Long v. State

• Decision Date: 21 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1028-03.,1028-03.
• Parties: Gwin H. LONG, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

132 S.W.3d 443

Gwin H. LONG, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas.

No. 1028-03.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 21, 2004.

Michael P. Gibson, Dallas, for Appellant.

Davis S. Glickler, Special Crimes Division Office of the Attorney General, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MEYERS, PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.

The police officers in this case obtained a warrant to search the rural, gambling business premises of "Train's" which was explicitly described as a "silver in color passenger train car." We conclude that this warrant did not authorize the search of appellant's home, an entirely different and distinct structure—a red caboose— which was located nearby. There are, in fact, two problems with the present search.¹ First, there is no descriptive language in this warrant that would authorize the search of appellant's home as well as a search of the separate and independent business establishment. Second, there are no facts set out in the affidavit that would lead a reasonable officer executing this search warrant to have probable cause to believe that the gambling devices, paraphernalia, and business records described within the search warrant or affidavit would be found in appellant's home. We conclude that the officers violated Ms. Long's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in their search of her home. Because the court of appeals, over a thoughtful dissent, held otherwise,² we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

Sgt. Scott Wilson, an undercover officer for the Texas Attorney General's Special Crimes Unit conducted an investigation into illegal gambling operations at appellant's business establishment, "Train's," which is located in a rural area of Henderson County. Sgt. Wilson went to "Train's" one evening to play eight-liner video gambling devices. He spoke with appellant, who told him that successful players were no longer rewarded with Wal-Mart gift certificates, but they were entered into a weekly contest to win a dinner for two and $50.00 cash. Sgt. Wilson returned on several other days, continued playing the eight-liners, and saw others doing so as well.

Based upon his investigation, Sgt. Wilson drafted a lengthy and thorough affidavit and search warrant which authorized a search of the "Train's" premises as well as appellant's arrest. Other police officers executed this warrant, and they searched not only the business establishment of "Train's," but also another train car located in the same vicinity,³ and appellant's home which was a nearby red caboose. Neither of these structures were mentioned in the warrant or affidavit. The facts establishing probable cause to believe that appellant was operating a gambling business, owned gambling paraphernalia, and kept records of gambling activity specified activity only at the silver colored passenger train car. When they searched appellant's home, officers seized cash, bank records, Wal-Mart gift certificates, and the keys to the eight-liner machines.

At trial appellant objected to the admission of any items seized from her home because the search warrant authorized a search only of "Train's." She claimed that the search of her home without either a warrant or exigent circumstances violated her Fourth Amendment rights. After hearing arguments, the trial court agreed with appellant and sustained her objection.⁴ At the State's behest, however, the trial court changed its mind the next morning and allowed the admission of all items taken from appellant's home, including $1,200 in cash found underneath the mattress of her bed.

The jury convicted appellant of five gambling offenses, and the trial court assessed a sentence of 60 days in jail on each count, to be served concurrently, plus a fine of $1,000 on each of the five counts.

Appellant's sole point of error on appeal was that the trial court erred in admitting any evidence seized from her red-caboose home because that search was illegal. The court of appeals' majority correctly noted that "[s]earch warrants and affidavits should be considered in a common sense manner, and hypertechnical readings should be avoided."⁵ It then analyzed a number of federal and state cases which had held that a search warrant describing a particular residence or building may include, within its scope, other "outbuildings" or areas that are closely connected to that described residence or building.⁶ After reviewing that relevant case law, the court concluded that "the search warrant was properly construed as authorizing a search of the red caboose.... The fact that Appellant was also using the caboose as her residence does not alter our view."⁷ Justice Griffith dissented and concluded that:

the search exceeded the parameters permitted by the search warrant, and improperly intruded into the residence of Appellant without an authorizing search warrant, and, therefore, evidence obtained in the search of Appellant's residence should have been excluded from Appellant's trial.⁸

We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to resolve this disagreement on a material question of law between justices on the same court of appeals.⁹

II.

A. What "premises" does the search warrant and affidavit describe?

One of the specific commands of the Fourth Amendment is that no warrant shall issue except one "particularly describing the place to be searched."¹⁰ The present warrant and affidavit, taken together, provide a remarkably specific description of the place to be searched. The affidavit begins with this description:

1. THERE IS IN SEVEN POINTS, HENDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS, A SUSPECTED PLACE AND PREMISES DESCRIBED AND LOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

An unnamed business establishment known locally as Train's is located at 1075 Pritchett Lane, Seven Points, Henderson County, Texas. The structure is a silver in color passenger train car. The passenger train car is located north, 8/10 of a mile from State Highway 334 on the west side of Pritchett Lane, Seven Points, Henderson County, Texas. In front of this silver in color passenger train car is a black mail box located on the west side of Pritchett Lane with the numbers "1075". This is the only silver in color passenger train car located on Pritchett Lane 8/10 of a mile north of State Highway 334, Seven Points, Henderson County, Texas.¹¹

From this superb description, we can go to Henderson County and find that silver passenger train car. We also know that there is only one such train car. It is silver, it is a passenger car, and it is a business. It is not red, it is not a caboose, and it is not a home. In front of this solitary silver passenger train car business establishment is a black mail box with the numbers "1075" written on it. Finding that mail box will help us find the silver passenger car right behind it.

Are we now to conclude that the affiant, having set out such an exemplary description of the specific property to be searched, did not mean what he said? Instead, was he really seeking a warrant to search any and all structures near the described business, including appellant's home? The affiant officer testified at trial that he knew the red caboose was appellant's home, so if he had probable cause to search her separate home as well as her business establishment, why did he not say so? Then the neutral magistrate could have decided whether there was probable cause to believe that appellant kept gambling devices, paraphernalia and business records in her home as well as at the nearby business. To conclude that this description of the specific property to be searched includes, sub silentio, the right to search appellant's home subverts the objectives of the Fourth Amendment's Particularity Clause.

The constitutional objectives of requiring a "particular" description of the place to be searched include: 1) ensuring that the officer searches the right place; 2) confirming that probable cause is, in fact, established for the place described in the warrant; 3) limiting the officer's discretion and narrowing the scope of his search; 4) minimizing the danger of mistakenly searching the person or property of an innocent bystander or property owner; and 5) informing the owner of the officer's authority to search that specific location.¹² As one federal court has stated:

When investigators fail to limit themselves to the particulars in the warrant, both the particularity requirement and the probable cause requirement are drained of all significance as restraining mechanisms, and the warrant limitation becomes a practical nullity. Obedience to the particularity requirement both in drafting and executing a search warrant is therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches and seizures.¹³

Of course, "[a] search made under authority of a search warrant may extend to the entire area covered by the warrant's description."¹⁴ And, when courts examine the description of the place to be searched to determine the warrant's scope, they follow a common sense and practical approach, not a "Procrustean" or overly technical one.¹⁵

For example, as we stated in Comeaux v. State,¹⁶ when a warrant uses the legal term "premises," courts should interpret its use in a given warrant to "portray the intent with which it was embraced in the document."¹⁷ In Comeaux, officers obtained a warrant to search "a certain place and premises," namely the defendant's "residence, No. 1700 Brooklyn Street, City of Beaumont, Jefferson Co., Texas, the same being occupied and used by Walter Como [sic] and others, as a private dwelling."¹⁸ This Court noted that a fair reading of this language authorized the officers to search "not only the mansion house but the garage [located about 40-50 feet away from the house] upon the same lot forming a part of the curtilage."¹⁹ We reached the common-sense conclusion that "it is not...