Long v. Long

Decision Date04 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 25723.,25723.
Citation135 S.W.3d 538
PartiesCatherine M. LONG, Respondent, v. Gordon L. LONG, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

James R. Sharp, Sharp & Bredesen, Springfield, for appellant.

Justin A. Harris, Lowther Johnson, LLC, Springfield, for Respondent.

ROBERT S. BARNEY, Presiding Judge.

Appellant Gordon L. Long ("Husband") appeals from the dissolution of marriage decree entered by the Honorable Don Burrell, Jr., ("Family Court Judge") after a hearing before Family Court Commissioner Scott Tinsley.

Husband and Respondent Catherine M. Long ("Wife") were married on September 6, 1994. At the time of the hearing, Husband was 60 years old and Wife was 56 years old. When the parties married, Husband was working at Dairy Farmers of America1 as the director of pension and personnel services and Wife worked at St. John's Hospital as a nurse.

Just prior to the marriage, Wife had gone through a bankruptcy proceeding, and therefore, she brought only $1500.00 into the marriage. Husband brought approximately $84,000.00 into the marriage, including his equity in a house where the parties lived for the first few years of their marriage ("the South Sparks Street House").

In October 1998, Husband's position with Dairy Farmers of America was eliminated and Husband was offered a similar position in Kansas City. While Wife told Husband she preferred to stay in Springfield, she informed Husband it was his decision whether to take the job or retire. Husband elected to retire and has not worked since that time. Husband received $26,000.00 as severance pay upon his retirement.

In 2000, Husband received an inheritance of approximately $94,400.00, which Husband deposited into joint accounts with Wife. The equity in the Sparks Street House and a portion of Husband's inheritance was used to purchase the marital home that was then titled in Husband's and Wife's names ("the Sunset Street House"). At the time of the hearing, the parties had no outstanding debt on the Sunset Street House.

Husband and Wife separated on March 29, 2002. After the separation, Wife received over $130,000.00 in inheritance, which she deposited in an account in her sole name. According to Wife, she expected to receive an additional $30,000.00 to $36,000.00 together with $12,000.00 in interest earnings from the same inheritance.

On July 30, 2002, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. A hearing on Wife's motion was held before Commissioner Tinsley on May 28, 2003. Prior to this hearing, Husband and Wife were able to reach an agreement regarding certain non-marital property, which the parties stipulated to at the hearing. On June 3, 2003, Commissioner Tinsley entered Findings and Recommendations for Judgment and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, which were adopted by the Family Court Judge on June 4, 2003.

In the judgment, Wife was awarded non-marital property valued at $250,768.49 plus $232.45 per month in earnings derived from a pension plan, together with marital property valued at $161,393.00.2 Husband was awarded non-marital property valued at $252,930.00 plus $870.00 per month in earnings from his pension plan, and marital property valued at $211,360.00. As such, Husband was awarded approximately 56.7 percent of the marital property, and Wife was awarded approximately 43.3 percent of the marital property. Wife's award included liquid assets of $242,965.49 in non-marital property and $159,817.00 in marital property. Husband's award included liquid assets of $238,243.00 in non-marital property and $35,125.00 in marital property. Husband was also awarded as marital property the Sunset Street House valued at $175,000.00. The judgment included an order that Husband pay Wife $1500.00 for attorney fees.

On June 20, 2003, Husband filed a Motion for Rehearing, which was denied on July 1, 2003. This appeal followed. Husband raises two points on appeal, addressed below.

In his first point, Husband maintains the court's judgment was an abuse of discretion and was not supported by substantial evidence because the court failed to consider that: (1) Husband contributed significantly more to the acquisition of marital property than Wife; (2) Wife received substantial inheritance after the separation while the majority of Husband's pre-marital and inheritance property was transmuted into marital property during the marriage; (3) Husband is retired with a fixed income and suffers from osteoporosis while Wife is employed with an income of over $50,000.00 per year, is living with a man who shares expenses, is in good health, and has "better economic prospects than Husband;" and (4) Wife was awarded "the vast majority of the parties' liquid bank accounts" while the marital home constituted the bulk of marital property awarded to Husband.3

"In a court-tried case, the decree of the trial court must be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law." Rivers v. Rivers, 21 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Mo App.2000). The trial court has broad discretion in identifying and assigning value to marital property. Farley v. Farley, 51 S.W.3d 159, 164 (Mo.App.2001); Beckham v. Beckham, 41 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Mo.App. 2001). The trial court is also given broad discretion in dividing property, and we will interfere with its decision only if the division is so unduly weighted in favor of one party that it amounts to an abuse of discretion. Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 77 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Mo.App.2002); King v. King, 66 S.W.3d 28, 32-33 (Mo.App.2001). The trial court abuses its discretion only when its ruling is "clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock one's sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." In re Marriage of Holden, 81 S.W.3d 217, 225 (Mo.App.2002).

Furthermore, we review the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Kirkwood, 77 S.W.3d at 680; Love v. Love, 72 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Mo.App.2002). "Judging credibility and assigning weight to evidence and testimony are matters `for the trial court, which is free to believe none, part, or all of the testimony of any witnesses.'" Love, 72 S.W.3d at 171 (quoting In re Marriage of Haugh, 978 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo.App.1998)). We presume that the trial court took into account all evidence and believed such testimony and evidence that is consistent with its judgment. Kirkwood, 77 S.W.3d at 680. The party challenging the trial court's judgment in a dissolution of marriage has the burden of demonstrating error. Id.; King, 66 S.W.3d at 33.

Pursuant to section 452.330.1, the trial court in a dissolution proceeding is to divide marital property and debts in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors set out therein.4 See Rivers, 21 S.W.3d at 122. Those factors listed in section 452.330.1 are not exhaustive, and the trial court has "great flexibility and far-reaching power in dividing the marital property." Farley, 51 S.W.3d at 165. There is no formula respecting the weight the trial court is to give the relevant factors set out in section 452.330.1. Id.; see also Holden, 81 S.W.3d at 225. "Disparity in the value of marital property awarded each spouse is justified if any of the relevant factors, statutory or otherwise, justify an unequal division." Hayes v. Hayes, 792 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Mo. App.1990).

As previously noted, Wife was awarded non-marital property valued at $250,768.49 plus $232.45 per month in pension earnings and marital property valued at $161,393.00, and Husband was awarded non-marital property valued at $252,930.00 plus $870.00 per month in pension benefits and marital property valued at $211,360.00. As to the liquid marital property, Wife was awarded $159,817.00 while Husband was awarded $35,125.00.

Husband first addresses his contribution to the marital estate. In summary, Husband claims he contributed over $318,000.00 of the marital estate while Wife contributed only $198,000.00 and that the Court should have considered his greater contribution in awarding marital property. As previously noted, there is no formula respecting the weight the Court is to give those factors set out in section 452.330.1. Farley, 51 S.W.3d at 165.

The court observed that Husband brought approximately $80,000.00 into the marriage while Wife brought very little. However, the court also noted that Wife continued to work throughout the marriage while Husband elected not to work for the last one-half of the marriage. In so noting, the court concluded that Wife's "contribution to maintaining the marital estate and paying marital expenses through her employment offset the pre-marital funds" that Husband invested in the marital estate. The court further acknowledged Husband received a substantial inheritance during the marriage that was transmuted into marital property and cited that inheritance as the primary reason Husband was awarded "a significantly greater percentage of the marital estate."

Husband directs our attention to nothing in the record that would indicate the court failed to consider the contribution of the parties toward the acquisition of the marital estate in dividing the marital property. See Kahn v. Kahn, 839 S.W.2d 327, 332 (Mo.App.1992). As such, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in awarding Husband 56.7 percent of the marital property or that such an award was not supported by substantial evidence.

Husband next argues that Wife received a substantial inheritance after the separation while the majority of Husband's pre-marital and inheritance property was transmuted into marital property during the course of the marriage. As best we discern, this is an allegation that the Court failed to consider the value of the non-marital property set apart to each spouse as required by ...

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