then called into the executive board meeting and agreed to retire, effective September 1, 1997. Madonia called Long into his office and told Long he was retiring and had been authorized to offer Long 30 days severance pay. When Long asked for an explanation, Madonia told him that the executive board wanted to take IMEA "in a new direction." Madonia suggested that Long talk to the executive board. Long was allowed to address the executive board that day and "asked essentially what had happened, what had changed, what had I done." Long testified that he was again told that they wanted to take IMEA in a new direction. He stated that was the only reason he was given. Ronald D. Earl became IMEA's General Manager on January 1, 1998. Earl has not hired an Assistant General Manager for IMEA and this position no longer exists.

Long subsequently filed his Complaint in this court, and the case is before the court for ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the parties.

ANALYSIS

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court has one task and one task only: to decide, based upon the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). In making this determination, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Schmidt v. Runyon, 20 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1248 (C.D.Ill.1998). "Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence, not mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, which demonstrates that there is a genuine issue for trial." Schmidt, 20 F.Supp.2d at 1248. Neither the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties nor the existence of some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Debs v. Northeastern Ill. Univ., 153 F.3d 390, 394 (7th Cir.1998).

II. FEDERAL § 1983 DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

In order to make his due process claims, Long must establish that he had a property interest in his job of the sort that the Constitution protects. Border v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1996). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that such property interests "are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law...." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also Border, 75 F.3d at 273. A person's interest in a benefit, such as continued employment, constitutes "property" for due process purposes only if "there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit." Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). A protected property interest in employment arises from those "rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits" and can be embodied in a statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract. Domiano v. Village of River Grove, 904 F.2d 1142, 1147 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701); see also Border, 75 F.3d at 273. The Supreme Court has directed courts to examine state law to determine whether a person's interest in continued employment qualifies as a legally-protected property interest. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2694; Border, 75 F.3d at 273.

Because Long was employed in Illinois, this court looks solely to Illinois law to determine whether he had a property interest in his job. Border, 75 F.3d at 273. Under Illinois law, employment contracts are presumed to be at-will and are terminable by either party. Kalush v. Deluxe Corp., 171 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1999); McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 176 Ill.2d 482, 223 Ill.Dec. 911, 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1349 (1997). Further, an oral promise of permanent or lifetime employment is not enforceable because a writing is required. McInerney, 223 Ill.Dec. 911, 680 N.E.2d at 1351-52. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that "an employee handbook or...