Loomis v. Board of Ed. of School Dist. of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 22 March 1954 |
| Citation | 376 Pa. 428,103 A.2d 769 |
| Parties | LOOMIS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DIST. OF PHILADELPHIA. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Action by teacher against Board of Education to recover pay for 15 days in each of two years during which teacher was engaged in active military training as member of a reserve component of the United States army. The Court of Common Pleas, No. 6 of the County of Philadelphia, December Term, 1951, No. 2346 Louis E. Levinthal, J., entered judgment from which the defendant appealed. The Superior Court, No. 33, October Term 1953, William E. Hirt, J., affirmed, 98 A.2d 416, 173 Pa.Super. 597, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court No 342, January Term, 1953, Chidsey, J., held, inter alia, that statute entitling public employees to leave of absence without loss of pay for period not to exceed 15 days within any one year for service with reserve component of armed forces of the United States, was not invalid as special legislation.
Judgment affirmed.
C. Brewster Rhoads, Edward B. Soken, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Augustus S. Ballard, Pepper, Bodine, Stokes & Hamilton, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Lewis F. Adler, Harrisburg, for Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n, amicus curiae.
Before STERN, C. J., and STEARNE, JONES, BELL, CHIDSEY, MUSNANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
The plaintiff, a teacher in the Philadelphia public schools who was also a a member of a Reserve Component of the United States Army, brought an action in assumpsit against the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia to recover pay for 15 days in each of the years 1950 and 1951 during which periods he was engaged in field training ordered by competent military authority and absent from his professional duties. The action was brought under the Act of July 12, 1935, P.L. 677, 65 P.S. § 114, which provides: ‘ All officers and employes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or of any political subdivision thereof, members, either enlisted or commissioned, of any reserve component of the United States Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating on all days not exceeding fifteen in any one year during which they shall, as members of such reserve components, be engaged in the active service of the United States or in field training ordered or authorized by the Federal forces.’
Plaintiff's complaint set forth that he was comployed by defendant in 1947 by written contract covering a school term of ten months and continuously thereafter, performing his duties in each school year, commencing September 1st to June 30th, following; that throughout such time he was a lieutenant colonel in a Reserve Component of the United States Army; that he made written request for military leave of absence in accordance with the Act of 1935 covering a period in June of 1949 which was granted by defendant with full pay; that he made similar requests for military leave of absence covering periods commencing in June, 1950 and June, 1951, respectively, which were granted by defendant, but with full loss of salary for the 15 days in each year when he was absent from his professional duties as a teacher. He claimed the proportionate part of his salary covering the 15 day period in each of the years 1950 and 1951.
The defendant filed preliminary objections, claiming the complaint failed to state a cause of action, that the Act of 1935 violates Article III, § 7 of the Constitution, P.S., of the Commonwealth as a special law granting to individuals a special or exclusive privilege or immunity and Article III, § 18 as a provision for payment of public funds for unauthorized purposes, and that since plaintiff was not required to perform any duties as an employe of the defendant during the periods from July 1st to August 31st, inclusive, in the years 1950 and 1951, he received adequate leave of absence without loss of pay during those years and the defendant was not required by the Act of 1935 to grant any further leave to plaintiff without loss of pay.
The lower court dismissed defendant's preliminary objections. The defendant did not file an answer and judgment in the amount of plaintiff's claim was taken against it for want of an answer. On appeal the Superior Court affirmed the lower court, 173 Pa.Super. 597, 98 A.2d 416, and we allowed this appeal because of the constitutional question involved.
Nothing but a clear violation of the Constitution will justify the judiciary in nullifying a legislative enactment. Every presumption must be indulged in its favor, and one who claims an Act is unconstitutional has a very heavy burden of proof. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 316 Pa. 65, 173 A. 289; Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 A. 80, 37 A.L.R. 1515; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. 164.When a statute is challenged as prohibited special legislation, the reasonableness of the classification made is for the Legislature in the first instance; the duty of the court is limited to considering whether the Legislature had any reasonable ground for making it. Chester County Institution District v. Commonwealth, 341 Pa. 49, 17 A.2d 212; National Transit Co. v. Boardman, Secretary of Revenue, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239.
Our decisions have held that the Legislature may legislate for public employes as a class. Commonwealth v, Perkins, 342 Pa. 529, 21 A.2d 45; Commonwealth ex rel. Graham to Use of Markham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701, 120 A.L.R. 777; Retirement Board of Allegheny County v. McGovern, Commissioners, 316 Pa. 161, 174 A. 400.In Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, supra, it was decided that preference of veterans in applications for civil service did not render a statute invalied as special or class legislation, holding that the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the advantages of discipline, experience and service incident to military activity could be expected to ensure to the benefit of the public. Chief Justice Kephart, speaking for an unanimous Court, 333 Pa. at page 573, 3 A.2d at page 704 said: * * *’ (Emphasis supplied.)
The Legislature has recognized the worth of military service on the part of public employes by the enactment of the Act of 1935 in question. Courts may not question the wisdom of the legislative classification unless there can be found no reasonable ground for it. ‘ * * * The test is not wisdom, but good faith in the classification.’ Seabolt v. Commissioners of Northumberland County, 187 Pa. 318, 41 A. 22, 23.And see 12 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 495.
In support of its position, appellant cites Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382, and Kurtz v. Pittsburgh, 346 Pa. 362, 31 A.2d 257, 145 A.L.R. 1134.In the O'Neill case it was held unconstitutional to prefer veterans over nonveterans for advancement to higher public positions as distinguished from original appointments, because it placed too high a valuation on past military service, and, through loss of incentive on the part of nonveteran employes equally skilled and qualified for promotion, the preference created was in fact prejudicial to the public service. The Act of 1935 now under consideration cannot be said to appreciably affect the incentive of other employes. Jthey enjoy, presently and potentially, the same positional status and efficiency rating as the reservists, with equal opportunity for advancement. Since we held in the Schmid case that preference to veterans as to initial appointments as to government employment was justified because the advantages of discipline, experience and service incident to the past military activity of veterans could be expected to ensure to the benefit of the public, clearly it must be held that the current intensive military training of a reservist similarly contributes to his efficiency as a public employe. And since the taxpayer thus benefits, the two weeks of military training granted to reservists without loss of pay cannot be held to be a mere gratuity falling within the prohibition of Section 18 of Article III of the Constitution.
In the Kurtz case the Court passed...
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