Longacre v. Ganowski
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 83345-6-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CLAYTON ERNEST LONGACRE, Appellant, v. LISA L. GANOWSKI, JEFFREY T. CLOSSON, JOHN DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 2, Respondents. |
CLAYTON ERNEST LONGACRE, Appellant,
v.
LISA L. GANOWSKI, JEFFREY T. CLOSSON, JOHN DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 2, Respondents.
No. 83345-6-I
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1
February 22, 2022
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Smith, J.
Clayton Ernest Longacre appeals the trial court's summary dismissal of his trespass and harassment claims against Lisa L. Ganowski, Jeffrey T. Closson, and John Does 1 and 2. Longacre contends he has demonstrated that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding dismissal of his claims. He also contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to amend his complaint and denying his motion to compel discovery and suspend all motions. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
Elizabeth Kelsey owned and lived in a home located on Madrona Point Drive in Bremerton. Kelsey's fiancé Clayton Longacre often resided there with her. In 2016, Lisa Ganowski purchased and moved into the home directly to the north. Ganowski's significant other Jeffrey Closson lived there with her. A fence separated the two properties.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
The neighbors had a contentious relationship from the start. In May 2018, Ganowski began reporting multiple disturbances involving Kelsey's dogs to the Bremerton Police Department and Kitsap Animal Control. Longacre's behavior towards Ganowski on the night of her first report caused her to call 911 out of fear for her safety. On June 13, 2019, a dog belonging to Longacre wandered onto the Ganowski property, leading Closson to collect and return the dog while Ganowski recorded the exchange on her cell phone. Kelsey responded by shouting profanities and repeatedly threatening to shoot Closson if he ever came on her property again. The following day, Ganowski and Closson obtained temporary antiharassment orders against Kelsey in municipal court.
On July 23, 2019, Longacre filed a pro se lawsuit against Ganowski, Closson, and John Does 1 and 2, [1] alleging causes of action for trespass and harassment and seeking damages under both theories. The complaint alleged that the defendants (1) caused raw sewage from their property to back up into the first floor of the Kelsey residence, (2) installed a gate that damaged a wooden fence on the Kelsey property, (3) made false reports to parking enforcement in an attempt to get plaintiff's vehicles towed, (4) shoveled snow onto the Kelsey property, (5) coaxed the plaintiff's dogs onto their property in order to make false reports to animal control, (6) behaved in a threatening manner towards the plaintiffs, and (7) colluded with other neighbors to harass and make false claims against the plaintiffs. On September 13, 2019, Longacre filed an amended complaint adding Kelsey as a plaintiff and asserting three additional causes of
action: abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
While Longacre's original complaint was pending, the municipal court transferred the antiharassment orders to the jurisdiction of the superior court. On September 16-17, 2019, the superior court held a hearing on the antiharassment petitions and also addressed motions filed by both parties in the civil lawsuit. Ganowski and Closson argued that Longacre's amended complaint should be stricken because, among other reasons, they had already moved to dismiss the lawsuit under CR 12(b)(6) and Longacre did not file a motion to amend his complaint.[2] The court denied Ganowski's and Closson's motions to dismiss and struck Longacre's amended complaint, stating, "if Mr. Longacre wants to file an amended complaint at this point, he can file a motion requesting we to do that." Regarding the antiharassment petitions, the superior court ruled that Kelsey's threatening and aggressive behavior, as demonstrated on the cell phone recording, as well as the dog's repeated invasions of the Ganowski property, constituted harassment. Accordingly, the court entered protection orders effective for one year against Kelsey on behalf of Ganowski and Closson.
On June 19, 2020, Ganowski served a motion for summary judgment on Longacre via email.[3] Ganowski argued that Longacre's retaliatory complaint consisted entirely of baseless claims lacking factual support or any showing of damage. Ganowski further argued that there is no civil cause of action for
harassment, and to the extent that intentional infliction of emotional distress was his intended claim, Longacre failed to demonstrate that the defendants' alleged behaviors met that standard. CP 83-84. In doing so, Ganowski relied on her own declaration, transcripts of the September 16-17, 2021 hearing, the protection orders, and the deposition of Longacre. Closson moved for summary judgment shortly thereafter on the same basis.
On June 18, 2020 - the same day Ganowski served the summary judgment motion - Longacre filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint pursuant to CR 15(a). The proposed amended complaint added Kelsey as a plaintiff, included several new allegations of fact, and asserted five new causes of action: abuse of process, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, theft and possession of stolen property, and nuisance, encroachment, and intentional interference with quiet enjoyment of property.
On July 23, 2020, Longacre filed a response in opposition to summary judgment. Longacre asserted that the case arose when another neighbor recruited the defendants to join his ongoing harassment of Longacre and Kelsey. In asserting that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, Longacre relied on his own declaration, Kelsey's declaration, the declaration of Randall Hills (an individual who stated that he witnessed an incident of harassment), transcripts of 911 calls placed by two neighbors, and a fire marshal's report. On July 27, 2020, Longacre filed a "motion to compel discovery and to suspend all motions and discovery by defendants until discovery requested is fully answered and provided." Longacre argued that the defendants
unreasonably resisted discovery by refusing to answer interrogatories, provide requests for production, or attend depositions, in violation of CR 37 and CR 26.
On October 13, 2020, the superior court issued a memorandum opinion granting Ganowski's and Closson's motions for summary judgment and denying Longacre's motion for leave to amend and motion to compel discovery. The court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the trespass claim because Longacre had failed to show damages and failed to present evidence beyond mere speculation. The court further ruled that there is no tort claim in Washington for harassment and that the defendants' alleged conduct did not rise to the level required to prove the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In denying the motion for leave to amend his complaint, the court found that the defendants would be prejudiced by Longacre's "late request to amend his complaint and the futility thereof." The court further found that Longacre's motion to compel discovery was "merely an attempt to delay or avoid Defendant's motion for summary judgment," that Longacre had failed to specify how additional discovery would present any evidence that would create a question of material fact, and that the defendants had reasonably attempted to accommodate Longacre's request to take their depositions. Longacre appeals.
ANALYSIS
Summary Judgment
Longacre first argues that the trial court erred when it granted the respondents' motions for summary judgment on his trespass and harassment claims. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review an order on summary judgment de novo, viewing all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c).
When a defendant brings a motion for summary judgment, "the moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a material fact." Young v. Key Pharm. 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). Once this initial showing is made, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln and Okanogan Public Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 118 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 820 P.2d 497 (1991). The nonmoving party may not rely on speculation, argumentative assertions, or unsupported affidavits. Dombrovsky v. Farmers Ins. of Wash., 84 Wn.App. 245, 253, 928 P.2d 1127 (1996). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "reasonable minds could differ on the facts controlling the outcome of the litigation." Ranger Ins. v. Pierce Cty., 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). When a reasonable person could reach but one conclusion from all of the evidence, summary judgment will be affirmed. Peterson v. Kitsap Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, 171 Wn.App. 404, 416, 287 P.3d 27 (2012).
Trespass
"Trespass occurs when a person intentionally or negligently intrudes onto the property of another." Jackass Mt. Ranch, Inc. v. South Columbia Basin Irr. Dist., 175 Wn.App. 374, 401, 305 P.3d 1108 (2013). Longacre alleges both forms of trespass.
A. Negligent Trespass
To show negligent trespass, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation, and proximate cause. Pruitt v. Douglas Cty., 116 Wn.App. 547, 554, 66 P.3d 1111 (2003). Longacre asserts that Ganowski committed negligent trespass because someone improperly used a snake to unclog a toilet in her home, thereby flooding the Kelsey residence with sewage and causing significant damage....
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