Longwell v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 02 May 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 05-316-ART.
• Parties: Jeannie LONGWELL, Petitioner, v. Joyce ARNOLD, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

Page 759

559 F.Supp.2d 759

Jeannie LONGWELL, Petitioner, v. Joyce ARNOLD, Warden, Respondent.

Civil No. 05-316-ART.

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division, Pikeville.

May 2, 2008.

John Anthony Palombi, Public Advocate's Office, Frankfort, KY, for Petitioner.

Courtney Jones Hightower, Office of Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMUL R. THAPAR, District Judge.

The Petitioner, Jeannie Longwell, is pursuing a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), claiming that the faulty jury instructions given at her trial violated her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, Longwell alleges that the jury was unable to make a finding on all elements of the offense of complicity to commit first-degree robbery. Longwell also claims there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict her of complicity to commit first-degree robbery.

In the context of federal habeas review, the threshold question is whether the adjudication of the claim in state court "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir.2002).

I. DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute the Kentucky Supreme Court's recitation of the facts, see Longwell v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-SC-0623, 2004 WL 1365995 (Ky. June 17, 2004) (unpublished), which is as follows:

At Longwell's trial, the jury heard evidence that she and her boyfriend, Ray Shively, drove to a department store in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, on December 5, 2001, and while Shively waited in the car, Longwell entered the store and shoplifted some items to sell to support her drug habit. When Longwell was confronted outside by two loss prevention managers, Shively approached, armed with two knives, and Longwell escaped to the car. Thereafter, Shively got into the passenger side of the car and Longwell sped away. After a lengthy car chase during which Longwell ran numerous traffic lights and ignored police sirens, six police cruisers blocked the car and Longwell and Shively were apprehended. When police approached the vehicle, Shively was in the passenger seat holding the stolen clothing.

On February 19, 2003, a jury convicted Longwell of one count of complicity to commit first-degree robbery, one count of first degree fleeing or evading, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. Id. at *1. She was sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison. Id. Shively was convicted of terroristic threatening and fleeing or evading police, but was acquitted on the first-degree robbery charge. Id.

On direct appeal, Longwell argued that the jury instruction on complicity to commit first-degree robbery was flawed because it did not require the jury to find that she intended for Shively to use or threaten the immediate use of physical force, which is an essential element of the offense. See id. The relevant portions of the jury instructions, in the order they were given, are as follows:

INSTRUCTION NO. 1

DEFINITIONS

Complicity—Means that a person is guilty of an offense committed by another person when, with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with such other person to commit the offense, or aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in planning or committing the offense.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2

COMPLICITY TO COMMIT FIRST-DEGREE ROBBERY

You will find the Defendant guilty of Complicity to Commit First-Degree Robbery under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant, alone or in complicity with another, committed all of the following:

A. That in this county on or about December 5, 2001, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, she stole items of clothing from Proffitt's at Towne Mall, Elizabethtown, Kentucky;

B. That in the course of so doing and with intent to accomplish the theft she by herself or with the aid of Ray Shively used or threatened the immediate use of physical force upon Chad Harrod and Jonathan Goldsburg and that she acquiesced in his actions;

AND

C. That when she did so, Ray Shively was armed with two knives.

[R. 13 (appendix)].

The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the trial court on direct appeal, noting that although section "B" of the complicity to commit first-degree robbery instruction (Instruction No. 2) erroneously failed to include the element of intent, the separate instruction defining complicity (Instruction No. 1) satisfied the intent element, and therefore, no reversible error occurred. Longwell, 2004 WL 1365995, at *2.

Thereafter, Longwell filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus [R. 1] in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court concluded that Longwell's state-court remedies had been exhausted [R. 20] and the Magistrate Judge proceeded to the merits of her claim [R. 21]. In his report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge found that Longwell had failed to demonstrate that the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law, [R. 21 at p. 8], and that if there was error it was harmless, Id. at 9. The Magistrate Judge further found that Kentucky Supreme Court's decision that sufficient evidence existed to convict Longwell was not "an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law." Id. at 12.

Longwell objected to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation [R. 22]. On March 26, 2008, the Court held a hearing [R. 25] on Longwell's objection and gave the parties an opportunity to file post-hearing briefs [R. 27 and 28] on the issues presented at the hearing. After consideration of all of the arguments and briefing, this Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge was correct and the Petition should be denied for the reasons that follow.

A. The Supreme Court of Kentucky's decision is not contrary to clearly established federal law.

Longwell first argues that the complicity instruction was contrary to clearly established law because it did not include every element of the offense of complicity to commit first-degree robbery [R. 1, Memorandum in Support at p. 4]. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (recognizing that Constitution gives criminal defendant the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, his guilt of every element of crime charged, and trial judge's refusal to allow jury to consider "materiality" of defendant's false statements infringed upon that right). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

At oral argument, Longwell, raised the following two new arguments: (1) the complicity instruction was flawed because it was ambiguous, see Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (holding that for constitutional error to occur there must be reasonable likelihood that jury applied ambiguous instruction "in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence"), and (2) the complicity instruction and definition instruction were contradictory, see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322-23, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (holding that when one instruction is contradictory to another on an essential element, it is impossible to tell whether the jury relied on the proper or improper instruction, and thus, the conviction must be reversed). As discussed below, neither of these arguments was presented to the Kentucky Supreme Court, and thus, are procedurally defaulted.

(1) The omission of the intent requirement in the complicity instruction in the context of the overall charge and as part of the whole trial was not a constitutional error.

Longwell argues that the trial court's failure to include the intent element in the complicity instruction was a constitutional error requiring reversal. It is well established that a jury must find a defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). When reviewing jury instructions, however, courts do not view the contested instruction in isolation, but rather in the context of the overall charge. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S.Ct. 442, 70 L.Ed. 857 (1926)); see also United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 852-53 (8th Cir.2008) (concluding that although the instructions were in error, when viewed as a whole, the instructions "adequately apprise[d] the jury of the essential elements of the offense[ ] charged and the burden of proof required of the government.") (alteration in original); Hardaway v. Withrow, 305 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir.2002) (instructions failed to include one element of the crime but it was not reversible error where instructions as a whole adequately apprised the jury); United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 765 (5th Cir.1991) (stating that instructions are to be viewed as a whole when analyzing whether they provide a correct statement of law when defendant is claiming that an element is missing).

In viewing the faulty complicity instruction in the context of the instructions as a whole, this Court agrees with the Supreme Court of Kentucky's conclusion that the definition instruction cured...