Longoria v. Texas

• Decision Date: 21 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-41052.,05-41052.
• Citation: 473 F.3d 586
• Parties: Adam LONGORIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of TEXAS, et al., Defendants, David Hudson, Assistant Warden; Donna Johnson, Individually and in her official capacity; Ronald Stafford; Michael Peacock, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity; Jerry Rogers, Officer; Herbert Farr, Individually and in his official capacity; Paul Staggs, Officer; Lieutenant Zelda Glass, Individually and in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

473 F.3d 586

Adam LONGORIA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of TEXAS, et al., Defendants David Hudson, Assistant Warden; Donna Johnson, Individually and in her official capacity; Ronald Stafford; Michael Peacock, Officer, Individually and in his official capacity; Jerry Rogers, Officer; Herbert Farr, Individually and in his official capacity; Paul Staggs, Officer; Lieutenant Zelda Glass, Individually and in her official capacity, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 05-41052.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

December 21, 2006.

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Christopher J. Gale (argued), Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, San Antonio, TX, for Longoria.

Shanna Elizabeth Molinare (argued), Matthew Tepper, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge:

Inmate Longoria, who was stabbed by fellow inmates for being a "snitch," sued various Texas prison officials for constitutional and state-law violations arising from the attack. In this interlocutory appeal from denial of Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we REVERSE IN PART AND DISMISS IN PART. The district court erred in failing to assess the degree of participation of each prison official individually, and most of them — Officers Farr, Glass, Peacock, Rogers, Stafford and Staggs — were entitled to qualified immunity, as a matter of law.

I. BACKGROUND

We recite the facts as depicted in appropriate summary judgment evidence.

After midnight on May 27, 2000, Appellee Adam Longoria, a prisoner at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's ("TDCJ") Telford Unit, was stabbed twenty-eight times by fellow inmates David Peralez and George White.¹ Due to their suspected membership in the Texas Syndicate ("TS") prison gang, Longoria, Peralez, and White were housed near one another in a lockdown unit (or "pod") because of recent hostilities that had broken out between the TS and a rival gang.

After inspecting the toilet and shower area for weapons, Officers Farr and Staggs strip-searched inmates Peralez and White and took them to the third-tier shower area. Shortly thereafter, Officer Rogers removed Longoria from his cell in order to escort him to a routine lockdown interview. Longoria claims he told Rogers that Peralez and White were in the showers and wanted to kill him. Rogers allegedly assured Longoria that if anything happened he would be protected. Officer Rogers then handcuffed him and removed him from the cell.

As Longoria and Officer Rogers walked along the corridor, Peralez and White emerged from the showers armed with shanks and began running toward them. Longoria fled. Although unarmed,² Rogers initially attempted to stand between Longoria and his attackers, but was pushed aside as they chased Longoria. Officers Farr and Staggs, who were inspecting Peralez's and White's cells for contraband, heard the commotion, were approached and threatened by White, and ran away to alert other guards and obtain weapons and tear gas.

Peralez and White chased Longoria through the now-sealed pod,³ tackled him and began stabbing him in the chest and neck. Longoria finally broke free and fled to the first-floor common area where he collapsed and was met by arriving officers. He was seriously injured.

Longoria was likely targeted by the TS because he had become a jailhouse informant. On several occasions in the months preceding the attack, Longoria had provided gang-related information during meetings with investigators from the Security Threat Group ("STG") and the Internal Affairs Division ("IAD").

Major Hudson⁴ instructed STG Officer Johnson to interview Longoria on two occasions, March 15 and March 22, 2000 concerning an attack on another gang member ordered by the TS. Longoria admitted that he had been a TS prospect since his arrival at Telford, but he no longer desired to be associated with the gang. Longoria did not express any fear for his safety or request a life-endangerment investigation during these interviews, but did request to be removed from lockdown because he was no longer affiliated with the TS. Officer Johnson, however, had obtained information from the prison administration that Longoria had been a TS leader at the Willacy Unit and had a history of manipulative and "slick" behavior. Based on Officer Johnson's reports, Major Hudson discounted much of Longoria's information and, because he was a TS member, kept him on lockdown status.

A few weeks later, Longoria again contacted prison officials and offered information about the murder of a TS member. After briefing Officer Scott and IAD Officer Stafford, Longoria again requested to be removed from lockdown, stating that he was not a TS member and felt that his life would be endangered if other inmates were to learn that he was meeting with prison officials. Major Hudson was then informed of the meeting by Officer Scott but decided to take no action to rehouse Longoria.

In the days following his meeting with Scott and Stafford, Longoria had made several additional written requests to be removed from lockdown. In neither of his letters dated April 2 and May 22⁵ did Longoria express any concern for his safety.

Longoria claims, however, that he sent at least two additional letters sometime in early May to Major Hudson and Officers Scott and Johnson in which he made life-endangerment claims and stated that TS members knew of his meeting with Officers Scott and Stafford and had ordered a revenge "hit" on him. Major Hudson attested that neither of these letters were found in Longoria's casefile, nor could Hudson confirm that any prison officials received these letters.

On May 26, 2000 — the day of the attack — Longoria approached Sergeant Vann in the pod's common area and informed her that the TS was planning to murder him. Longoria requested a life-endangerment investigation, immediate removal from lockdown, and reassignment to protective housing. In response to Longoria's assertions, Vann telephoned STG Officer Johnson, who at the time of the call was processing a large group of newly arrived inmates. Johnson halted her intake interviews and told Vann that she would contact Officer Glass, a member of the Inmate Classification Committee, to make a determination concerning the validity of Longoria's life-endangerment claim.

Officer Johnson then consulted with Officer Glass, who recommended that since Longoria notified Sergeant Vann of his claims, it was ultimately Vann's responsibility to initiate a life-endangerment investigation. Following Glass's instructions, Johnson told Vann to initiate an investigation if Vann determined that one was necessary. Johnson then passed the telephone to Officer Glass, who informed Vann to proceed with an investigation if Longoria had a legitimate claim. Glass further explained to Vann that, because neither Glass nor Johnson was authorized to reassign Longoria to a new cell, Vann needed to contact Major Gray. After unsuccessful attempts to locate Major Gray, Vann notified the ranking security officer on duty Captain Langley, of Longoria's claim and explained that Longoria was a TS member currently relegated to lockdown status. Because of the minimal exposure to other inmates that Longoria would have on lockdown status, Langley determined that immediate housing reassignment was not necessary and that a life-endangerment investigation should be undertaken prior to any change in Longoria's assignment. Early the next morning, the attack occurred.

Longoria brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Texas, TDCJ,⁶ Major Hudson, Officers Farr, Glass, Johnson, Peacock,⁷ Rogers, Stafford, and Staggs. Narrowing Longoria's claims to those of failure to protect and state-created danger, the district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. All of the officers have appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability to the extent that "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). For qualified immunity purposes, "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 524 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)).

It is well established that prison officials have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of their fellow inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976-77, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).⁸ Under Farmer, an inmate "must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm" and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to an inmate's safety. Id. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference if he is aware of an "excessive risk to inmate ... safety" and disregards that risk. Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. In this context, an officer's awareness of the risk is evaluated subjectively. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists" and must in fact also have drawn the inference. Id. No liability exists, however, if an official reasonably responded to a known substantial risk, "even if the harm was ultimately not averted." Id. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at 1983.

The district court predicated its denial of summary judgment on the existence of disputed material facts, including the authenticity of the May 22 letter, the amount of notice given by...