Longstreth v. Franklin County Children Services
| Decision Date | 21 December 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-3190,93-3190 |
| Citation | 14 F.3d 601 |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Mark E. LONGSTRETH, The Estate of Mark E. Longstreth, Deceased, by Linda S. Colling, Administrator, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Linda S. Colling; David M. Longstreth, Sr., Plaintiffs, v. FRANKLIN COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before: MILBURN and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; and COHN, United States District Judge. *
Plaintiff, the Estate of Mark E. Longstreth, deceased, by Linda S. Colling, Administrator, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, which arises from the death of Mark E. Longstreth while in the custody of the Franklin County Children Services. On appeal, the issue is whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment based upon the res judicata effects of a prior Ohio state court decision in a wrongful death action between the same parties. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The plaintiffs in the action below were the Estate of Mark E. Longstreth ("Longstreth"), deceased, by Linda S. Colling, Administrator; Linda S. Colling, the deceased's natural mother; and David M. Longstreth, Sr., the deceased's natural father. 1 The defendants are Franklin County Children Services; Franklin County Children Services Board; Franklin Village; Franklin County, Ohio; and Carol Hoversten-Pepper 2, as an employee and agent of Franklin County Children Services.
During the summer of 1989, Mark Longstreth, aged 16, was committed to the Franklin County Children Services ("Children Services") as an unruly minor. After being committed to the custody of Children Services, Longstreth was placed at the Transition Center, a temporary residential facility at Children Services.
On July 22, 1989, Longstreth and six other youths were taken on a recreational outing, a "merit outing," by defendant Carol Hoversten-Pepper. Hoversten-Pepper was a social worker employed at Children Services as an activities therapist. Her duties included planning and supervising youth activities such as the recreational outing. Participation in the recreational outing was based on merit; the youths earned the privilege of participating in the outing by following the rules of the Transition Center.
Originally, the outing was to include swimming, fishing, and a picnic at the Alum Creek Reservoir. However, Hoversten-Pepper changed the outing to a fishing trip and picnic at the Greenlawn Dam when she found out that there was not enough gasoline in the agency van for the trip to and from Alum Creek Reservoir. Greenlawn Dam is a lowhead roller dam located on the Scioto River.
At Greenlawn Dam, the party fished on the northeast bank of the Scioto River. After lunch, the party moved to the more remote western shore of the river where the river flows rapidly and noisily over a spillway. Some of the children, who were wearing swim trunks or cut-offs, began wading in the river to fish. Hoversten-Pepper called them back when they got too far out in the river. At some point, Longstreth and two other youths were wading in the water when Longstreth stepped into a "drop off" in the Scioto River and drowned.
Hoversten-Pepper, who was not qualified in water safety or lifesaving, did not attempt to rescue Longstreth since she was alone and could not leave the other children stranded. Further, there were no lifeguards in sight at the river, and the participants had passed signs prohibiting swimming and wading when they arrived in the Greenlawn Dam area. Moreover, Hoversten-Pepper had not brought a life preserver, buoy or life jacket with her on the outing.
The Greenlawn Dam area is generally known as a site where previous drowning deaths have occurred. Both the on-site agency supervisor and the administrator of the Transition Center knew of the drownings at Greenlawn Dam, but Hoversten-Pepper apparently did not ask anyone about the suitability of the Greenlawn Dam area for the recreational outing. In addition, plaintiffs assert that Hoversten-Pepper knew from previous outings that Mark Longstreth was afraid of deep water and was a poor swimmer and that she also knew that Longstreth had trouble obeying authority figures.
On September 29, 1989, Linda S. Colling as administrator of Longstreth's Estate filed a wrongful death action in the Franklin County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. However, the state court complaint was significantly amended in September 1990.
On July 22, 1991, the present civil rights action was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, alleging the violation of the civil rights of Longstreth and various family members as a result of his death by drowning while in the custody of the defendants. Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the district court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the civil rights action due to the pending wrongful death action in state court.
On January 31, 1992, the district court granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss. As a result, the derivative heirs and next of kin were dismissed, but plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint. An amended complaint was filed on March 2, 1992.
Thereafter, on September 24, 1992, the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granted a judgment in favor of defendants in the state wrongful death action, finding that Hoversten-Pepper was not reckless in conducting the outing and further finding that defendants were entitled to immunity under Ohio Rev.Code, Ch. 2744.
On October 1, 1992, defendants requested that the district court dismiss this civil rights action based upon the doctrine of res judicata. Subsequently, on December 16, 1992, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants based upon res judicata.
Thereafter, on December 22, 1992, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which operated as a time-tolling motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on January 15, 1993, plaintiffs filed a premature notice of appeal. On February 12, 1993, the district court denied the motion for reconsideration. However, the second notice of appeal referred to in footnote 1 was timely filed on February 19, 1993.
Subsequent to the filing of the briefs and joint appendix in this appeal, on June 29, 1993, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Tenth Appellate District entered an opinion affirming the decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in plaintiffs' wrongful death action. 3
Plaintiff challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on the ground of res judicata. On appeal, a district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Brooks v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th Cir.1991); Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, Ohio, 927 F.2d 909, 911 (6th Cir.1991). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988).
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed by the parties. However, plaintiff argues that as a matter of law the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground of res judicata. Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the district court erroneously accorded greater preclusive effect to the state court decision than it would be given under Ohio law. Plaintiff also asserts that because the federal civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and the state law tort claim for wrongful death are different causes of action with different standards for each cause of action, the district court erred in finding res judicata.
"In determining what preclusive effect to give to a prior state court judgment, federal courts must give the same effect to that judgment as would be given it under the law of the state that rendered the judgment." City of Canton, Ohio v. Maynard, 766 F.2d 236, 237 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (citing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ, 465 U.S. 75 (1984)). This rule has been explicitly applied to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Migra, 465 U.S. at 84-85. "In deciding whether res judicata ... lend[s] preclusive effect to a particular state court decision, federal courts look to the state's law to 'assess the preclusive effect it would attach' to that decision." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1537 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 557 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 532 (1985)).
Ohio's doctrine of res judicata bars relitigation of claims upon which a final judgment on the merits has been rendered, and the doctrine also bars those claims which might have been litigated in the first lawsuit. Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1537 (). But, Norwood, 52 N.E.2d at 71. " 'The test for determining whether a second suit is for the same cause of action as the first is to consider the facts necessary to sustain the two claims.' " Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction...
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McCauley v. Mayer
...precludes actions brought for violations of federal civil rights laws. Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.09(E). See Longstreth v. Franklin Cty. Children Services, 14 F.3d 601, at *6 (6th Cir. 1993), citing Craig v. Columbus City Schools, 760 F. Supp. 128, 130 (S.D. Ohio 1991). Accordingly, Defendants' ......