Olson v. Little

• Decision Date: 20 July 2012
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:09-cv-361-KSF
• Parties: STEPHANIE DENISE OLSON, PETITIONER, v. JEFF LITTLE, Warden, Otter Creek Correctional Complex, RESPONDENT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

STEPHANIE DENISE OLSON, PETITIONER,

v.JEFF LITTLE, Warden, Otter Creek Correctional Complex, RESPONDENT.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:09-cv-361-KSF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON

Dated: July 20, 2012

OPINION & ORDER

On November 12, 2009, Stephanie Olson filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 concerning her conviction in Kentucky state court for complicity to murder. DE 1. Warden Jeff Little responded on March 9, 2010. DE 10. Consistent with local practice, this matter was referred to the Hon. Edward B. Atkins, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).

On January 5, 2012, the Magistrate Judge filed his Report and Recommendation that the petition be denied based on a review of the state court record and the applicable law. DE 20. Following an extension of time, Olson filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on February 9, 2012. DE 23. On February 23, 2012, Warden Little filed his response to Olson's objections. DE 25. This matter is now ripe for review.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this matter were fully set out by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Olson v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-592, 2008 WL 746651 (Ky. March 20, 2008) and were briefly summarized in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, the facts are recited herein only as necessary to place the Court's disposition of this matter in context.

The victim of the June 6, 2002 murder was Diane Snellen, Olson's mother, who disapproved of Olson's relationship with her boyfriend, David Dressman. Dressman and his acquaintance, Timothy Crabtree, were accused of the murder.

Olson was convicted by a Scott Circuit Court jury of complicity to murder. Record ("R") 2 at 2-4. As a result, she was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years. Olson's conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. R. 6 at 112-137. Her petition for rehearing [R. 7 at 138-150] was denied but led to a modification of the Kentucky Supreme Court's Opinion. The modification did not affect the holding of the case. R. 9 at 158-184.

Olson then filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. DE 1. In support, Olson argued that she was entitled to relief on the following grounds: (1) the evidence at the state trial was constitutionally insufficient to sustain her conviction for complicity to murder; (2) she was denied a fundamentally fair trial and due process of law because of the improper tactics employed by the prosecution to obtain the "impeachment" testimony of Richard Roberts; (3) she was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial by the trial court's numerous evidentiary errors; (4) she was deprived of a fair trial and due process because the court denied her request for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's references in his opening statement to highly damaging testimony, which testimony was not presented.

II. THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("AEDPA"), Magistrate Judge Atkins reviewed the state court's adjudication of the merits of Olson's claims to determine if it:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). However, "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). As noted by the Magistrate Judge, it is not the role of the reviewing court "to reexaminestate-court determinations on state-law questions." Id. at 68 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). Rather, "[i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. Additionally, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus "simply because the state court issued a decision that erroneously or incorrectly applies clearly established law; rather, the state court's application of law must have been objectively unreasonable." Ware v. Renico, 371 F.3d 862, 865 (6th Cir. 2004).

Olson's brief to object to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation begins with a verbatim repetition of the extensive factual background in the petition. Compare DE 23 at 2-18 to DE 1 at 4-20. This is followed by a lengthy and repeated discourse on habeas corpus law. See DE 23 at 19-41; DE 1 at 23-45. Another eight pages of factual background follow. DE 23 at 41-48. None of this discussion is tied to the Magistrate Judge's Report. In fact, the Report is first mentioned on page 48 of the so-called "Objections." One has to wonder why counsel thought this lengthy discourse was the best use of the Court's valuable time.

A. Application of the AEDPA

Olson's first objection is that the AEDPA should not have been applied to her case because the Supreme Court of Kentucky relied only on Kentucky case law in upholding the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. Accordingly, she asserts that her 14th Amendment claim was not adjudicated on the merits and should be reviewed de novo.

The Kentucky Supreme Court applied the test for sufficiency of the evidence set forth in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W. 2d. 186 (Ky. 1991). Benham asks whether the evidence is sufficient for "a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty...." Id. at 1887. The federal test set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) is whether, based on the evidence, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elementsof the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319. The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that nothing in the state court opinion suggested any variance from the Jackson standard in ruling on Olson's claim. Additionally, as the Magistrate Judge noted, a number of courts in this Circuit have found an application of the Benham standard to be substantially equivalent to that of Jackson, such that the Kentucky Supreme Court adjudicated both the state and federal sufficiency of the evidence claims. DE 20 at 6. Bowen v. Haney, 622 F. Supp. 2d 516, 547 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (This Court finds no indication that the Kentucky Supreme court departed from the Jackson test for insufficiency of the evidence in applying Benham); Longwell v. Arnold, 559 F. Supp. 2d 759, 767 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (The Supreme Court of Kentucky applied a similar standard as the Supreme Court used in Jackson....); Hodge v. Haeberlin, No. 04-cv-185-KKC, 2006 WL 1895526 at *39 (E.D. Ky. June 10, 2006) ("The words of the Supreme Court of Kentucky [citing Benham] clearly mirror the constitutional standards set by the Supreme Court of the United States."); see also Matthews v. Parker, 651 F.3d 489, 503 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the analysis for a failure to direct a verdict and an insufficiency of the evidence claim are "materially identical" and that both Benham and Jackson "scrutinize whether any rational trier of fact would find the element in question beyond a reasonable doubt."), rev'd on other grounds, Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ___, 2012 WL 2076341 (June 11, 2012).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Next, Olson argues that the "Magistrate Judge did not correctly apply Jackson to the facts of this case." DE 23 at 54. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that sufficiency of the evidence claims "face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference. First, on direct appeal, 'it is the responsibility of the jury - not the court - to decide what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.'" Coleman v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012),(quoting Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, ___, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011)). "And second, on habeas review, 'a federal court may not overturn a state court decision rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable."'" Id. (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)). See also Nali v. Phillips, 681 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 2012) (The Jackson "standard requires deference to the jury's verdict and to the state court's review of that verdict."). The Magistrate Judge correctly applied the Jackson standard and AEDPA deference when considering Olson's challenges to the evidence.

Olson does not object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion regarding evidence that David Dressman and/or Timothy Crabtree killed Diane Snellen, Olson's mother, by stabbing and that they caused the death intentionally. She objects to the evidence of her complicity with respect to proof of a voluntary act of assistance and proof of intent. DE 23 at 55-60. The Magistrate Judge carefully reviewed the evidence and found that "the Kentucky Supreme Court's determination was not clearly contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the constitutional standard articulated in Jackson." DE 20 at 14. This Court agrees there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury verdict and the Magistrate Judge correctly recommended that the habeas petition be denied.

Olson argues that her comment to Walter Martin could have been an example of proper mourning, rather than an admission of guilt, and "does not lend itself to an interpretation that it was...