Long v. State
| Decision Date | 24 November 1922 |
| Docket Number | 24,116 |
| Parties | Long v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Floyd Circuit Court; John M. Paris, Judge.
Prosecution by the State of Indiana against Willard W. Long. From a judgment of conviction, the defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Harry W. Carpenter and George B. McIntyre, for appellant.
U. S Lesh, Attorney-General, and Mrs. Edward Franklin White, for the state.
This is a prosecution under an indictment for bigamy under § 2350 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, § 454, which indictment charges that the appellant, being married, married again, the former wife being alive and the bonds of matrimony still undissolved, and that no legal presumption had arisen of the death of his wife.
Appellant at the age of 23 years, was married in the State of Kentucky in November, 1903, to Mary Lee Durrett, and as a result of such marriage there was born to them a daughter about three years after this marriage. Approximately all the period of his married life appellant had been engaged in mercantile pursuits, the last few years of which had been as manager of a store in Kentucky, while he had his residence in the city of New Albany, Indiana. For three years prior to the alleged crime with which he is charged, he had under his employ as such manager, Majorie McFall, the last two years of which employment she was his bookkeeper. While Marjorie was still in such employ, and on November 16, 1921, she and appellant were married. At the time of appellant's said second marriage he was of the age of 42 years and Marjorie was of the age of 19 years. Since the marriage of appellant with Mary Lee Durrett, including the time of appellant's courtship and marriage with Marjorie, they had lived continuously together as husband and wife. The second marriage was performed by a minister of the Gospel by virtue of a marriage license issued by the clerk of the Clark Circuit Court, and return of such marriage was duly made to such clerk by the officiating minister, as provided by law. In making application for such marriage license appellant in answer to the question, "Has such prior marriage or marriages been dissolved?", answered, "Yes;" question, "If so, how?" answer, "Death." Appellant's daughter accompanied him and Marjorie to the parsonage of the officiating minister and stood up with her father at the marriage ceremony for the marriage of appellant and Marjorie McFall. During the time that appellant and his daughter and Marjorie were away from appellant's home engaged in the second marriage, appellant's first wife, Mary Lee Durrett Long, was at appellant's home preparing the wedding repast in celebration of this second marriage of appellant, to which home the three repaired after the marriage ceremony. Appellant, in his own behalf, and his two wives, called on behalf of the state, were witnesses in the trial of the cause. It is interesting to note, in the consideration of the rejected evidence complained of, that appellant upon direct examination in his own behalf, testified as to what answer he made to a witness in the case, who, with the officers, accompanied him from the place of his arrest in Louisville, Kentucky, to New Albany, Indiana, as to why he married Marjorie McFall, and if he did not know he had violated the law, answered, "When the question was put to me in regard to the law, I said I was actuated by a higher power than the law of the land."
The trial before the court and the jury resulted in a verdict of guilty, which was followed by a judgment of imprisonment, from which appellant appeals.
Error is predicated upon the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial, the causes for which, not waived, are: That the defendant was precluded by rulings of the court from introducing in evidence, testimony to prove his intent and motive for marrying the second time; that the court erred in giving certain instructions to the jury; and that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.
Concerning the question of intent or motive, appellant, in testifying in his own behalf, was asked upon direct examination, "Why did you marry Marjorie McFall?" Over the objection of the state, appellant's counsel offered to prove in answer to the question, that "he married Marjorie McFall for the reason that some unknown power or spirit had so directed his mind that it made him feel that it was compulsory on his part that he do it, and that he married her in good faith, believing that he was doing an act that was in compliance with the commands of a higher power." And thereupon the court sustained the objection to the question. The following question was asked appellant upon direct examination, "When you answered me a while ago that Mary Lee died on the 27th day of October, explain to the jury what you meant by that." Over the objection by counsel for the state, counsel for appellant offered to prove by the witness in answer to the question, "In explaining that his wife died on the 27th day of October, 1921, that she was not the same woman that he married, but that her spirit had departed from her body, and she was no longer the same Mary Lee Long, but that she was changed in ways and acts and not her natural being, and that her spirit had departed into another, and it was because of that spirit speaking to this defendant that caused him to marry Marjorie." Thereupon the court sustained the objection by the state to the question.
It is maintained that the answers to these two questions, as shown by the offers to prove, relate to the intent to commit the crime, and that the evidence if permitted, in answer to these questions, would tend to prove the appellant committed the act with no criminal intent or motive. As a general proposition, in criminal law where there is no criminal intent there can be no guilt; but it is equally true that every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does; so that in the offense of bigamy, where the statute makes it criminal to do an act under particular circumstances, the party doing that act is criminally responsible, regardless of any criminal intent. People v. Spoor (1908), 235 Ill. 230, 85 N.E. 207, 126 Am. St. 197, 14 Ann. Cas. 638; Rice v. Commonwealth (1907), 31...
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