Long v. Stanley

• Citation: 79 Miss. 298,30 So. 823
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
• Decision Date: 19 December 1901
• Parties: MARGARET LONG v. ALBERT D. STANLEY ET AL

30 So. 823

79 Miss. 298

MARGARET LONG v. ALBERT D. STANLEY ET AL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

December 19, 1901

October 1901

FROM the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county. HON HENRY C. CONN, Chancellor.

Mrs Long, the appellant, was the complainant in the court below Stanley and others, appellees, were defendants there. The object of the suit was to cancel a tax deed as a cloud upon complainant's title to lands. From a decree denying complainant relief, she appealed to the supreme court. The facts are stated in, or clearly inferable from the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Wells & Wells, for the appellant.

The tax title of defendants, appellees, is void for four reasons: 1. There was no valid assessment, therefore, the tax collector was not armed with power to make the sale. 2. The deed made by the sheriff to the pretended tax purchaser was not filed with the chancery clerk during the time allowed by law for redemption. 3. The lands were not sold in forty acre tracts, as required by law. 4. The tax sale was made at Raymond, in the second district of Hinds county, and not at Jackson, the county site of the first district, where the land lies.

Virden v. Bowers, 55 Miss. 1; Stovall v. Connor, 58 Miss. 138; Mitchum v. McInnis, 60 Miss. 945; Fletcher v. Trewalla, 60 Miss. 963; Carlisle v. Goode, 71 Miss. 453; Carlisle v. Christman, 69 Miss. 392; Pearce v. Perkins, 70 Miss. 276; Davis v. Vanarsdale, 59 Miss. 367; Greene v. Williams, 58 Miss. 752; Gibson v. Berry, 66 Miss. 515; Herring v. Moses, 71 Miss. 620; Griffin v. Ellis, 63 Miss. 348; Caruthers v. McLaran, 56 Miss. 371; Higdon, v. Salter, 76 Miss. 766; Nelson v. Abernathy, 74 Miss. 164; Gregory v. Brogan, 74 Miss. 694. These authorities not only maintain our positions, but refute our adversaries' claims.

The parties hold under a common source of title; the land was assessed to appellant upon the assessment roll, upon which the tax deed rests. Johnson v. Futch, 57 Miss. 74, and complainants' title was therefore well pleaded.

Williamson, Wells & Croom, for the appellees.

The decree of the court below should be affirmed for three reasons: (1) The complainant was barred by the three years' statute of limitations (code 1892, § 2735) at the time the suit was brought; (2) complainant failed to deraign her title, as required by code 1892, § 501, and hence has no standing to assail appellee's tax title; (3) the tax title is not shown to have been void.

Whether the complainant's suit was barred depended upon a question of fact--one of adverse possession under the tax deed--which was found for appellees by the chancellor upon evidence amply sufficient to support the finding, and, of course, this court will largely be bound by the determination of the court below.

Code 1892, § 501, requires a complainant in a case like this to deraign her title, or give a reason for not doing so, neither of which was done in this cause, by the pleadings or the evidence. Unless complainant herself had title she cannot complain. The parties do not hold under a common source of title. The fact that the land was assessed to Mrs. Long does not create a common source. The tax sale passed the title, no matter to whom the lands were assessed. The deed from Sullivan to complainant did not help her cause, for the reason Sullivan was not shown to have had any title.

OPINION

CALHOON, J.

Appellant filed her bill to remove clouds from her title to land, and avers that appellees claim under two tax conveyances, which she says are void. The appellees set up that she did not deraign her title under code, § 501, and denied that she ever had any title. The only showing of title made by the complainant in her bill is that in the latter part of the year 1885 she became the owner in fee simple" of the lands. In her proof she produces a conveyance to her from one Elizabeth Sullivan, bearing the apparent date of September 15, 1885. The requirement to deraign title appears for the first time in the legislation of this state in ...