Long v. Mattingly

• Decision Date: 05 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-273-II,89-273-II
• Citation: 797 S.W.2d 889
• Parties: Geneva I. LONG and Raymond C. Long, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Basil M. MATTINGLY, Individually and d/b/a Marion Mission, an Unincorporated Association or an Individual Proprietorship, and Marion Mission Company, a Corporation, Defendants/Appellants . 797 S.W.2d 889
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 889

797 S.W.2d 889

Geneva I. LONG and Raymond C. Long, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Basil M. MATTINGLY, Individually and d/b/a Marion Mission, an Unincorporated Association or an Individual

Proprietorship, and Marion Mission

Company, a Corporation,

Defendants/Appellants

.

No. 89-273-II.

797 S.W.2d 889

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section, at Nashville.

July 5, 1990.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court Oct. 22, 1990.

John T. Rice, Paul E. Scott, Luther, Anderson, Cleary & Ruth, Chattanooga, for defendants-appellants.

Joe Timberlake, Chattanooga, for plaintiffs-appellees.

OPINION

KOCH, Judge.

This appeal involves an automobile accident in South Pittsburg. The driver whose automobile was struck from behind and her husband filed an action in the Circuit Court for Marion County against the driver of the second automobile and his employer. After the jury awarded $100,000 to the plaintiff-driver and $25,000 to her husband, the plaintiffs accepted remittiturs reducing the awards to $85,000 and $20,000 respectively. The defendants have appealed, insisting that they were entitled to a directed verdict, that the jury instructions were erroneous, and that evidence concerning the reasonableness of a portion of the medical expenses was inadmissible. We have determined that judgment should be affirmed but that the damage awards should be reduced further to $50,000 and $10,000 respectively.

I.

Geneva Long was returning home from her hairdresser early on the afternoon of May 25, 1985 when she decided to go to the Dollar General Store in South Pittsburg. She traveled west on Cedar Street and stopped behind two other cars at a traffic signal at the intersection of Fifth and Cedar Streets. After the intersection, Cedar Street changes from a two-lane to a five-lane road with a dedicated turn lane. The Dollar General Store was only a short distance from the intersection, and Mrs. Long intended to make a left turn into the store's parking lot after passing through the intersection.

The car in front of her began to move into the intersection when the signal turned green. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Long's car was struck from behind by a car being driven by Basil Mattingly. The impact of the collision pushed Mrs. Long's car into the car in front of her being driven by Roxanne Earvin. Ms. Earvin's car was not damaged, and the rear of Mrs. Long's car was only slightly damaged.

Ms. Earvin and Mr. Mattingly were not injured. Mrs. Long left the scene thinking that she was not hurt. However, she developed a headache later in the afternoon and experienced pain and swelling in her neck the next day. During the next two years, she was treated by four different physicians for cervical and lumbar strain. The treatment included occipital nerve injections, physical therapy, and various medications.

II.

Mr. Mattingly and his employer first take issue with the denial of their motion for a directed verdict. While conceding that Mr. Mattingly's car struck Mrs. Long's car, they assert that Mrs. Long failed to prove that the accident was the proximate cause of the pain and numbness in her neck, arms, and back. We disagree.

Directed verdicts are appropriate when the evidence supports only one conclusion. Gann v. International Harvester Co., 712 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Tenn.1986); Holmes v. Wilson, 551 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tenn.1977). They are inappropriate when the material facts are in dispute or when there is substantial disagreement concerning the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Sauls v. Evans, 635 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tenn.1982); Maddux v. Cargill, Inc., 777 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989).

Appellate courts take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence favoring the opponent of the motion when called upon to determine whether a trial court should have granted a directed verdict. They also allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the motion's opponent and disregard all evidence contrary to the opponent's position. Crosslin v. Alsup, 594 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tenn.1980); Maddux v. Cargill, 777 S.W.2d at 691; Solomon v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 774 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989).

Mrs. Long testified, without contradiction, that she did not have problems with either her neck, arm, or back prior to the accident. She complained of headaches as well as swelling and pain in her back shortly after the accident. Her treating physicians opined, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that she was suffering from cervical and lumbar strains and occipital neuralgia and that this condition "frequently follows a whiplash-type injury which is what she described." This evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case on proximate cause.

III.

Mrs. Long consulted four physicians during the two years after her accident. She made three visits to Dr. Stanley Payne, a Chattanooga orthopaedic surgeon, between May and July, 1985. Then she switched to Dr. H. Barrett Heywood, another Chattanooga orthopaedic surgeon, who treated her from July, 1985 through March, 1986. At Dr. Heywood's direction, Mrs. Long underwent six weeks of physical therapy at Erlanger Hospital in 1985.

When Mrs. Long's pain continued, Dr. Heywood referred her to Dr. Hufstutter, a Chattanooga rheumatologist. After three visits, Dr. Hufstutter referred Mrs. Long to Dr. Walter M. Boehm, a Chattanooga neurosurgeon. Dr. Boehm has treated Mrs. Long since May, 1986. In 1986, at Dr. Boehm's direction, Mrs. Long underwent another fourteen weeks of physical therapy with a private therapist.

Mrs. Long testified concerning her injuries and the history of her medical treatment. She then introduced the portions of Dr. Heywood's and Dr. Boehm's depositions in which they opined that the medical treatment and physical therapy she received was necessary and reasonable. Her proof with regard to medical expenses concluded with her husband introducing $6,173.19 worth of medical bills into evidence. ¹

Mr. Mattingly and his employer now challenge the admissibility of the doctors' opinions concerning the necessity of Mrs Long's medical treatment and the reasonableness of the charges. They assert that these opinions were based on hearsay and that both physicians were not competent to give their opinions about the other physicians' treatment or charges because they had not examined the other physicians' files. We disagree.

Both Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm testified that the treatment they provided Mrs. Long was necessary and that their own charges were reasonable. This testimony was clearly admissible. Thus, this issue pertains only to the treatment Mrs. Long received from Dr. Payne and the physical therapy she received at the direction of Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm. ²

A physician who is familiar with the extent and nature of the medical treatment a party has received may give an opinion concerning the necessity of another physician's services and the reasonableness of the charges. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Carter, 522 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tenn.1975). To be qualified to render these opinions, the physician must first demonstrate (1) knowledge of the party's condition, (2) knowledge of the treatment the party received, (3) knowledge of the customary treatment options for the condition in the medical community where the treatment was rendered, and (4) knowledge of the customary charges for the treatment. See Nash v. Carter, App. No. 87-192-11, Slip op. at 13, 1987 WL 19312 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 4, 1987).

Both Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm were familiar with Mrs. Long's condition because they had treated her for the same injuries Dr. Payne had treated her for. Both physicians practiced in Chattanooga where Dr. Payne practiced. Dr. Heywood practiced in the same specialty Dr. Payne practiced, and Dr. Boehm testified that there was a great deal of overlapping between his specialty and Dr. Payne's specialty insofar as conditions like Mrs. Long's were concerned. Accordingly, both Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm established their familiarity with the Chattanooga medical community's customary treatment and charges for Mrs. Long's condition.

Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm became acquainted with the services Dr. Payne provided Mrs. Long by examining a tabulation of all of Mrs. Long's medical bills prepared by her lawyer. The tabulation showed (1) the name of each provider, (2) the date the service or product was provided, (3) a description of the service or product, and (4) the charge for the service or product. Even though he conceded at trial that the tabulation was "probably" correct, Mr. Mattingly's attorney now attacks Dr. Heywood's and Dr. Boehm's opinions because they were based on the tabulation rather than the actual bills themselves.

There is no proof that the tabulation was inaccurate or deceptive or that all parties did not have access to the bills on which it was based. The bills themselves were properly introduced into evidence at trial, and even a cursory comparison of the tabulation and the bills reveals that the bills themselves contain no relevant information that did not also appear on the tabulation. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly found that Mrs. Long's medical experts could base their opinion on the necessity and reasonableness of the treatment and charges based on their personal knowledge of her condition and their review of the abstract of the bills. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence Sec. 698 (1964); State v. Wiseman, 643 S.W.2d 354, 365 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982).

Similarly, both Dr. Heywood and Dr. Boehm were competent to testify concerning the necessity of the physical therapy Mrs. Long received and the reasonableness of the charges for the therapy. With regard to the necessity issue, both physicians testified that they prescribed the therapy because they thought Mrs. Long's condition required it. With regard to the reasonableness of the charges, both physicians testified that they were familiar with the charges for physical therapy in the Chattanooga area and that Mrs....